pro

Please read the instructors carefully

1. Use of Case Studies on Assignment to Illustrate Concepts

Literature for two major case study programmes for Olympics 2012 and Crossrail (or
Elizabeth Line) have been provided on the Moodle site and used to illustrate the
Management of Programmes and Portfolio concepts/theories on the module. These
can be used and referenced to support assignments or alternatively if one other case
of your own choice can be used however it must be sourced from ‘real life’
programmes or portfolios and fully referenced.

project for further context. You will have the opportunity to critique current practice in
project management drawing on any of the concepts from this module to provide
justification for your answers for this assessment which must be supported by evidence
from the literature (academic books and journal articles). You may also cite from
professional bodies and Institute websites e.g. Association of Project Management
(APM), Project Management Institute (PMI), Chartered Management Institute (CMI),
Government and Industry websites but there must be a balance with the use of
academic references. However, use of ‘wikis’ is to be avoided.

2. This assignment covers all learning outcomes (LOs) for this Module which are:

1. Evaluate the significance of Programme and Portfolio management.

2. Appraise the significance of developing and maintaining a comprehensive business case
for a programme.

3. Critically review the significance of benefits management and its impact on programmes

4. Synthesise, the latest research on programme management and portfolio management.

3. Assignment Objectives (Your Task):

1- Critically review the role of Governance and Methods (i.e. Managing Successful
Programmes and Management of Portfolios) to deliver Programmes and Portfolios in an
effective way. Support your answer with literature and best practice for Managing Successful
Programmes and Management of Portfolios (LO4).

(Use case study programmes for Olympics 2012 in London)

– Synthesise, the latest research on programme management and portfolio
management.

2- Evaluate the significance of Projects, Programmes and Portfolios and their management in
relation to the successful delivery of an organisation’s strategy. Justify your answer supported
by evidence from the literature and provide fully referenced ‘real-life’ case example to
illustrate (LO1, LO4).

(Use case study programmes for Olympics 2012 in London)

– Evaluate the significance of Programme and Portfolio management.

– Synthesise, the latest research on programme management and portfolio
management

3- Appraise the significance of developing and maintaining a business case with robust
benefits for a programme. Please ensure you illustrate your theory using a fully referenced
‘real-life’ case (L02, LO3, LO4).

(Use case study programmes for Crossrail Elizabeth Line in London)

– Appraise the significance of developing and maintaining a comprehensive business
case for a programme.

– Critically review the significance of benefits management and its impact on
programmes

– Synthesise, the latest research on programme management and portfolio
management.

• Please in Objective 3 use this Information Presented in the Business Case is along 5 dimensions
APMBoKV7 (2019): p44-p45

• – Strategic Context – The compelling case for change
• – Economic Context – Return on investment based investment appraisal of options
• – Commercial Approach – Sourcing Strategy and Procurement Strategy
• – Financial Case – Affordability to the Organisation
• – Management Approach – Roles, Governance* structure, life cycle

4. Assignment format:

Discussion paper of 3,250 words (+/-10%) (excluding diagrams, references and
appendices). Use a report structure with a contents page, headings, sub-headings,
page numbers, an introduction, main body of the work covering objectives 1, 2, 3 and
4, conclusion, list of References and Appendices.

Students should use APA 7 for referencing.

5. Instructor

Needs wider evidence from the academic literatures literature to support your arguments,
including relevant theory and constructs covered from this Module for the theoretical
underpinning.”

Ensure that all of the statements, which you make, are supported by evidence. Critical
analysis.

You may consult other credible sources including professional websites, Industry websites and
government sources.

More accurate referencing is required and wider use of sources. In particular please make sure
that your online sources are correctly cited in APA 7 style using the name of the webpage
rather than the website address.

Case studies for the assignment can be used to illustrate concepts and assessment and these
Crossrail (Elizabeth line); plus one other but MUST be FULLY referenced

Use in the Introduction:

-According to the paper what is the difference between Governance and management?

-What are the key differences between projects, programs and portfolios?

-What are the two approaches to governance?

-How might conflicts/contradictions arise between the management and governance of projects
and programmes?

-Define Governance and deferent view

Use in the conclusion:

-What you did summarized
-What you found
-What dose it mean

Managing Programmes and
Portfolios (MPP) Module M32494

Interactive Workshop:
Lessons Learned from

London Olympics 2012 –
Programme Management

London Olympics 2012

• Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) established by an Act of Parliament April
2006 – public funded body to resource, procure and deliver major
construction works

• Bid cost £4.036bn to Final cost £9.325bn increase of 131%

• Fixed deadline for Olympic Games Opening Ceremony July 2012

SUMMARY

6 THE BUDGET FOR THE LONDON 2012 OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC GAMES

6 This increase in cost estimates, along with a
reduction in anticipated private sector funding, means
that public sector funding for the Games has increased
by £5.906 billion (Figure 2). The costs to be covered by
this increase in funding include £1.173 billion of tax3
which will ultimately flow back to the Exchequer. On the
basis that the Department has confirmed to us that the tax
liabilities associated with the Games will be met entirely
from Exchequer funding, this means that the net increase
in public sector funding should be £4.733 billion. The
funding increase of £5.906 billion includes contingency of
£2.747 billion which the Department has made clear to us
may not be used in full.

7 The main reasons for the difference between the cost
estimates at the time of the bid and the budget announced
in March 2007 are:

n A new provision of £2.747 billion for programme
contingency (including £337 million of tax).

n A new provision of £836 million for tax, following
the Treasury’s confirmation that the Olympic
Delivery Authority would be liable to VAT in the
normal manner and unable to reclaim it (which,
although a real cost to the Games, will flow back to
the Exchequer).

n A new estimate of £600 million for policing and
wider security (which remains subject to further
oversight and scrutiny).

n An increase in the Olympic Delivery Authority’s
programme delivery budget from £16 million to
£570 million (the original estimate of £16 million

at the time of the bid was based on the costs of a
small Urban Development Corporation and did
not include the costs of complex site logistics, or
a delivery partner to undertake programme and
project management which the Department and the
Delivery Authority deem necessary for successful
delivery of the venues and infrastructure).

n A decrease in anticipated private sector funding
from £738 million to £165 million. This excludes,
however, the significant increase in the estimated
private sector contribution to the Olympic Village
which is outside of the budget. It also excludes any
receipts from future sales of land and property after
the Games, out of which the Government has since
estimated, in June 2007, that £675 million would be
available for repayment to the National Lottery.

8 From the outset of any programme or project it
is vital to use sound processes to establish a clear and
accurate budget. The budget should not only set out the
costs involved and the funding to meet these, but also the
main benefits to be delivered, with a clear statement of
any underlying judgements and assumptions. It enables
stakeholders to plan and progress with confidence and
certainty, and establishes a baseline against which to
assess progress and performance. A programme of the
scale, complexity and profile of the 2012 Games gives rise
to a high level of inherent risk and uncertainty, and the
need for significant judgements and assumptions about
future costs and benefits. This increases the importance of
adopting a rigorous and sound approach in establishing a
budget for the Games.

2 The difference between the estimates at the time of the bid and the March 2007 budget

Source: National Audit Office drawing on information from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport

March 2007 budget
(£ million)

9,3252

1652

9,3252

9,3253

Difference
(£ million)

6,027

(573)

5,289

5,906

Estimate at the time of the bid
(£ million)

3,2981

7381

4,0361

3,4193

Net cost of the Games to be met from public sector funding

Expected private sector contribution4

Gross cost of the Games4

Public funding available

NOTES

1 See paragraph 34 on page 15.

2 The Department told us that, should the anticipated £165 million private sector funding not materialise, this would be met from within the contingency
provision (which is included within the £9.325 billion) or from a reduction in costs. Therefore, the gross and net cost of the Games as stated here are the
same, with the £9.325 billion representing the Department’s upper limit on public funding for the Games.

3 See paragraph 37 on page 18.

4 The figure for gross cost of the Games includes the expected public sector contribution to the cost of the Olympic Village, but does not include the gross
cost of the Village itself, which is expected to be largely funded by the private sector. Similarly, the figure for expected private sector contribution does not
include the expected contribution to the cost of the Village.

3 £1.173 billion is the sum of £836 million and £337 million as set out in notes 5 and 6 to Figure 6 on page 16.

The budget for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, National Audit Office HC 612 Session 2006-7 20 July 2007

Olympic Delivery Authority Core Costs

• Olympic Delivery Authority Costs
– Building New Venues and facilities (including legacy

conversion)
– Upgrading and enhancing existing facilities (i.e. at

Weymouth)
– Transport Infrastructure
– Programme Management
– Site Security

• Infrastructure and Regeneration Costs (preparing ground to
enable construction)

• Staging Costs (broadcasting, sponsorship)
• Wide Costs

– Improving transport links in London
– Policing to support games in London

The budget for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, National Audit Office HC 612 Session 2006-7 20 July 2007

The Nature of Different Programme Types

2 Guide to developing the Programme Business Case

Chapter 1: Introduction

Figure 1. The different nature of different programme types
Focus of programme

Making and delivering
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External or societal changeOrganisational change

N
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o
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p
ro

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ra

m
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Vision-led, Outcome driven,
Ambiguity and clarity co-exist,

Proactive adjustment to scope, loose levers

Vision-led, Benefits driven,
Good clarity / Some ambiguity,

Reactive adjustment to scope, clear levers

Specification-led, Output driven,
High clarity / Low ambiguity,

Reactive adjustment to scope.

Making and delivering: where the change being delivered is based on making and delivering
new facilities, the programme will tend to be led by the specification of the outputs required –
Figure 2, bottom left. There will be relatively low levels of ambiguity about what the programme
is to deliver. The scope will be reasonably well defined and adjusted according to circumstances.

Organisational change: where the change is more focused on changing the way an organisation
works, the programme will tend to be led by a vision of the desired outcome and the benefits
it will deliver – Figure 2, (middle). There will typically be some level of ambiguity about what the
precise changes are and how they will be delivered; but there are fairly clear levers that can be
employed to achieve the vision.

External or societal change: where the change is focused on interventions and improvements
in society, the programme will be driven by the desired outcome, but will typically be highly
ambiguous and complex to define in terms of what it will involve – Figure 2, (top right). The
scope may need to be adjusted as ambiguities are clarified over time.

Developing a Programme Business Case applies to all types of programmes and needs to be
undertaken by trained people who have the capabilities and competencies to undertake the
tasks involved.

How does a programme align with the strategic planning process?
A programme is a major undertaking for most organisations and that involves significant
funding and change for the parties involved.

Figure 2 below shows a typical environment for programme management.

(HM Treasury, 2018)

Interactive Workshop

• Please read and refer to the following two
Olympic Games Learning Legacy papers on
Moodle:

– Kintrea K (2012). Learning Legacy Lessons Learned from the
London 2012 Games Construction Project, Programme
Management, Olympic Delivery Authority, April 2012.

– Mackenzie I and Davis A (2012). Learning Legacy Lessons
Learned from the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games
Construction Programme, Olympic Delivery Authority, October
2012.

For Discussion in Groups

1. What was the Olympic Delivery Authority’s (ODA’s) approach to
programme management? and what was key in each of these
areas?

2. The ODA appointed a Delivery Partner (DP) – What experience did
they require from the appointed DP? what was their role in the
programe? And why did ODA have this as a preferred approach.

3. Explain why the Olympics was a programme? (refer to the
definition of a programme) and What were the key elements of the
programme?

4. What 4 areas were critical within Programme Management?

5. What were the reasons for the cost increases (bid v outturn)?

6. Were the Olympic Games a success? And why?

Reflection

• Reflect on the Case Study in the context of
Programme Managament and the material covered

Managing Programmes and
Portfolios (MPP) Module M32494

Projects, Programmes & Portfolios

Objectives LO1

• Evaluate the Significance of a Programme and
Portfolio

What is a Project? & Project Management?

• Project = A temporary organisation, usually
existing for a much shorter time, which will deliver
one or more outputs in accordance with a
specific business case. A particular project may
or may not be part of a programme. Whereas
programmes, deal with outcomes, projects deal
with outputs” (MoP, 2011)

• Project = ”A unique, transient endeavor
undertaken to bring about change and to achieve
planned objectives” (APM, 2019).

Projects are…. (APM, 2019)

• Unique, time bound
– Uses project management techniques to focus on the key objectives

• Risk aware
– Only mitigate high priority risks

• Capital funded
– Funded by loans, investment capital etc.

• Specialist skills
– Range of skills (need is temporary)

• Create outputs
– Also know as products or deliverables

• Focussed on standard of output
– Continuous improvement of process

Project Management Definitions

• The application of processes, methods, knowledge,
skills and experience to achieve specific objectives
for change (APM,2019)

• Planning, monitoring and control of all aspects of
the project and the motivation of those involved in
it to achieve the project objectives on time and to
the specified cost, quality and performance (MoP,
2011)

Project Management (ILX MoP, 2019)

Project Management is about…

• Defining the rationale for the investment
• Capturing project requirements
• Developing project scope
• Preparing a Business Case to justify the investment
• Securing corporate agreement and funding
• Selecting the life cycle
• Developing the Deployment Baseline
• Developing and implementing the Project Management Plan
• Leading building and motivating the project team
• Managing risks, issues and changes on the project
• Controlling, monitoring and controlling progress against the plan

(schedule)
• Managing costs against the project budget
• Maintaining communications with stakeholders and the project team
• Handing Over and Closing the project in a controlled fashion when

appropriate

What is a Programme & Programme
Management?

• Programme = “A temporary, flexible organization created to
co-ordinate, direct and oversee the implementation of a set of
related projects and activities in order to deliver
outcomes and benefits related to the organization’s
strategic objectives. A programme is likely to have a life
that spans several years” (MoP, 2011).

• Programme = ”A unique, transient strategic endeavor
undertaken to achieve beneficial change and incorporating a
group of related projects and business-as-usual (activities)”
(APM, 2019).

• Programme Management = “The action of carrying out the
co-ordinated organization, direction and implementation of a
dossier of projects and transformation activities (i.e.
programme) to achieve outcomes and realise benefits of
strategic importance to the business” (MoP, 2011).

Benefits of Programme Management

• All projects are focussed on the strategy

• Projects are planned in the optimum order, recognising the dependencies
between them to minimise delays

• Project outputs are transitioned into outcomes and benefits realised

• Infrastructure projects are justified by the programme business case

• Economies of scale:
– Cost reductions by procuring resources across several projects

together instead of one at a time
– One programme office to support all projects instead of multiple

project offices

• Risk managed at programme/strategic level

• Wider stakeholder community is engaged throughout.

The Nature of Different Programme Types

2 Guide to developing the Programme Business Case

Chapter 1: Introduction

Figure 1. The different nature of different programme types
Focus of programme

Making and delivering

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st
ru

ct
io

n,
En

gi
ne

er
in

g,
Sy

st
em

s
&

IT

C
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M
an

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em

en
t

Po
lic

y
&

St
ra

te
gy

External or societal changeOrganisational change

N
at

ur
e

of
p

ro
gr

am
m

e

Vision-led, Outcome driven,
Ambiguity and clarity co-exist,

Proactive adjustment to scope, loose levers

Vision-led, Benefits driven,
Good clarity / Some ambiguity,

Reactive adjustment to scope, clear levers

Specification-led, Output driven,
High clarity / Low ambiguity,

Reactive adjustment to scope.

Making and delivering: where the change being delivered is based on making and delivering
new facilities, the programme will tend to be led by the specification of the outputs required –
Figure 2, bottom left. There will be relatively low levels of ambiguity about what the programme
is to deliver. The scope will be reasonably well defined and adjusted according to circumstances.

Organisational change: where the change is more focused on changing the way an organisation
works, the programme will tend to be led by a vision of the desired outcome and the benefits
it will deliver – Figure 2, (middle). There will typically be some level of ambiguity about what the
precise changes are and how they will be delivered; but there are fairly clear levers that can be
employed to achieve the vision.

External or societal change: where the change is focused on interventions and improvements
in society, the programme will be driven by the desired outcome, but will typically be highly
ambiguous and complex to define in terms of what it will involve – Figure 2, (top right). The
scope may need to be adjusted as ambiguities are clarified over time.

Developing a Programme Business Case applies to all types of programmes and needs to be
undertaken by trained people who have the capabilities and competencies to undertake the
tasks involved.

How does a programme align with the strategic planning process?
A programme is a major undertaking for most organisations and that involves significant
funding and change for the parties involved.

Figure 2 below shows a typical environment for programme management.

(HM Treasury, 2018)

Project and Programme Management
(ILX MoP, 2019)

Coal Power Station to Nuclear:
Outputs & Outcomes (ILX MoP, 2019)

• Outputs = Tangible or intangible product delivered by a project (i.e. deliverables or product).

One project concerned with buying land, another produce plans for a new power station

• Outcomes = Changed behaviour that results from use of an output and leads to realisation of a benefit.

Instead of burning coal to generate electricity we are using nuclear energy – benefit to reduce Co2

Projects v Programmes (APM, 2019)

Programmes Projects

Tend to be long term endeavours Shorter time frame

Based on achieving a strategic vision Focussed on delivering outputs on
time, on cost to the required standard

Has a business case

Has a business case but
infrastructure/enabling projects rely in
the programme business case for
justification

Focussed on creating outcomes and
benefits Focussed on delivering outputs

Greater ability deliver economies of
scale

Less ability to deliver any economy of
scale

Wider group of stakeholders Restricted group of stakeholders

Manages the dependencies between
projects

Manages the dependencies within
projects

Situations where Programmes could be used…

• Large construction project:
– High speed 2 (HS2) rail

• Split into different projects land aquisition, tunnel
construction, signaling, rolling stock, stations and local
infrastructure (access roads).

• Local Community Initiative:
– To provide stronger, greener, safer communities (vision)

• Split into different projects for street lighting, street furniture,
health awareness and community policing.

• Organisational change:
– Virgin and O2 merged in a 50:50 Joint Venture in June 2021 with

a programme to rationalize operational departments of both
organisations

• Split into different projects for marketing, cost saving by merging call
centres, combining technologies, rebranding, sale.

What is a Porfolio? & Portfolio Management?

• Portfolio = “The totality of an organization’s investment in
the changes required to achieve its strategic objectives “ (MoP,
2011).

• Portfolio = “A Portfolio of projects and/or programmes used to
structure and manage investments at an organizational or
functional level to optimize strategic benefits or operational
efficiency” (APM, 2019).

• Portfolio Management “The totality of an organization’s
investment (or segment thereof) in the changes required to
achieve its strategic objectives” (MoP, 2011).

• Portfolio management “The selection, prioritisation and
control of an organisation’s projects and programmes in line with
its strategic objectives and capacity to deliver’ (APM, 2019)

Portfolio Management (ILX MoP, 2019)

Typical Environment for Portfolio and Programme
Management

3Guide to developing the Programme Business Case

Chapter 1: Introduction

Figure 2
Internal or External operating environment

Political, Economic, Sociological, Technological

Influence and Shape

Define Scope and Prioritise

Initiate, Align and Monitor

Implement and Deliver

Bring About

Policies, Strategies, Initiatives and Targets

Programmes

Projects and related activities

New or Transformed Business Operations Services

Outcomes Achieved and Benefits Realised

Organisations achieve their vision and mission through business strategies, policies,
initiatives and targets that are influenced and shaped by the political, economic, sociological,
technological, and legal environment in which they operate.

These business strategies consist of strategic portfolios that scope, define and prioritise the
programmes needed to deliver the agreed business changes, outcomes and benefits.

The programmes within these strategic portfolios, in turn, initiate, align and monitor the
projects and activities required to deliver the necessary outputs. These outputs may consist
of new products and services, new processes and service capabilities, or changes to business
operations. But it is not until the projects deliver and implement the required outputs into
business operations, to improve organisational capabilities and achieve outcomes, that the full
benefits of the programme can be achieved.

A continual process of alignment is required to ensure that the programme remains linked to
strategic objectives, because even as programmes are implementing changes and improvements
to business operations, they may need to respond to changes in strategies or to accommodate
new initiatives and policies.

A case study showing the relationship between strategy, programmes and projects is
provided at Annex A.

What is the importance of the Programme Business Case using the Five
Case Model?
The Programme Business Case is important because programmes will only deliver their intended
outcomes and benefits if they are properly scoped, planned and costs justified from the outset.

Preparing a programme business case using the Five Case Model provides decision makers
and stakeholders with a proven framework for structured ‘thinking’ and assurance that the
programme:

(HM Treasury, 2018)

Projects, Programmes & Portfolios

Source: (APM, p18, 2021)

Host Organisation (Strategic Objectives)

Portfolio

Business-as-usual

Projects

Programme Programme Programme

Environment

Programme

Portfolio

Situations where Portfolios could be used…

• “Levelling-up the North” – Central government needs
to establish a range of programmes and projects to
improve (see: https://www.centreforcities.org/levelling-up/#work)

– Living standards
– R&D
– Transport Infrastructure
– Education
– Health
– Well being
– Housing
– Crime
– Local Leadership

Situations where Portfolios could be used…
(Rayner & Reiss, 2013)

• A building supplies merchant decides to expand from 8th to 4th

largest chain in the country – add home DIY and services to their
business historically focused on the building trade.

• Decided to establish 3 programmes:
– Store expansion programme

• Objective to increase from 40 to 70 stores
– Home services programme

• To launch a range of services to home owners
– Fitted kitchens and bathrooms

– Manufacturing programme
• Manufacture certain product lines previously bought in

– Would mean factory building, production line,
warehousing, stock control plus new distribution

• Other small projects included:
• IT/MIS, Human Resources, Accounts, Larger carpark

Characteristics of Portfolios, Programmes and
Projects

Aspect Project Management Programme Management Portfolio Management

Scope Narrow, focused on delivery of
defined products.

Wide scope focused on delivery of
capability that will make possible
realization of expected benefits.

All of initiatives (programmes &
projects) for the organization as a
whole.

Success
Criteria

On-time, on-budget, on-
specification creation of
defined produces.

Realisation of expected business
benefits.

Overall contribution to the
organization’s strategy of its
complete portfolio of programmes
and projects.

Timescale Time needed to create and
deliver defined products
typically expressed in months.

Time needed to create the new
capability and transition activities –
typically years.

Ongoing business as usual activity
with no anticipated end date.

Approach to
change

Projects should be clearly
defined and change strictly
controlled to minimize impact
on TCQ.

Change is inevitable and embraced
with impact reviewed against the
business case. Frequently
uncertainties at start. Leadership
should focus on constant learning
and refinement.

Objectives is to structure portfolio
so as to optimize the organistion’s
benefits against the total
investment being made and risk
taken.

Typical
Planning

Detailed planning to manage
delivery of the defined
products.

High level plans, providing guidance
and oversight of component
projects, focus on independencies of
projects and resolution of conflicts.

Overall processes and
communications to establish
contributions and costs of the
whole portfolio.

Typical
Controls

Monitor and control tasks to
ensure on-budget, on-time
and on-specification delivery
of defined products.

Monitor component projects and on-
going work through governance
structures.

Monitor aggregate performance of
whole portfolio, in terms of
benefits realized and contribution
to organizational objectives.

Rayner and Reiss (2013, p18)

References

• APM (2019) APM Body of Knowledge Seventh edition, Association of
Project Management, Princess Risborough, Buckinghamshire.

• APM (2021) APM Project Management Qualification Study Guide,
Princess Risborough, Buckinghamshire.

• HM Treasury (2018) Guide to Developing The Programme Business
Case.

• ILX MoP (2019) Management of Portfolios MoP, User Guide, V1.7.

• MoP (2011) Management of Portfolios 2011 Edition, AXELOS Limited.

• Rayner P & Reiss G (2013) Portfolio and Programme Management
Demystified – Managing Multiple Projects Successfully, Routeledge.

Managing Programmes and Portfolios
(MPP) Module M32494

Governance, Methodologies and Methods –
Workshop

For Discussion in Groups

1) What was the approach to governance on the London Olympics
2012 case study?

2) Why was programme governance and assurance critical to the
London Olympics 2012?

Be prepared to present back to the wider group.

Managing Programmes and Portfolios
(MPP) Module M32494

Developing Capability – Workshop

Managing Programmes and Portfolios
(MPP) Module M32494

Leadership, Challenges and Leading Programmes – Workshop

Managing Programmes and Portfolios
(MPP) Module M32494

Stakeholder Engagement – Workshop

Managing Programmes and Portfolios
(MPP) Module M32494

Projects in Context – Workshop

For Discussion in Groups

1) What is the importance of reviews and audits in the delivery of a project or programme?

2) How was project and programme monitoring undertaken on the London 2012 Olympics
case?

3) How have reviews and audits impacted on the delivery of the London 2012 Olympics?
Provide evidence from the case.

Please review the Learning Legacy documents by Kintrea & the APM and McKenzie & Davies
to inform your discussion.

Be prepared to present back to the wider group

White Paper

The Functions of Governance

1 www.mosaicprojects.com.au

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License.

For more White Papers see: https://mosaicprojects.com.au/PMKI.php

Over the last decade or two, governance has been an

emerging area of interest, growing in importance and the

focus of increasing legislative interest.

The objectives of governance were defined in 2002 by Sir

Adrian Cadbury and in 2004 by the OECD. The objective

of ‘good governance’ adapted from the definition by Sir

Adrian Cadbury (2002) is generally accepted as: “……

holding the balance between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals. The

governance framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require

accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests

of individuals, the organisation and society”.

The necessary principles and practices needed to implement governance have also been thought through and

defined, probably the most comprehensive being the Australian Institute of Company Directors ‘Corporate

Governance Framework1’.

What’s missing is a clear description of the ‘functions of governance’ similar to the widely accepted

‘functions of management’ developed by Henri Fayol (1841 – 1925). Fayol defined the five functions of

management in his 1916 book Administration Industrielle et Generale, as:

M1 To forecast and plan,

M2 To organise

M3 To command or direct (lead)

M4 To coordinate

M5 To control (French: contrôller: in the sense that a manager must receive feedback about a process

in order to make necessary adjustments and must analyse the deviations.).

Management undertakes these functions through management structures and committees such as project

control boards. A more detailed discussion of the functions and principles of management is contained in

our White Paper: WP1094 The Functions of Management2 Given these functions of management are still

generally accepted more than 100 years after their publication; they cannot also be the functions of

governance (assuming governance and management are different).

The Six Functions of Governance

Governance is the action of governing an organisation by using and regulating influence to direct and control

the actions and affairs of management and others3. It is the exclusive responsibility of the ‘governing body’,

1 For more on the AICD ‘Company Directors, the Corporate Governance Framework ‘ see:

http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-Resource-Centre/Publications/Company-Director-magazine/A-
framework-for-good-director-practice

2 See WP1094 The Functions of Management:
https://www.mosaicprojects.com.au/WhitePapers/WP1094_Defining_Management.pdf

3 For more on the definition of governance see:
https://mosaicprojects.wordpress.com/2014/04/21/defining-governance-what-the-words-mean/

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the person, or group accountable for the performance and conformance of the organisation (in a commercial

organisation, the Board of Directors)4.

The functions of governance were originally defined in Dr. Lynda Bourne’s article The Six Functions of

Governance5. They are:

• G1 – Determining the objectives of the organisation expressed through its vision and mission

statements and implemented through its strategic plan. The objectives define the purpose of the

organisation, and describe how the purpose will be fulfilled. The strategic plan is a key interface

between management and the governing body:

o The governing body determines the organisation’s objectives;

o There is shared responsibility to develop an effective strategy to achieve the objectives;

o Management is responsible for implementing the strategy through the efficient and effective

use of the organisation’s limited resources6.

• G2 – Determining the ethics of the organisation; defining what values, morals and attitudes

matter in the creation and evolution of the organisation – values rarely change. How much

importance is genuinely given to factors such a sustainability, corporate social responsibility,

customer satisfaction and stakeholder engagement over profits and short-term movements in the

share prices. Ethics are based on morals and values and define the rules or standards governing the

conduct of people within the organisation. They answer key questions about the organisation such

as: ‘what do we stand for?’, ‘what do we not want to lose?’, and ‘what do we want to be?’. The

organisation’s values should be an integral part of assessing every potential employee’s suitability

to join the organisation and where people fail to live up to the values require appropriate actions to

help the person change or exit the organisation.

The ethical standards of any organisation are set by the behaviours of people at the top and cascade

down the hierarchy7. Some core values underpinning the organisation’s ethics both internally and

externally may include:

o Integrity, steadfastly applying high moral principles.

o Honesty, being truthful and open.

o Competence, ensuring our advice, opinion and decisions are based on experience and facts.

o Conformance, to all relevant legal, regulatory and other standards deemed necessary or

important by the wider society within which the organisation operates. Conformance should

go beyond merely complying with the ‘letter of the law’ to embrace the spirit of the

documents and aspirations of the wider society.

o Benevolence, treating all with respect and kindness.

o Sustainability, protecting the wider environmental and social spheres within which the

organisation operates (ESG8).

4 For more on corporate governance see: https://www.mosaicprojects.com.au/WhitePapers/WP1033_Governance.pdf

5 Bourne, L. The Six Functions of Governance. PM World Journal Vol. III, Issue XI – November 2014.

Download from: https://www.mosaicprojects.com.au/PDF_Papers/P188_Six_Functions_of_Governance.pdf

6 The efficient use of resources includes avoiding over commitment through the use of prioritised decision making and
selection processes such as project portfolio management to achieve the optimum overall outcome for the organisation.

7 For more on the ethical foundations of policy see:

8 For more on ESG see:
https://mosaicprojects.wordpress.com/2014/10/29/stakeholders-generate-profits-for-shareholders/

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o Stewardship9, protecting resources under your control for the future.

• G3 – Creating the culture of the organisation: this is a more subtle process and deals with the way

people interact with each other. Culture is the environment in which work gets done, and is

embedded in the people working for the organisation, it naturally evolves as a company grows or

changes and requires continuous nurturing and management. The governing body decides on the

culture it wants and influences the operating culture of the organisation through the people it

appoints to executive positions. The most important function of a governing body is appointing the

organisation’s executive management team, and the guidelines they impose on the executive

defining how they will in turn select and appoint other levels of management and the

organisation’s staff, contractors and suppliers. Culture is created by people.

Governmentality10, the willingness of people to ‘be governed’ and to support the governance

system is at the centre of an effective culture. Other aspects include: how supportive the

organisation is, how innovative, how risk seeking/averse, how open and transparent, how mature

and professional, and how tolerant is it. It is impossible to have innovation as a key objective,

which requires sensible risk taking if the organisation’s culture is intolerant of failure. Some

important aspects of a constructive culture include:

o Leadership

o Openness and transparency

o Fairness

o Enterprise and attitudes to sensible risk taking

o Commitment both to the organisations and its values

o Confidence

o Respect

o Accountability and responsibility

• G4 – Designing and implementing the governance framework for the organisation. The

governing body is accountable for the performance of the organisation, and retains overall

responsibility for the organisation it governs; however, in most organisations the governing body

cannot undertake all of the work of governance itself. To ensure the efficient governance of the

organisation various responsibilities need to be delegated to people within the organisations

management11. The governance framework defines the principles, structures, enabling factors and

9 Stewardship is an important governance concept. It includes:

• Fealty: A propensity to view the assets and resources at one’s command as trust for future generations rather
than available for selfish exploitation.

• Charity: A willingness to put the interests of others ahead of ones own.

• Prudence: A commitment to safeguard the future even as one takes advantage of the present.

• Responsibility: The obligation to undertake actions to protect and make proper use of the assets and
resources being governed.

• Accountability: Accepting responsibility for the systemic consequences of one’s actions and decisions.

• Equity: A desire to see that rewards are distributed fairly, based on contribution rather than power.

10 See R. Müller, S.Pemsel, J.Shao. Organisational enablers for project governance and governmentality in project-
based organisations. International Journal of Project Management (Pre press).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2014.07.008

11 The governance and management structures needed to effectively govern and mange projects and programs is
discussed in The management of project management: A conceptual framework for project governance, see:
https://www.mosaicprojects.com.au/PDF_Papers/P162_The_Management_of_Project_Management_IJPM.pdf

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interfaces through which the organisation’s governance arrangements will operate by delegating

appropriate levels of authority and responsibility to managers and other entities.

• G5 – Ensuring accountability by management:

o For the ethical and cultural environment, they develop and maintain within the organisation.

o For the stewardship and proper use of the resources entrusted to their care.

o For the accomplishment of the strategic plan and fulfilment of the organisation’s objectives.

• G6 – Ensuring compliance by the organisation: providing relevant stakeholders with assurance of

the organisation’s compliance with its regulatory, statutory and legal obligations, as well as

monitoring and directing the performance of its management and staff as they work towards

achieving the organisation’s objectives, working within the organisation’s ethical and cultural

framework and supporting the values established by the governing body.

To implement the functions outlined above12, the governing body (in order of development) has to:

• Understand the concepts of good governance – concepts are abstract ideas framed in general terms;

• Determine the objectives of both the organisation and its governance;

• Determine the respective functions of both the governance and management systems13;

• Establish the principles of governance to be used, these are the fundamental propositions that

define the way system of governance will operate, and acceptable behaviours for the organisation;

• Document the policies that are to be used to implement the principles;

• Work with management to establish appropriate procedures, processes and practices to be used by

the organisation;

• Oversight the specific methods and tools (methodologies) used by management and other people

within the organisation to achieve its objectives14.

• Implement accountability (usually various forms of reporting and meetings with management),

and assurance functions (usually various forms of internal and external audit15) that provide the

governing body with the necessary degree of confidence that the organisation’s management and

workforce (including external suppliers and contractors) are in full compliance with the

governance system described above. The governing body needs the skills and structure such as

properly resourced ‘board sub-committees’ to be able to receive, and understand the significance

of, the various management and audit reports and to validate the effectiveness of its management,

and its auditors and the audit processes.

12 These ‘functions of governance’ are very similar to, and support the independently developed Carver Policy

Governance® Model, see: http://www.carvergovernance.com/model.htm

13 For more on management and governance systems see:
https://www.mosaicprojects.com.au/WhitePapers/WP1084_Governance_Systems.pdf

14 The definitions of these terms are discussed in Governance processes and terminology, see:

15 Audits take many forms and require different types of expertise to be effective. Some of the more important include:
– Financial and taxation audits (both legally mandated and internal compliance audits);
– Safety, risk, Intellectual Property (IP), and security audits (cyber security is an emerging area of significance);
– Various supplier and supply chain audits (usually focused on compliance with legislation outlawing practices
such as ‘the bribery of foreign officials’, ‘the use of child labour’, and ‘modern slavery’ – even if these practices
do not place the organisation in breach of the law in its home territory, they create reputational risks);
– Quality audits of all types (both internal and focused on the supply chain);
– Cultural audits (demonstrating a robust ethical culture is becoming increasingly important, this type of audit starts
by considering the ‘tone at the top’ and focuses on the ‘soft controls’ that drive behaviour throughout the
organisation.

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In a well governed organisation, the key driver for its objectives will be a clearly enunciated ‘customer value

proposition16’. By focusing on the needs of the stakeholders the organisation exists to serve17, its strategic

objectives can be refined and from this base management effort focused on activities that directly contribute

to fulfilling the organisation’s purpose, and feedback provided to the governing body on how this is being

achieved.

Mapping the functions of governance and management:

The governing body appoints, provides direction to and oversees the functioning of the organisation’s

management and makes the ‘rules’ the organisation’s management and staff are expected to conform to.

Management’s job is to achieve the objectives of the organisation; working within its ethical and cultural

framework, whist complying with the ‘rules’ and providing assurance back to the governing body that this is

being accomplished. The mapping of the relationship between Fayol’s functions of management and the

functions of governance are set out below:

Management functions are assumed to be hierarchal with the governance inputs

cascading down to lower level functions.

16 Peter Drucker: “the purpose of a business is to create a customer”. The purpose of any organisation is to create value

for the stakeholders it exists to serve.

17 Understanding what is valuable to your stakeholders / customers is complex and involves more than simple financial
considerations. However, if the stakeholders do not feel the organisation contributes or creates value for them, they
will go elsewhere (and without customers there is no long-term possibility of the organization remaining viable). For
more on perceptions of value see: https://www.mosaicprojects.com.au/Mag_Articles/SA1038_Who_Values_Value.pdf

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Governance Functions Management Functions

G1 To determine the objectives of the organisation M1 To forecast and plan

G2 To determine the ethics of the organisation M2 To organise

G3 To create the culture of the organisation M3 To command or direct (lead)

G4 To design & implement the governance framework M4 To coordinate

G5 To ensure accountability by management M5 To control

G6 To ensure compliance by the organisation

Conclusion

The governance system and the management system are symbiotic, but whilst being mutually

interdependent, the two systems fulfil very different functions18. A well governed organisation is designed to

allow these two systems to work together to the benefit of the organisation’s overall stakeholder community.

The amount of time and effort devoted by the ‘governing body’ to compliance and accountability can be

significantly reduced if the organisation’s objectives, ethics and culture are sound.

_____________________________

First published 15th November 2014, augmented and updated.

Downloaded from Mosaic’s PMKI
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18 For more on governance and management systems see:

https://www.mosaicprojects.com.au/WhitePapers/WP1084_Governance_Systems.pdf

1

The remit and task given to CLRL was to define a preferred
scheme for Crossrail line 1 and prepare for an authorisation
process, as well as to study possible routes for a Crossrail line 2.
A  sum of £154  million was allocated for this work, with the
authorisation process expected to begin in late 2003. An  outline
‘earliest practical’ timetable (Figure  2) was included in the first
information brochure produced by CLRL to accompany its official
launch in January 2002.

1. Introduction

The £14·8 billion Crossrail project to deliver the new Elizabeth line
east–west railway across London, UK, has had a long and tortuous
gestation. The history of the project goes back so far that it cannot be
encompassed here, so this paper concentrates on the most recent and
relevant history of the scheme that starts operating in 2018.

The paper covers route option selection, consultation and design
development, starting from the creation of Cross London Rail
Links (CLRL) in 2001 and concluding with agreement to deposit
the Crossrail parliamentary bill in 2004. Information on the earlier
history can be found on the Crossrail website (Crossrail, 2017) and
in ‘CrossRail: Scope, background and feasibility’ (Fergusson, 2001).

2. Creation of CLRL

On 3 May 2001, Britain’s transport ministers Angus Macdonald
and Keith Hill announced to the houses of parliament that the
UK Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) and Transport for London
(TfL) would work together on project definition and design
development of a new cross-London rail link. The  project had
been recommended by SRA’s London East–West Study published
in December 2000 (Figure 1) and included in the London mayor’s
transport strategy in 2001.

SRA and TfL then established a joint-venture company limited
by guarantee, with a board and seconded staff drawn from both
organisations. Staff included the ‘care and maintenance’ team
from London Underground, which, since the original 1992
Crossrail parliamentary bill failed in 1994, had administered the
safeguarding directions for Crossrail and the Chelsea–Hackney
line. These had been put in place by the transport secretary to
protect the routes from conflicting development.

The company was named Cross London Rail Links (CLRL) and set
up offices at 1 Butler Place adjacent to TfL’s headquarters at Windsor
House. The first chairman of CLRL was Christopher Benson, who
had long experience in property development and the City of London,
and the chief executive was Norman Haste, who had led the project
to build the second Severn crossing and managed the preliminary
work for Heathrow Terminal 5. Two  other key appointments were
Jon Willis, formerly head of transport planning at TfL, as head of
planning and Keith Berryman, who had led the London East–West
Study work at SRA, as director of operations and development.

Crossrail project to deliver London’s
Elizabeth line: from options to
parliamentary bill
Simon Bennett BEng, FCILT, MCIPR, GMICE
Head of Learning Legacy, Crossrail Limited, London, UK

The Crossrail programme to deliver the Elizabeth line east–west railway across London, UK, was authorised by the Crossrail
Act 2008. It was the culmination of 6 years of planning and development work by an organisation called Cross London
Rail Links (CLRL), which was created for the purpose as a joint venture between the Strategic Rail Authority (succeeded
by the Department for Transport) and Transport for London. This paper explains the planning and development work,
from the creation of CLRL in 2001 until agreement was given to deposit the Crossrail parliamentary bill in 2004.

Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers
http://dx.doi.org/10.1680/jcien.17.00006
Paper 1700006
Received 09/02/2017 Accepted 27/06/2017
Keywords: history/government/infrastructure planning

Civil Engineering

Crossrail project to deliver London’s Elizabeth
line: from options to parliamentary bill
Bennett

ICE Publishing: All rights reserved

Figure 1. SRA’s London East–West Study

Civil Engineering

2

Crossrail project to deliver London’s Elizabeth
line: from options to parliamentary bill
Bennett

of the City financial district. This included significant business
and residential development in the area around Canary Wharf.
Providing greater capacity to cater for further growth in that area
was seen as a key benefit of an east–west project. In addition, the
development of the former London Underground East London line
into the London Overground network had had the effect of turning
Whitechapel into a significant transport hub.

As a result, the work to define a preferred scheme for line 1
concentrated on the route options outside the centre, with a tunnel
extending further east than the safeguarded route, and stations at
Whitechapel and Isle of Dogs being included, at least as options, in
all the routes considered.

A long list of options (Figure  3) was identified through desk
study using the team’s planning, engineering and operational
experience. These options were drawn widely so as not to miss
possible opportunities. They therefore included longer distance
routes (such as to Oxford in the west and to Clacton or Southend in
the east) as well as options to replace existing services, which had
not previously been considered in the long gestation of Crossrail
(such as taking over the Metropolitan line to Uxbridge).

The long-list options were assessed using a multi-criteria
assessment appropriate to the level of information that could
practically be identified across such a large range of options in
a short time. This provided a comparative rather than exhaustive
assessment. The criteria used were

■ cost (operating and capital)

3. Route option development

One of the findings of the London East–West Study was to
confirm that there were very few practical routes for a new east–
west tunnel through the centre of London. Essentially only the
routes already established by safeguarding directions for an east–
west Crossrail and the Chelsea–Hackney line in the early 1990s, or
a route below and along the River Thames were practical. The latter
would not offer relief to the most congested London Underground
lines and presented difficult construction issues, in particular at
stations, so was not recommended.

The Crossrail route safeguarded in the 1990s was for a scheme
running from a point just west of Paddington station to a junction
with the Great Eastern main line to the east of Liverpool Street.
Stations were included at Paddington, Bond Street, Tottenham
Court Road, Farringdon and Liverpool Street and sites for the
surface works relating to these stations, known as ‘areas of surface
interest’, were included in the safeguarding.

The effect of the safeguarding had been to sterilise a number of
potentially valuable development sites for over 20 years. It was felt
that ignoring these sites and selecting new options for demolition
would create unjustified new impacts and possible opposition so
it was decided at an early stage to stick as far as possible to the
safeguarded alignments and station locations through the central
area of London.

Since the mid-1990s the geography of London had changed
somewhat, with greater development taking place to the east

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2012 2014

Year

A
ct

iv
it

y

Develop route options
Option selection

Outline design
Prepare for consent

Consent process
Tender design

Tender preparation
Tender period

Implementation
Rail service begin

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10

Crossrail line 1
Crossrail line 2

Note: This is a draft outline of the earliest practical timetable.

Figure 2. Outline activity programme (from ‘Crossrail means…’ brochure)

To Aylesbury

High
Wycombe

Reading

Slough

Chesham

Liverpool
StreetPaddington

Watford
Junction

Heathrow

Charlton Plumstead

Shenfield

River Thames

Dartford Ebbsfleet

Southend

Grays

Stratford
Uxbridge

Alternative
routes

km 100

Figure 3. 2002 potential route options map (from stakeholder consultation document)

Civil Engineering

3

Crossrail project to deliver London’s Elizabeth
line: from options to parliamentary bill
Bennett

moved into the construction phase, but this includes the challenges
of the expectation of instant response when using social media.

The stakeholder consultation booklet was published in May
2002 and set out five corridors for possible Crossrail services,
including two alternative routes on corridor 5 between Canary
Wharf and Woolwich (Figure 5). The key attributes of each route
were set out in summary including commentary on the areas
served, interchanges which would be provided, the impact on other
services, engineering works expected to be required and the likely
benefits. The document also set out the draft appraisal framework
CLRL intended to use (see Supplementary Table 1), to seek views
on whether it was appropriate to enable a robust decision.

A workshop was held in July 2002 to consult interested and
experienced stakeholders, such as the local planning authorities,
on the appraisal framework to ensure that there would be support
for the decisions taken. A total of 151 responses were received to
the stakeholder consultation. Mostly in the form of several-page
letters, these were combined into a report that enabled the views to
be considered during the workshop process to compare the options.

The appraisal framework was applied by choosing a ‘reference
case’ project and scoring each criterion for the options as equal,
better or worse than the reference case, with three levels of positivity
or negativity. The reference case was essentially the widest extent of
the options, with routes to Watford Junction and to Reading (and
Heathrow) in the west and to Shenfield and to Ebbsfleet in the east.
The  route to Aylesbury via Amersham was not included in the

■ benefits (time savings, international connections, regeneration,
social exclusion, town centre regeneration, regional access,
strategic interchange, capacity, congestion relief)

■ environmental impacts
■ required statutory consents (railway industry and construction)
■ engineering and operational feasibility.

A series of reports was produced summarising the performance
of groups of options to the east and west of London against
these criteria. Comparing these alongside the responses from
early discussions with key stakeholders, particularly railway
organisations, enabled CLRL to identify a shortlist to take to a
more detailed appraisal. A  notable result was to confirm, as had
been recommended by the London East–West Study, that Crossrail
should be a metro railway, typically serving all stations on a route.

The alternative, providing a service that would run fast to the
central area and then stop frequently, would be suboptimal as it
would mix modes of operation and create a challenge to design a
train that could cope with high passenger numbers in the centre as
well as provide the expected comfort over long distances.

4. Route option selection

The next step was to assess the shortlisted routes using the
then relatively recently introduced ‘new approach to appraisal’.
Alongside this, a stakeholder consultation was undertaken to seek
the views of potentially affected planning authorities, but also
regional government, government and non-governmental agencies
as well as critical transport, planning, environment and business
groups. A full public consultation was not undertaken at this stage
as it would run the risk of blighting property values on routes that
might not eventually be chosen. The  decision was to arrive at a
preferred route then consult publicly with that route as the base
option.

The project published a stakeholder consultation document
(CLRL, 2002) (Figure  4), including placing it on the Crossrail
website where it could be viewed publicly. This led to some
responses to the stakeholder consultation being received from
private individuals. It  is worth noting, and may be surprising to
some, that the use of online media for communication was still in
its infancy in the early 2000s. Modern projects need to embrace
web-based communication fully, as indeed Crossrail did as it

Figure 4. Stakeholder consultation document cover

River Thames

To Aylesbury

Reading

Slough

Chesham
Watford
Junction

Heathrow

Charlton Plumstead

Shenfield

Dartford Ebbsfleet

Alternative
routes

km 100 Liverpool
StreetPaddington

Stratford

Figure 5. 2002 shortlisted corridors

Civil Engineering

4

Crossrail project to deliver London’s Elizabeth
line: from options to parliamentary bill
Bennett

would have been incompatible with providing a below-ground Crossrail
station at Woolwich due to the impact on the station environment of
diesel traction and the substandard passenger platform train stepping
distances required to provide clearance for container wagons. Given
that the Docklands Light Railway extension to Woolwich Arsenal was
about to open, providing new journey opportunities as well as additional
capacity between Woolwich and central London, it was accepted by
CLRL that Woolwich station be deleted.

After the additional consultation on the Kingston branch, a further
comparative appraisal was performed, which produced the 2003
preferred route (Figure 8). The Watford branch was dropped, which
avoided a possible issue in the days before London Overground took
over the provision of services to Watford Junction on the Watford
DC line. This was that the introduction of Crossrail services would
have significantly reduced or even removed train services at South
Hampstead and Kilburn High Road stations. The  question of a
surface or tunnelled route between the Great Western main line and
Gunnersbury remained unresolved. This was because of the cost of
the tunnel and the below-ground station at Turnham Green, and the
disruption to road and rail traffic of the surface route because of
level crossings. As a result these were both included as options.

5. Preferred option consultation

The Crossrail business case for the preferred route was
presented to the Department for Transport (DfT) and this led in
July 2003 to the transport secretary announcing a review of the
business case and at the same time calling on CLRL to carry
out public consultation. The consultation was planned to run for
12 weeks to accord with then current guidance and good practice.
Crossrail set objectives for the consultation to identify and contact
a wide range of stakeholders, to identify their concerns and, where
practical, mitigate them.

To ensure the consultation reached as many people as possible,
a public awareness campaign was held in advance to communicate
the preferred route and encourage people who wished to be
consulted to contact the project. To avoid the summer holidays, the
awareness campaign ran from mid-September and the consultation
took place from October to December 2003. By  this time it had
become clear that the surface route on corridor 6 was not practical
and the route for consultation was therefore as shown in Figure 8.

reference case because there had been significant responses to the
consultation from railway organisations, local authorities and others
that Crossrail should avoid impacting the Chiltern line, which was
performing well under a long-term franchise.

The results were presented to the Crossrail board in November
2002 with a recommendation that the reference case scheme be
pursued, including stations at Whitechapel, Isle of Dogs, the Royal
Docks and Woolwich. However, during 2002 the executive team at
the SRA had changed and, after the board meeting, the SRA was
successful in getting agreement that CLRL be instructed to
consider a sixth corridor. This would be a branch serving Kingston
via Richmond, connecting the Great Western main line at North
Pole to the North London line north of Gunnersbury, either through
a new chord at the west end of North Pole depot, or a new tunnel.
The  reason for this addition was to enable Crossrail to address
capacity issues at Waterloo station, which had become a concern to
the new team at the SRA, by attracting journeys away from stations
on the South West main line.

An addendum to the consultation document was published (Figure 6)
and the additional local authorities the new route would serve were
consulted in January 2003 (Figure 7). The SRA also wanted to enable
the Crossrail tunnel under the Thames between the North Kent line
and North London line at North Woolwich to carry freight trains. This

Heathrow Shenfield
Hayes and
Harlington

Ealing
Broadway Stratford Ilford

Manor
Park

Seven
Kings

Chadwell
Heath

Gidea
Park

Brentwood

Goodmayes Romford
Harold
Wood

Forest
Gate

Kingston Ebbsleet
Crossrail

Hampton
Wick

Strawberry
Hill

Custom
House

Slade
Green

Stone
CrossingBelvedere SwanscombeRichmond Gunnersbury

Teddington Twickenham Kew
Gardens

Isle of
Dogs

Abbey
Wood

Erith Dartford GreenhitheActon
Central

Paddington Tottenham
Court Road

Liverpool
Street

Bond
Street Farringdon Whitechapel

Chiswick
Park

Existing station
Possible new station
Existing surface line
Surface option
Tunnel option
Portal (tunnel entrance and exit)

Figure 7. 2003 preferred route with corridor 6 options

Figure 6. Corridor 6 addendum

Civil Engineering

5

Crossrail project to deliver London’s Elizabeth
line: from options to parliamentary bill
Bennett

and vibration from the operation of additional trains and possible
ground settlement due to tunnelling works. The  Crossrail team
were aware these concerns were most likely to arise and so for
this consultation round the team produced a series of explanatory
factsheets (Figure 10) to address the issues and explain the likely
mitigation measures to be used.

The responses were reviewed and collated to identify the key
issues and a report was produced, which was used by Crossrail to
decide whether changes could be made. The detail of the process,
results and response from the consultation is contained in an
aggregated consultation report CLRL produced when the Crossrail
bill was in parliament (CLRL, 2005).

6. Review of business case

The UK transport secretary then appointed Sir Adrian
Montague, a senior civil servant, to review the Crossrail
business case. His  report, Crossrail Review (Montague, 2004),
recommended that the project should proceed but also noted
that the scheme was not an attractive proposition for a public–
private partnership and therefore, and thanks to the receptiveness
of London business representative groups, the government
should consult on legislation to enable the London mayor to

The consultation programme involved holding information centres
at locations along the route, close to proposed stations or significant
works. The consultation team was joined at these events by engineers,
planners and environment specialists from the wider CLRL team to
answer detailed questions (Figure 9). Having specialists available was
extremely helpful as matters of concern could be addressed directly.
The  team supported those experts to communicate with consultees
by providing briefings to develop communication skills, ensure the
scheme was understood and that likely impacts were neither under- nor
over-played, and that all proposals were presented as subject to change
as a result of the consultation and/or further development work.

Meetings were arranged with local authority officers, local
and national politicians, and local community, business and
environment groups, which had been identified from desk and web
searches as well as those who responded to the initial consultation
and awareness campaign.

As the publication of the route would put property at risk of blight,
a major exercise was also carried out to contact all owners of land
and property that might be affected by the project. Letters were sent
offering a meeting with TfL property surveyors. The  explanatory
booklets on compulsory purchase and compensation (DCLG, 2001a,
2001b) were very useful in providing an independent explanation of
the operation of the national compensation code for property to be
acquired or affected. The aim was to ensure that no affected property
owner would find out through visiting an information centre.

Some of the areas where concerns were raised were

■ Hanbury Street, Spitalfields: construction of a shaft for
ventilation, emergency escape and for launch of tunnel boring
machines in an area of dense housing and narrow streets

■ Richmond: construction of a dive-under to the east of Richmond
station to allow Crossrail trains to access the through-Windsor line
tracks to serve stations beyond Richmond to Kingston, including
the acquisition of parts of back gardens adjoining the railway

■ Mayfair: routing of tunnels south of Oxford Street
■ Romford: construction of a depot and the need for a dive-under

to access the depot that would require land from a playing field
■ Shenfield: lack of benefit from the proposed services at a

station where longer distance services call and, therefore, offer
faster journeys to Liverpool Street than would Crossrail.

As well as the opposition to the works in these specific locations,
the general concerns were noise from construction traffic, noise

Heathrow Shenfield
Hayes and
Harlington

Ealing
Broadway Stratford Ilford

Manor
Park

Seven
Kings

Chadwell
Heath

Gidea
Park

Brentwood

Goodmayes Romford
Harold
Wood

Forest
Gate

Kingston Ebbsleet
Crossrail

Hampton
Wick

Strawberry
Hill

Custom
House

Slade
Green

Stone
CrossingBelvedere SwanscombeRichmond Gunnersbury

Teddington Twickenham Kew
Gardens

Turnham
Green

Isle of
Dogs

Abbey
Wood

Erith Dartford Greenhithe

Paddington Tottenham
Court Road

Liverpool
Street

Bond
Street Farringdon Whitechapel

Existing station
New station
Existing surface line
Tunnel
Portal (tunnel entrance and exit)

Figure 8. 2003 preferred route

Figure 9. Crossrail staff meeting the public at an information centre

Civil Engineering

6

Crossrail project to deliver London’s Elizabeth
line: from options to parliamentary bill
Bennett

■ delete the route to Kingston via Richmond as the costs of
the tunnel and underground station at Turnham Green were
disproportionately high and the benefits low for a route that
would only carry 12 trains per hour

■ shorten the western route to terminate at Maidenhead, with
Crossrail trains serving all stations, thus avoiding the cost of
electrification between Maidenhead and Reading, a relatively long
distance with only one intermediate station (electrification between
Maidenhead and Reading is now being delivered for the Intercity
Express programme, so services to Reading have been added to the
Elizabeth line without the need for infrastructure work) (Figure 11).

A second public consultation was held, named round 2, delivered
in a similar way to the first round, with some improvements.
A consultation document (CLRL, 2004) (Figure 12) was produced,
which summarised all the details of the proposed scheme, and set out
how the scheme had changed in response to the results of round 1.
The suite of factsheets was developed into a larger number of ‘policy
statements and position papers’ modelled on documents that had
been successfully used by the Channel Tunnel rail link project.

The final innovation was two fixed ‘information exchanges’
established in a shop unit at Farringdon station and in exhibition
space in Spitalfields. Each was open for 2 days per week throughout
the 12-week consultation period. More detail on the management
of the consultation and the responses received can be found in the
aggregated consultation report.

Responses to round 2 were more informed about the scheme.
This is reflected in the fact that while the numbers of responses
to each round were very similar, round 2 raised 7472 separate
comments within 2836 responses, whereas round 1 had only
produced 3710 issues from 2893 responses. The  total number of
visitors to information centres and exchanges during round 2 was
10 125, an increase on the 7244 who attended during round 1.

Alongside the consultation events, the team commissioned
market research with two purposes: to check that promotion of the
consultation was effective and people were aware that they could
give their views, and independently to gauge support for the project.
It is often difficult to understand overall reactions because those who
support a scheme often do not respond to a consultation because they
think it will happen whatever they say. The research found that 36%
of residents within postcode areas that would be served were aware
of the project. It also found that 73% agreed that the project would
ease overcrowding and 64% considered it ‘good value for money’.

levy businesses to provide some of the necessary funding. This
ultimately bore fruit, as described in a companion paper on
funding by Buck (2017).

The review also recommended that further work be done on the
extent of the project. After the retirement of Benson, Montague
was appointed chairman of CLRL Limited and a further round
of development and consultation began with the intention of
depositing a hybrid bill in November 2004.

7. Public consultation round 2

Revisions to the project scope recommended by the Crossrail
Review (Montague, 2004) and following further work were to

Noise and vibration

Crossing the Capital Connecting the UK

Noise and vibration

Figure 10. Example explanatory factsheet

Shenfield

Stratford Ilford

Manor
Park

Seven
Kings

Chadwell
Heath

Gidea
Park

Brentwood

Goodmayes Romford
Harold
Wood

Forest
Gate

Ebbsleet
Crossrail

Custom
House

Slade
Green

Stone
CrossingBelvedere Swanscombe

Isle of
Dogs

Abbey
Wood

Erith Dartford Greenhithe

PaddingtonActon
Main Line

West
Ealing

SouthallWest
Drayton

Heathrow

LangleyBurnhamMaidenhead Tottenham
Court Road

Liverpool
Street

Bond
Street

Ealing
Broadway

Hayes and
Harlington FarringdonHanwellIverSloughTaplow Whitechapel

Existing station
New station
Existing surface line
Tunnel
Portal (tunnel entrance and exit)

Figure 11. 2004 route

Civil Engineering

7

Crossrail project to deliver London’s Elizabeth
line: from options to parliamentary bill
Bennett

closely with local authorities; for example, to allow for further
intensification of development at the new stations.

The incremental approach to consultation, while it was forced on
the project by the several steps required in getting approval to proceed,
worked very well to inform the public. This was demonstrated by the
number of ‘no comment’ responses dropping considerably and the
number of specific issues raised per response rising between the two
consultation rounds. It was undoubtedly useful to anticipate the likely
issues and field expert staff at events to ensure people’s questions
could be answered as immediately and fully as possible.

It would have been helpful if the full suite of information papers
had been signed off between CLRL and the DfT at an earlier
stage. This would have enabled more detail to be given during the
consultation phase about the promoters’ approach to addressing
matters of concern, such as settlement, noise and vibration and
property acquisition. That they were not was perhaps due to the
DfT only becoming closely involved when the SRA was abolished
and after the two consultation rounds had taken place.

Finally, despite the project’s efforts at researching the likely
petitioners, more effort could have been made to involve a wider
range of consultees at the earliest stage, particularly among those
who would gain from development and might therefore assist
with the costs. The  project assumed a non-commercial stance
with consultation and, as a result, perhaps did not derive benefits
for other stakeholders, which could ultimately have improved the
case for the scheme. The growth of the web mentioned in Section 4
will also enable future projects more easily to identify and contact
stakeholders and engage fully with them.

Acknowledgements

The author is very grateful for the assistance of Keith Berryman
(director, CLRL 2001–2011), Bernard Gambrill (former head of public
affairs, CLRL 2002–2006), David Taylor (head of route protection
and development) and Sarah Goodburn (helpdesk manager) for
providing their recollections and reviewing the author’s work.

The revisions to the scheme resulting from the work
recommended by the Crossrail Review and the responses to
round 2 fed into the production of a new business case, on the basis
of which the project was given authorisation to proceed to prepare
a bill to authorise the scheme. The experiences and learnings from
the bill process are the subject of a separate companion paper
(Bennett, 2017)

8. Conclusions

While CLRL did not meet its initial aim of beginning the
authorisation process in late 2003, the reasons were not within
the company’s control. It  is notable that several key decision
points coincided with parliament rising for summer recess in
the relevant year, and this demonstrates the extent to which even
schemes of national significance with cross-party support are
subject to external programme impacts. Future schemes could
perhaps avoid this by choosing the development consent order
authorisation route. This was not available to CLRL, but there are
other advantages to the hybrid bill process which would need to be
weighed up.

The new approach to appraisal has since been superseded by
the ‘Webtag’ process for appraisal, but the lesson to consult on
the methodology to be used with those who might challenge the
results remains relevant. Keeping local authorities briefed limited
the scope of their petitions to the way Crossrail would be delivered
rather than what was planned. Having said that, CLRL could have
been more aware of land-use planning priorities and worked more

References

Bennett S (2017) Crossrail project to deliver London’s Elizabeth line – the
parliamentary bill process. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers
– Civil Engineering, http://dx.doi.org/10.1680/jcien.17.00014.

Buck M (2017) Crossrail project: finance, funding and value capture for
London’s Elizabeth line. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers –
Civil Engineering, http://dx.doi.org/10.1680/jcien.17.00005.

CLRL (Cross London Rail Links) (2002) Stakeholder Consultation. CLRL Ltd,
London, UK.

CLRL (2004) Crossrail Business Case. CLRL Ltd, London, UK.

CLRL (2005) Aggregated Consultation Report. CLRL Ltd, London, UK.

Crossrail (2017) www.crossrail.co.uk/route/crossrail-from-its-early-beginnings
(accessed 15/06/2017).

DCLG (Department for Communities and Local Government) (2001a)
Compulsory Purchase and Compensation Booklet 1: Compulsory Purchase
Procedure. DCLG, London, UK.

DCLG (2001b) Compulsory Purchase and Compensation Booklet 4:
Compensation to Residential Owners and Occupiers. DCLG, London, UK.

Fergusson JC (2001) CrossRail: Scope, background and feasibility.
Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Transport 147(2): 61–69,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1680/tran.2001.147.2.61.

Montague A (2004) Crossrail Review. The Stationery Office, London, UK.

Figure 12. Round 2 consultation document

Managing Programmes and Portfolios
(MPP) Module M32494

Stakeholder Engagement

Managing Programmes and Portfolios
(MPP) Module M32494

Projects in Context

Themanagementofprojectmanagement:Aconceptual
frameworkforprojectgovernance

Eric G. Too a,⁎ , Patrick Weaver b

a University of Southern Queensland, Australia
b Mosaic Project Services Pty Ltd, Australia

Available online 31 August 2013

Abstract

For an organization to create optimal value from its investment in projects there must be a clear link between the outputs created by the projects and the
requirements of the organization’s business strategy. This means that organizations that have a structure in place for aligning the project deliverables with
their organizational goals will be better placed to realize their investment in projects, and achieve the value defined by their business strategies. This paper
examines existing research, ideas and concepts of project governance and enterprise project management, and offers a framework to build on current theory
development and practice. Synthesizing existing literature of project/program management, governance and portfolio management, this paper proposes
four key elements to improve the performance of projects and hence create value for organizations. These four elements are (1) portfolio management:
focused on selecting the right projects and programs to support the organization’s strategy, and terminating ones that no longer contribute to the business
success of the organization; (2) project sponsorship: providing the direct link between the executive and the project or program manager, focused on the
whole project lifecycle; (3) Project Management Office (PMO): providing oversight and strategic reporting capabilities; (4) projects and program support:
the effective support and management of projects and programs are the measures of an effective governance system. The purpose of the framework
described in this paper is to provide guidance to organizations in the development of effective project governance to optimize the management of projects.
© 2013 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Project governance; Multi project environment; Strategic alignment; Enterprise project management; Business value

1. Introduction

There is a significant growth in the adoption of project man-

projects – including program management and portfolio
management – is now the dominant model in many organizations
for strategy implementation, business transformation, continuous

www.elsevier.com/locate/ijproman

Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

ScienceDirect
International Journal of Project Management 32 (2014) 1382– 1394

Eric G. Too Patrick Weaver

1 / 13Outline Cited by Figures (4) Article info Hide

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Crossrail, the largest civil engineering project in
Europe, received Royal Assent on 22nd July 2008 and
is now being delivered after nearly two decades.
Enabling works for the scheme are due to start in the
New Year, with the main construction expected to
start in 2010 and operational in 2017.1 The scheme
is welcome news for the London economy. It will
provide at least a £20 billion boost to the UK
economy, significant employment during construction
and operations, regeneration and new capacity, and
much needed crowding relief. However, its journey
towards this significant milestone has taken 16 years
since the first attempt in the early 1990s; and it was
first considered nearly 150 years ago.The old adage,
‘what goes around comes around’, is no truer than
with the Crossrail. This article reviews Crossrail’s
ancestory and its epic journey to receiving Royal
Assent, and discusses future issues.

Crossrail’s ancestory
An east–west link across central London is not a
modern-day concept. In 1845, a proposal to link the
Great Western Railway (GWR) and Great Eastern
Railway (GER) was first put forward in 1845, but did
not progress.2 In more recent times, some authors
have traced Crossrail’s ancestors to the Abercrombie
Report, published in 1944, and The London
Transportation Study, published 1965.2,10 Although
these key reports provide the basis for the scheme,
the modern day version of Crossrail was derived
from the Central London Rail Study (CLRS)

commissioned by the then Conservative Secretary of
State Paul Channon in March 1988.The impetus for
CLRS was: overcrowding and congestion
experienced during peak times on the national rail
and underground networks and the roads, plans to
regenerate Docklands; and the need to identify a
transport strategy to meet future demand up to
2000.3 CLRS was a joint strategic study between the
Department of Transport (DoT), British Rail (BR),
London Regional Transport (LRT) and London
Underground Limited (LUL). The CLRS report,
published in January 1989, examined and provided
outline analysis of eight schemes categorised under
‘New underground lines and extensions’ and four
under ‘Surface lines run under the central area (or
crossrail concept)’. Three projects from the CLRS
study were conceived to combat the future
congestion problems4: The East–West Crossrail,
Cheslea–Hackney and extension of the Jubilee Line.

First time around
During autumn 1991, under the Conservatives, the
Crossrail promoters deposited a Private Bill to
Parliament to obtain powers for the scheme. From
January 1992, multiple Government cost-effective
and engineering reviews were ordered, which some
believe were in a bid to try and stall or even halt the
project. Early in May 1994, the bill was rejected by a
2:1 vote, by three conservatives who did not
represent London constituencies. It is understood
this decision was taken against a backdrop of an

Planning Crossrail

Crossrail has had a gestation period of 16 years’ but at

last it seems finally underway. Dr Mark Gannon CMILT,

lecturer in Operations and Project Management,

University of Surrey, investigates how Crossrail plans

have developed.

Author
Dr Mark J Gannon
CMILT

Tottenham Court Road Crossrail station plaza design

XVII FOCUSON PLANNING & POLICY

All images copyright Cross London Rail Links Limited.

transport_special:Layout 1 21/10/08 09:19 Page 18

economic recession and lower number of passengers
entering London, the schemes interference with rail
privatisation, and political preference for the Jubilee
Line Extension still in its legislative process, and
despite Crossrail having a stronger business case.3

Despite this disappointing news for sponsors and the
taxpayers’, sunk expenditure was estimated at £150
million3, the Government, according to Schabas5,
made a ‘good show of being disappointed’ and
requested that the route was ‘safeguarded’ to protect
the alignment of the route and prevent development.

Resurrection
In 1999, the City of London Corporation, under
Labour, resurrected Crossrail in a similar form to that
presented to Parliament in 1991. In December 1999,
the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, asked the
shadow Strategic Rail Authority (sSRA) to carry out
a review of issues relating to rail travel on an
east–west axis across London. Once again, the
impetus for the study was congestion, network
capacity, growth and regeneration. The aim of the
report was to create a programme comprising of
appropriate projects to deliver the capability ‘to
create a railway network for London’s status as a
world city’.6 The sSRA made nine recommendations,
five of which were focused on progressing the
Paddington to Liverpool Street Regional Metro
scheme from a concept to project definition and
support necessary; the remaining four were
infrastructure improvements around London’s
network.The final recommendation was to conduct
a feasibility study into theWimbledon–Hackney line.

What goes around comes around
In 2001, Central London Rail Links Limited (CLRL
Ltd), a 50:50 joint venture between Transport for

London (TfL) and the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA),
was formed to define and develop proposals for a
Crossrail link. Central Government provided CLRL
with a budget of £154 million to conduct a feasibility
study and acquire statutory powers for Crossrail line
1 and line 2, formerly the Chelsea–Hackney line.7

With the disbandment of the SRA in September
2005 and its subsequent engulfment into the
Department for Transport (DfT), the Crossrail
project was brought under the effective sponsorship
control of the Government. A long and short list of
options were examined by sponsors between 2001
and 2003, which led to a single option for Crossrail
line 1 being identified and taken forward to a Hybrid
Bill. Prior to the Government allowing Crossrail line
1 to proceed to submit a bill in Parliament, it called
for a review, led by Adrian Montague, of the schemes
preferred option and business case.

The Montague Review

The reviewers assessed the realism of the proposals
to deliver 24tph and the investment to support this
against a background of network interfaces with
Network Rail and the required investment on these
networks. Once the reviewers had discovered
uncertainties with the scope of the business case,
other components that are derived from the scope,
such as revenues and operating and maintenance
costs, were also in doubt.The reviewers questioned
the passenger revenue forecasts, especially model
calibration, lack of empirical evidence, annualising
methodology, risk and quality factors. A key finding
from the review was that the business case was not
‘fully deliverable as intended and further work is
needed to enable the scheme to be presented to
Parliament in a Hybrid Bill,’8

XVIII Planning Crossrail

Crossrail will tackle
congestion and the lack
of capacity on London’s
existing rail network

transport_special:Layout 1 21/10/08 09:19 Page 19

The Crossrail Act

After Montague’s uncommitted endorsement, the
Government cleverly steered the Crossrail project
through to introducing a Hybrid Bill, in the House of
Commons on 22nd February 2005, to construct,
operate and maintain the scheme.5 The bill left the
Commons towards the beginning of December
2007. During this period, it had 466 petitions against
the bill. The bill had its first reading on 14th
December 2007 and its second on 9th January 2008
in the House of Lords, and had 113 petitions against
it.The final reading was completed early July and the
bill received Royal Assent on 22nd July 2008.1, 9

Funding

On 5th October 2007, the Prime Minster announced
a £16 billion funding package to cover costs and
inflation increases for Crossrail.1 The details were
published in a Heads of Terms agreement between
the DfT and TfL that provides details of future
funding and governance arrangements for Crossrail.
In essence, the DfT and TfL are responsible for £5.6
billion and the Greater London Authority £7.7 billion;
and contributions are to come from British Airports
Authority (BAA), the City of London Corporation,
CanaryWharf Group and Berkley Homes.1

The scheme
Objectives

Crossrail has three objectives8: to support the
development of London as a world city, and its roles
as the financial centre of Europe and the UK; to
support the economic growth of London and its
regeneration areas by tackling congestion and the
lack of capacity on the existing network; and to
improve rail access into and within London.

Route

The Crossrail scheme is comprised of four sections10:
a western section, a central area and an upper and a
lower eastern section – see Figure 1. In the west, the
route runs on existing GreatWestern rail tracks from
Maidenhead and Heathrow to Paddington. A new
23km twin-bore tunnel will run under the central
London area from Royal Oak to Whitechapel and
then branch at a point near Stepney Green into an
upper and lower section. On the eastern section, the
upper branch will surface at Pudding Mill Lane and
then use existing Great Eastern tracks to Shenfield.
The lower eastern branch will surface at Victoria
Dock Road and then run through to a new tunnel
under the Thames resurfacing near Abbey Wood.
Tunnels with a diameter of approximately 6m–10m
at stations – will be constructed mostly 25–35m
below London’s street level and to depths of 35m,
40m and 50m at Hyde Park, Liverpool Street and the
Isle of Dogs respectively.10

Trains and trains service

Crossrail’s rolling stock will be 200m long, comprised
of 10 carriages each 20m in length, and will have
capacity for up to 1,500 seated and standing
passengers during peak periods. During these peak
periods, Crossrail plans to run 24tph in each
direction through the central area, with 12tph during
off-peak periods. It is forecast that during 2016,
160,000 passengers will travel on Crossrail during
the morning peak, with trains expected to travel up
to 100mph on the surface and 60mph in the tunnel.10

New stabling sidings are proposed at West Drayton
and West of Maidenhead and Old Oak Common
stablings are modified. Trains will be maintained at a
new depot that will be built west of Romford station
and existing stabling facilities extended at Gidea Park;
additionally sidings at Abbey Wood and Shenfield
may be utilised.10

Figure 1

XIX Planning Crossrail

The final Crossrail route

transport_special:Layout 1 22/10/08 16:27 Page 20

Stations

Crossrail will serve a total of 35 stations: 14 on the
western branch, 7 in the central area, 12 on the
upper eastern branch and 2 on the lower eastern
branch – again, see Figure 1.The central stations will
be new, with 210 m platforms long and two ticket
halls; at other stations, further enhancements will be
made to accommodate Crossrail trains.

Economic appraisal
A scheme appraisal and wider economic appraisal to
compare the net costs and benefits was conducted
by the CLRL Ltd and submitted as part of the
environment statement required for the Crossrail Bill.
Such benefits in the scheme appraisal included are:
journey time-savings; highway savings; reduction in
crowding and ambience and benefits to mobility
impaired users. With the July 2004 business case
evaluation, Crossrail had a benefit:cost ratio of 1.80:1,
1.63 with optimism bias.11 This was lower than
previous evaluations, primarily due to the lower
eastern branch terminating at Abbey Wood rather
than Ebbsfleet.A benefit:cost of 2.60:1, with optimism
bias 2.40:1, was derived for the wider economic
appraisal, which included such benefits as employment
opportunities and improved productivity and outputs.11

For instance,CLRL estimates that the central area will add
5,000–13,000 jobs in 2006, rising to 23,000–40,000
by 2026.

Discussion
Whilst Crossrail provides a much-needed rail scheme
for London, there are many issues that need fully
understanding.With any major transport investment,
concerns will be raised over cost overruns and
realisation of future forecasts. CLRL has provided
capital cost estimates that include optimism bias to
cover the likely eventuality of cost overruns. However,
time will tell whether these are sufficient.

With revenue forecast, rail transport schemes are
notorious for not being realised, due to their complex
nature with forecasting and political nature. In the
case of Crossrail, two-thirds of its forecast revenue is
from existing operations and a third from new
growth, which should provide some comfort.
However, the abstracted revenue should trigger
financial concerns with TfL on how revenue diverted
from London Underground’s Central line and other
lines will be replaced. Additionally, there are concerns
that Crossrail threatens to reduce funds available for
the upgrade of the tube12 and future LRT schemes in
London.Of equal concern is the funding for Crossrail.
Despite the Heads of Terms published in November
2007 and the political need to demonstrate ‘good
economic news’, the press has reported several
uncertainties with BAA and the concept of the
business levy.13

Cross-section of typical Crossrail
platform tunnel

The proposed Bond Street Crossrail entrance

XX Planning Crossrail

transport_special:Layout 1 21/10/08 09:19 Page 21

The Crossrail route has also been severely
challenged, especially from the promoters of
Superlink Ltd who believe the route does so little for
few, despite the £10 billion cost.5,14 Superlink,
proposed in December 2004, is a 550km network
that would provide regional service from
Northampton, Reading, Basingstoke, Guildford,
Cambridge, Ipswich, Southend Victoria and Tilbury
into London’s main traffic nodes of Euston,
Paddington,Waterloo and King’s Cross, connected by
a new east–west tunnel through central London.
CLRL Ltd conducted a feasibility assessment and
appraised the proposal, and concluded there were
major issue with its construction, operations and
obtaining powers through greenbelt land necessary
for construction. However, Superlink’s promoters
insist that although it will cost £3 billion more than
Crossrail, it will become more than self-financing by
generating more passenger revenue due to its far
reaching regional services.5

In conclusion
Crossrail is a major transport investment that will
deliver significant benefit to the UK and London
economy, and help maintain London as a world class
city and financial centre of Europe. It took nearly two
decades to achieve the Royal Assent milestone, and in
excess of 100 years to achieve the Crossrail dream’
As is apparent from other major transport schemes,
a contributory factor has been the transference of
the scheme to the effective control of the
Government and the DfT.This action can only assist
the scheme being steered through the significant
political mire at its height during project planning, the
critical project stage at which Crossrail faltered in the
early 1990s. Although the visionary Superlink is now
probably doomed to the transport history books, its
promoters will be looking over the Government’s
shoulders. As Dr Prideaux, Superlink Ltd, states: ‘Only
one major railway is built in London every 15 years
that costs over £10 billion – so it needs to be right!’14

References

1. GLA, ‘Crossrail given the go-ahead by Parliament’, press release, 23rd July 2008, www.london.gov.uk,
accessed 24th August 2008

2. FERGUSON, J C, ‘CrossRail: Scope, background and feasibility’, Journal of Transport, Proceedings of the
Institution of Civil Engineers, May 2001, Issue 2

3. HEATH, D L, ‘CrossRail: External influences and the way forward’, Journal of Transport, Proceedings of the
Institution of Civil Engineers, May 2001, Issue 2

4. Department of Transport, Central London Rail Study, January 1989

5. SCHABAS, M, Paying for Crossrail the Business Case, Institute of Economic Affairs, 2008

6. Shadow Strategic Rail Authority, London East–West Study, 2000

7. Crossrail, Crossrail Line 1 Shortlist Announcement, 7th March 2002

8. Department for Transport, Review of Crossrail Business Case, 2003, www.dft.gov.uk, accessed
20th August 2008

9.The Crossrail Act, www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/crossrail, accessed 24th August 2008

10. Crossrail, Crossrail Environmental Statement, 2005,Vol 1

11. Crossrail, Economic Appraisal of Crossrail, 2005

12. WEBSTER, B, ‘£16bn Crossrail go-ahead threatens to shunt tube upgrade into sidings’, The Times, 14th
September 2007

13. CECIL, N, ‘Crossrail backers raise doubts over financing’, Evening Standard, 7th August 2008

14. Prideaux, J, ‘Superlink: a viable alternative?’, The Utilities Journal, March 2005

Author: Dr Mark J Gannon CMILT is a lecturer in Operations and Project Management, within the School of Management,
University of Surrey, and Programme leader for an MSc in Operations and Logistics Management. He has gained a wide
range of project management, commercial and analytical expertise through working on some of the largest and most
innovative transport-based Private Finance Initiative/Public-Private-Partnership projects undertaken in the UK.

Note: The contents of this article represent the views of the author and do not represent the views of the University
of Surrey. The author does not accept any liability for its correctness.

For more information on rail planning, why not join our Strategic Rail or Transport Planning Forums? See our web
site www.ciltuk.org.uk for more deails.

Information

Some of the reports and
statements generated in the
planning of Crossrail

XXI Planning Crossrail

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PROGRAMME CONTROLS

RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN

Document Number: CR-XRL-Z9-GPR-CR001-00014

(Supersedes: CR/QMS/COM/S/0811)

Document History:

Revision Prepared Date: Author: Reviewed by: Approved by: Reason for Issue
1.0 13-04-10 First Issue

2.0 23-06-11 Second Issue, to
reflect re-

organisation

3.0 15-06-2015 Update to reflect
org changes

Business Owner (if different to Author):

This document contains proprietary information. No part of this document may be reproduced
without prior written consent from the chief executive of Crossrail Ltd.

This document is shared for the purposes of learning legacy. It is a snapshot in time and hence many of
the links within the document will become obsolete over time. Some links/document references will refer
to a document storage location that isn’t accessible. Users should refer to the learning legacy website
where these documents may be published separately.

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Contents
1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4

2 Purpose: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4

2.1 Objectives: …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4

3 Scope …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 5

3.1 Scope of Risk Management: ………………………………………………………………………… 5

4 Key Definitions ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 7

5 Responsibilities and Accountabilities …………………………………………………………… 8

5.1 Role of the Accountable Manager ………………………………………………………………… 8

5.2 Risk Management Organisation …………………………………………………………………… 8

5.3 The Role of Crossrail ………………………………………………………………………………….. 9

5.4 The Roles of Individuals within Crossrail ……………………………………………………… 9

5.5 The Roles of Crossrail’s Industry Partners …………………………………………………. 10

5.6 The Roles of Contractor’s working for Crossrail …………………………………………. 11

6 Governance ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 11

6.1 Audit Committee ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 12

6.2 Risk Sub Committee ………………………………………………………………………………….. 12

6.3 Programme Risk Panel ……………………………………………………………………………… 12

6.4 Area/ Function Governance ……………………………………………………………………….. 13

7 Risk Management Process …………………………………………………………………………. 13

7.1 Generic Process Description ……………………………………………………………………… 13

8 Interface with Other Processes …………………………………………………………………… 15

8.1 Health and Safety ……………………………………………………………………………………… 15

8.2 Issue Management ……………………………………………………………………………………. 16

8.3 Trend Management and Change Control …………………………………………………….. 16

8.4 Investment Authority Process ……………………………………………………………………. 17

8.5 Procurement Process ……………………………………………………………………………….. 17

8.6 Cost Management …………………………………………………………………………………….. 17

8.7 Contingency Management …………………………………………………………………………. 17

9 Quantitative Risk Assessment ……………………………………………………………………. 18

10 Risk Appetite and Escalation ……………………………………………………………………… 19

10.1 Risk Appetite ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 19

10.2 Risk Escalation …………………………………………………………………………………………. 19

11 Risk Reporting …………………………………………………………………………………………… 20

11.1 QRA Report ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 21

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12 Awareness and Training …………………………………………………………………………….. 21

13 Risk Management Systems ………………………………………………………………………… 21

14 Reference Documents ……………………………………………………………………………….. 22

15 Standard Forms / Templates ………………………………………………………………………. 22

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1 Introduction

Managing risk and uncertainty is vital to the successful delivery of Crossrail. This Risk
Management Plan describes the activities, governance, roles, responsibilities and process
which are required to ensure that Crossrail manages its risks effectively. It forms part of a
consistent suite of documentation which describes Crossrail’s risk management approach.

2 Purpose:

The purpose of this document is to provide a high level overview and description of the
Crossrail’s approach to risk management. This Risk Management Plan includes:

 High level overview and description of the Crossrail risk management process;

 Description of the high level roles, responsibilities and accountabilities for managing risk;

 Description of Crossrail’s risk management governance arrangements;

 Description of risk management interfaces;

 Summary of Crossrail’s risk appetite and the escalation procedure; and

Description of the purpose, frequency and scope of risk reporting.

2.1 Objectives:

Managing risk and uncertainty is vital to the successful delivery of Crossrail. Crossrail is
accountable for delivering a new world class, affordable railway safely through effective
partnerships. Crossrail must do this with incomplete knowledge of future events, in a complex
environment and within known funding and timing constraints.

Crossrail’s risk management process provides a structured approach to the identification,
assessment and treatment of risks to ensure project success by minimising threats and
maximising opportunities.

The objectives of Risk Management are to:

 Support the delivery of Crossrail by reducing the likelihood and potential consequences
of events that could have a negative effect on the project and increasing the likelihood
and potential consequences of events that could have a positive effect on the project;

 Provide assurance to internal and external stakeholders that the project understands its
significant risks and is actively managing them;

 Improve decision making, planning and prioritisation by improving understanding of
uncertainty and risk.

This Risk Management Plan forms part of a consistent suite of documentation to describe
Crossrail’s risk management approach and has been developed with reference to
ISO31000:2009 Risk management – Principles and guidelines and the Joint Code of Practice
for Risk Management of Tunnel Works in the UK.

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3 Scope

The scope of this plan includes the management of all categories of risk during design and
construction and during commissioning and handover to operation. Crossrail has established a
structured hierarchy of risk information defining Strategic, Programme, Area, Project and
Contract risk levels.

The plan describes the responsibilities and accountabilities for managing risk for individuals
within Crossrail and between Crossrail and its Delivery and Industry Partners.

The key elements of risk management governance within Crossrail are Audit Committee (a
committee of the Crossrail Board), the Risk Sub-Committee (a sub-committee of ExComm) and
the Programme Risk Panel (made up of members of the Programme Executive or their
delegates).

This plan describes the standard risk management process for Crossrail. This provides a
systematic approach to managing risks and represents a generic process to be applied
throughout the programme. The plan also describes some key areas of interface including
Health and Safety, Change Control and Contingency Management.

The plan describes the purpose and contents of the key reports which will be produced as part
of the process.

The plan also defines the principles by which Crossrail will establish its Risk Appetite and the
mechanisms by which risks will be escalated

3.1 Scope of Risk Management:
The Risk Management Plan forms part of a consistent suite of documentation to describe
Crossrail’s risk management policy and process, which is shown below.

Risk Management framework of documentation

This Risk Management Plan will apply to Crossrail and to all Crossrail’s Industry Partners. It will
be used as information for the wider Crossrail supply chain. This plan sets out the activities
which will deliver an appropriate programme of Risk Management to ensure that the Crossrail
project and programme risks are effectively managed and controlled.

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Crossrail will reflect Health and Safety risks which could affect project objectives in its overall
risk management process, however the identification, assessment and management of safety
risk is not covered within the scope of this plan. Guidance is given in the Health and Safety
Manual.

The scope of the plan includes the management of all categories of risk, both during design and
construction and during commissioning and operation. This includes:

 Business Risks (including Funding and Delivery risks);

 Engineering and Design risks;

 Interface and Logistics risks;

 Environmental risks;

 Quality risks;

 Business Continuity risks;

 Security risks;

 Fraud risks.

Crossrail has established a clear hierarchy to manage risk information at the correct level within
the programme. The hierarchy defines five levels:

 Strategic;

 Programme;

 Area;

 Project; and

 Contractor.

Establishing a hierarchy for risk information ensures that risks are managed at the most
appropriate level in the organisation. Although the principles of risk management at Crossrail
will be common, the mechanisms for managing risks in each level of the hierarchy may be
different. (Note that the level at which a risk is managed may differ to the contingency level from
which it is funded.)

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Crossrail hierarchy of risks

Risks may be escalated or delegated between levels to ensure that they are managed by the
party best placed to manage the risk and at the most appropriate level in the organisation.

Risks will be managed through a tiered system of risk registers which closely reflects the
organisation and accountability breakdown structure.

4 Key Definitions

Risk: An uncertain event or set of circumstances that, should it occur, will affect the project’s
objectives. Note that risks could have negative effects (threats) or positive effects
(opportunities).

Risk Exposure: Potential exposure over and above the estimate (e.g. cost or time) which could
arise as a result of the impact of one or more risks.

Contingency: A budgetary allowance made specifically to cover the cost of change, risk or
unforeseen event. To be allocated and expended in accordance with the governance
procedure.

Issue: A currently occurring event that is already impacting achievement of the programme
objectives (sometimes referred to as ‘Critical Issue’).

Strategic Risks

 Externally-driven relating to funding, market
and economic factors, industry and
stakeholder relations;

 Summarise key areas of risk within the
programme for reporting to the Crossrail
Board and Sponsors.

Area Risks

 Risks associated with delivery of Area scope
and coordination, interfacing and integration
of projects

Contractor Risks

• Risks which the Contractor is best placed to
manage

Programme Risks

 Associated with coordination, interfacing and
integration of Areas;

 Significant risks which cannot be resolved
within Areas; or

 Risks to Crossrail’s functional requirements.

Project Risks

 Risks associated with delivery of Project
scope

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5 Responsibilities and Accountabilities

5.1 Role of the Accountable Manager

The Risk Management Plan recognises the role of Accountable Manager. The Accountable
Manager is the person accountable for delivery of an element of work and who is accountable
for managing the risks associated with delivering that work. Typically this will include the Chief
Executive Officer, Programme Director, Delivery Director, Area Directors and Project &
Functional Managers. The risk management organisation provides support and guidance to the
Accountable Manager in managing their risks.

The Accountable Manager’s risk management responsibilities include:

 Maintaining a risk register in accordance with the Risk Management Procedure, for the
scope and project objectives for which they are accountable;

 Ensuring that the Risk Management Procedure operates fully within their teams, and
make adequate competent resource available to ensure that risk management
obligations are met; and

 Ensuring that all other relevant parties and perspectives (Area Managers (Delivery and
Functional), Project Managers, Contractors, stakeholders and specialists) are
appropriately engaged in the identification, assessment and management of risks in their
area.

5.2 Risk Management Organisation

The risk management organisation is made up of Risk Managers and Analysts who support
Accountable Managers by:

 Facilitating the identification of risks through facilitated workshops, data analysis etc.;

 Informing management priorities by assessing risks impacts;

 Supporting the development of effective response plans to mitigate risks;

 Helping, where possible, to expedite those response plans;

 Monitoring performance on identified response actions; and

 Informing decisions by providing qualitative and quantitative analysis of cost and
schedule risks

The risk management organisation comprises a core risk management team operating within
the Programme Controls directorate which acts as the owner of the risk management processes
and procedures. The risk management organisation is shown below.

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5.3 The Role of Crossrail
Under the terms of the Project Development Agreement, Crossrail is the programme manager,
systems integrator and delivery agent for the Central Section and bears the majority of risk
associated with the delivery of Crossrail. As a result, Crossrail must:

 Develop and implement a risk management policy and plan for Crossrail;

 Develop and implement processes and procedures for managing risk;

 Actively manage the risks for which Crossrail is responsible;

 Provide assurance that risk management carried out by the Industry and Delivery
Partners is competent and effective;

 Maintain a useful, accurate and up-to-date Crossrail risk database, ARM;

 Carry out a programme-wide cost and schedule Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) to
inform reporting of Anticipated Final Cost (AFC) and schedule confidence.

5.4 The Roles of Individuals within Crossrail
Risk management is an essential part of good project management and is a central
responsibility of all those working on the programme. Risks should be managed by the party
best placed to manage the risk and at the most appropriate level in the organisation.

The following individuals have specific accountabilities and responsibilities for managing risk.

Finance Director

Chief Executive

Area Director

Programme
Controls
Director

Area Director

Programme
Director

Area
Commercial and
Controls Director

Area
Commercial and
Controls Director

Delivery Director

Head of Risk
Management

Area Risk
Manager

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Core Risk
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5.4.1 Head of Risk Management

The Head of Risk Management’s responsibilities include:

 Providing functional leadership in Risk Management across the programme;

 Developing and implementing Crossrail’s Risk Management Plan;

 Determining competency standards for those involved in risk management and ensuring
that training is available;

 Ensuring that risk management activity on Crossrail is of an appropriate standard;

 Ensuring that risk management complies with the requirements of TfL;

 Leading assurance activities in the area of Risk Management;

 Reporting on risk to the Crossrail Executive and Board;

 Reporting on risk to the Sponsors and other external stakeholders; and

 Conducting the Crossrail programme-wide QRA.

5.4.2 Area Risk Manager

Area Risk Managers are embedded in delivery teams with line management reporting to Area
Commercial and Controls Directors (or Area Business Managers, depending on the Area) and
functional reporting to the Head of Risk Management.

Risk management responsibilities include:

 Ensuring that all teams within the Area (including their respective Contractors) follow the
risk management procedure, and alert non-compliances;

 Ensuring that all teams within the Area (including their respective Contractors) use the
designated tools to maintain up-to-date data which is of suitable quality in accordance
with the process, and alert significant errors;

 Ensuring that records are held to demonstrate risk management practices follow the risk
management procedure (e.g. records of meetings, approvals); and

 Liaising with the Crossrail Head of Risk Management to ensure continued alignment in
approach with requirements.

5.5 The Roles of Crossrail’s Industry Partners

Crossrail has a number of Industry Partners. The roles of the key industry Partners are
discussed in Crossrail’s Management Plan Volume 1 Ref 1

The roles and obligations in relation to risk management will be addressed in specific
arrangements with Crossrail and will address the following:

 Roles and Responsibilities in relation to Risk;

 Risk Management governance arrangements;

 Reporting requirements and information handling protocols; and

 Arrangements for Crossrail’s audit and assurance of Industry Partners’ risk management
functions.

Under these arrangements, all Industry Partners will be required to:

 Develop and implement a risk management plan and process, which aligns with the
principles laid out in this plan;

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 Actively manage the risks for which they are responsible;

 Take measures to inform Crossrail immediately about any emerging risks that they are
not best placed to managed;

 Report to Crossrail their key risks and risk management performance on a regular basis;

 Support Crossrail in carrying out the Crossrail cost and schedule QRA;

 Manage the interface risks between Crossrail and Industry Partners and report their
status to Crossrail on a regular basis.

In addition, Industry Partners may be required to record risk information on the Crossrail Risk
database where appropriate.

5.6 The Roles of Contractor’s working for Crossrail

Crossrail will engage a large number of contractors in delivering the Works. The role and
obligations of the contractors in relation to risk management will be detailed within the works
information of the contract which will place emphasis on the contractor to manage its risks
consistent with Crossrail’s Risk Management Policy and Plan.

6 Governance

Risks and issues should be considered as agenda items at all of the main committees and
meetings throughout the programme. The Crossrail Board has overall responsibility for risk
management on Crossrail and is responsible for setting Crossrail’s risk appetite.

In order to develop and oversee the functioning of the risk management process, Crossrail’s
Risk Management Governance has a number of key elements (as highlighted in the diagram
below).

Risk Management Governance meetings

15

High Level Risk Meetings

Review Area and Project RisksPeriodicLine Management Review

Report Key Area and Project RisksPeriodicArea Performance Review

Report Strategic Risks in detailPeriodicExComm

Review Strategic, Programme Risks in detailQuarterlyAudit Committee

Review Strategic, Programme Risks

and Risk Management Performance

PeriodicRisk Sub-Committee

Periodic

Periodic

Quarterly

Frequency

Report Summary of Strategic RisksCrossrail Board

Forum Agenda

Programme Executive Report Programme Risks in PDR

Programme Risk Panel Review Specific Risks, Responses in detail

2. Risk Management Process

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6.1 Audit Committee

The Crossrail Audit Committee is a sub-committee of the Board and meets four times a year or
at such other frequency as determined from time to time by the Chair. The duties and
responsibilities related to Risk Management are:

 To obtain assurance as to the adequacy of the systems of internal control in place
throughout the Company. Internal control is not restricted to financial control but
includes, amongst other things the arrangements that management has put in place for:

o the systematic identification of business risks and mitigating controls and
procedures for ensuring these are properly implemented and effective; and

o ensuring a systematic approach to minimise the risk of fraud.

 To consider and report to the Board matters relating to risk management.

The Audit Committee should on an annual basis review the suitability and effectiveness of
Crossrail’s arrangements for managing risk.

6.2 Risk Sub Committee

The Risk Sub-committee will advise on, assist, make recommendations and report, as the
context requires, to the Executive and Investment Committee in order to facilitate its and the
Board’s:

(i) Understanding of Crossrail’s key Strategic, Programme and Project risks and the
controls that are put in place to manage them;

(ii) Understanding the performance of Crossrail’s risk management, the risk profile of
the programme and its movement over time;

(iii) Understanding, reviewing and monitoring of the Quantitative Risk Assessment and
the level of Risk Exposure relative to the Contingency Provision; and

(iv) Understanding, reviewing and monitoring any other risk areas the Sub-committee
considers appropriate.

The Risk Sub-committee shall develop and establish appropriate policies and procedures to
ensure that there is proper assessment and management of risk throughout the Programme.

On an annual basis, the Risk Sub-committee will conduct a review of the suitability of the Risk
Management Plan and the capability and competence of the programme to deliver it and will
report their findings to the Audit Committee.

6.3 Programme Risk Panel

The Programme Risk Panel is chaired by the Programme Controls Director, is attended by the
Programme Leadership Team or their delegates and has the following Terms of Reference
relating to risk management:

 Review the high priority Programme Risks.

 Review the risk responses and evaluate their effectiveness.

 Endorse the high priority Programme Risks for inclusion in the periodic reporting.

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6.4 Area/ Function Governance
Each delivery Area / Function will put in place appropriate mechanisms to review risk
management performance. Areas / Functions will be required to report risk for review within the
Area / Function performance review as required by the Programme Controls Director.

7 Risk Management Process

7.1 Generic Process Description
The standard risk management process for Crossrail is shown below. This provides a
systematic approach to managing risks and represents a generic process to be applied
throughout the programme. The risk management process is iterative and continuous, although
formal reporting of risk will be on a regular basis as defined later in this document.

Standard risk management process based on BS31100.

All risk information generated by Crossrail will be recorded on the Crossrail risk database. Risk
information will be integrated into the programme data model and subject to quality control and
performance measurement.

7.1.1 Plan

Risks should be identified with reference to the objectives of the work under consideration.
Objectives for the Area / Function, teams and individuals should be clearly defined and
communicated in the Delivery Strategy and Management Plan. A useful first stage in the risk
management process is to review those objectives to ensure that they remain comprehensive,
up to date and relevant to the wider objectives of the programme.

7.1.2 Identify

Risk identification should be approached methodically to ensure that all significant sources of
risk are identified and recorded. Risks will be recorded within the appropriate risk register within
the Risk Management database.

7.1.3 Assess

Risk Assessment involves the analysis of individual risks and their aggregate effect, and
evaluation against a defined level of Risk Appetite.

Assessment of the severity of a risk drives management attention and supports planning for risk
mitigation. A risk assessment scheme consisting of qualitative probability and impact scales and
a Probability Impact Diagram (PID) is used to assess the severity of a risk.

Identify Assess Respond

ReviewReportMonitorPlan

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The Accountable Manager will be responsible for ensuring that all risks are analysed
qualitatively and the level of management and monitoring a risk should receive is based on its
Severity.

Risks should be assessed on the basis of probability and ‘average’ impact should the risk occur.
Impacts should not be ‘worst case’ but should be a reasonable.

The main Impact Categories considered in Crossrail are:

Impact Category Metric

Health and Safety Lost Time Injuries, RIDDOR Reportable events, Fatalities

Environment Environmental impact, Environmental harm

Capital Cost Annual cost impact, Anticipated Final cost impact

Time Critical path delays

Reputation Local/National Media reporting levels

Quality Non conformance

Crossrail Railway
Operations

Annual cost or revenue, loss or disruption to service, Impact on
customers

3rd Party Impacts Impacts on third party services

Table of Impact Categories

Risks exposure should be assessed at Current (pre-mitigation) and – once a response has
been identified – at Forecast (post-mitigation) levels. As part of establishing Current risk
exposure, Existing Controls should be reviewed.

Crossrail will employ Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) to evaluate the aggregate impact of
the identified risks on the cost and schedule (see section 7).

7.1.4 Respond

For each risk, the risk owner must establish an appropriate level of mitigation. Control measures
in addition to the existing controls may be needed to achieve this level of mitigation. Risk
responses may include measures to Tolerate (Accept), Terminate (Avoid), Transfer or Treat
(Reduce) the level of risk exposure to the programme.

Responses should be allocated to a Response Owner, who is the person responsible for
implementing the response. The Response Owner should develop and implement an
appropriate response and report to the Risk Owner on its status. Note that the Response Owner
and Risk Owner may or may not be the same person.

7.1.5 Review

The Accountable Manager should regularly review the output from the risk management
process to ensure that risks are being appropriately managed, and that the risk data remains
accurate and reliable. Specifically this should cover the risk profile and the key risks identified
and how these are changing in time, the progress of actions to treat key risks, whether risks are
being managed within the target.

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7.1.6 Report

Key outputs from the risk management process are reported on a regular basis in order to
inform management and support decision making.

All risk reports should be produced from a single set of risk information and will have a
consistent format and vocabulary.

The information reported should include:

 Significant risks;

 The aggregate effect of risks (risk profile);

 Progress on risk management actions.

 The trend in exposure over time; and

 Performance against target;

Risk information should form a key part of all standard reports but in addition, dedicated risk
reports will be produced. Section 9 includes further information on reporting.

7.1.7 Monitor

Continuous systematic and formal monitoring of implementation of the risk process and outputs
need to take place against appropriate performance indicators to ensure process compliance
and effectiveness. Monitoring may take a variety of forms and range from self-assessment and
internal audit to detailed reviews by independent external experts. Risk Managers will work with
Accountable Managers to develop and establish suitable performance indicators to provide an
efficient monitoring method.

8 Interface with Other Processes

8.1 Health and Safety

Crossrail’s Target Zero philosophy and improvement initiatives target the behaviours that are
precursors to risk.

The identification and management of health and safety risk is the responsibility of the relevant
duty holder as defined in UK law. There is no common process for the identification,
assessment, elimination and mitigation of health and safety risk, or collation of all risks, for all
parts of the Crossrail family (Crossrail, its partners, designers and contractors etc) and nor
would this be appropriate. Crossrail does however facilitate processes for the sharing of
information on health and safety risk with those that need it. These processes are numerous
and include:

 Designers risk registers;

 Interface Design Review Meetings;

 Discipline Design Review Meetings;

 Pre-construction information packs ;

 SHE notes on drawings;

 Project Manager Contractor Meetings;

 Project Wide Hazard Record (dealing with future operations risk).

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Crossrail monitors these processes to provide assurance that they are effective. Significant risk
can be elevated from designers and constructors and industry partners into the Project,
Programme and Strategic risk registers in ARM, particularly where it is identified that Crossrail
needs to take a lead.

8.2 Issue Management

An Issue is defined as a currently occurring event that is already impacting achievement of the
programme objectives. The relationship between Risks, Issues and Trends is illustrated below.

Key Issues are reported as part of regular performance reporting at the Contract, Project, Area
and Programme levels. Where issues are reported, the subsequent report should contain an
explanation of how the issue has been resolved.

Relationship with Trends/ Issues etc

8.3 Trend Management and Change Control

The Trend Management and Change Control process provides early identification and
authorisation of all potential changes to the agreed programme and project baselines. The
Change Control is a formal process used to change the Programme Baseline and to ensure that
changes to the programme are introduced in a controlled and coordinated manner.

Change proposals should be reviewed against the programme’s overall risk exposure to check:

 Reduction in the programme’s overall risk exposure as a result of risks crystallising into
changes;

 Changes in risk exposure as a result of changed approach – increase or decrease in risk;

 Uncertainty and risk associated with the revised estimates as part of the Impact
Assessment.

Changes to the programme risk exposure should only be made once the change has been
formally approved and it has been accepted into cost.

12

Relationship with Trends/ Issues etc

Management
Information

(QUALITATIVE)

Cost Forecasting
(QUANTITATIVE)

Issues

‘are happening’‘may happen’

Unresolved Resolved

‘knowns’

time

‘unknowns’

Trends

Risks

Risks (QRA)

2. Risk Management Process

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For all assessments of risk exposure, an understanding of relevant approved and unapproved
trends and/or changes is required.

8.4 Investment Authority Process

The Investment Authority Process requires an assessment of risk exposure for contracts at
PTBA and IA stages. Risk Managers will work with the Project Manager to identify and quantify
the risks associated with the contract concerned. Risk Managers will facilitate quantitative risk
assessment of the identified risks.

8.5 Procurement Process

The procurement process requires that the allocation of risks between Crossrail and the
Contractor is understood. Risk Managers will work with the Procurement lead to identify and
correctly allocate the risks within the Risk Allocation Summary template included in the full
procurement plan template. Risk allocation will be monitored and updated during the
procurement process.

8.6 Cost Management

Cost management will use the forecast risk exposure calculated from Project QRAs as part of
the forecasting of Anticipated Final Cost (AFC). Project QRAs will be run on a quarterly basis
with the results provided to the cost management team to be included in the Periodic Cost
Report.

8.7 Contingency Management

Contingency will be managed at two levels:

Delivery Contingency – a fund allocated to the Project Manager to allow them to manage risks
relating to their work scope in an effective and efficient way within delegated authority limits.

Programme Contingency – a fund held by the Crossrail organisation, outside of the control of
the individual Project Managers, to cover programme-wide or unforeseen risks.

The Programme Wide Contingency has been established with reference to an assessment of
the Programme-wide risk exposure derived through the Crossrail Risk Model. From this,
Delivery Contingency will be allocated to the relevant Project as each contract within the project
is granted Investment Authority. Contingency will not be allocated to individual risks.

Risk exposure will be reassessed by re-running the Crossrail Risk Model on a regular basis and
a comparison made with the remaining contingency to ensure funding sufficiency. This
comparison will be carried out at the Investment and Change Sub Committee and through other
reporting mechanisms.

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9 Quantitative Risk Assessment

Crossrail will conduct Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) to evaluate the aggregate exposure
of the identified risks on the cost and schedule and to prioritise risks and inform the risk
management process.

QRA should:

 Make a robust and accurate assessment of Crossrail’s risk exposure using
representative models that accurately reflects the nature of the risk.

 Identify the key risks which affect the cost and schedule;

 Create a transparent record of the assessment which supports the published outputs
and facilitates subsequent phases of the risk management process.

QRA will be carried out for Projects, Areas and Programme-wide elements and combined into a
comprehensive assessment – the Crossrail Risk Model (CRM).

The programme-wide QRA will be conducted on a quarterly basis or more frequently as
required. This will consider risks to both cost and schedule. Risks at all levels (i.e. Strategic,
Programme, Area and Project) will be reviewed with a view to establishing the quantified impact
on cost estimate and baseline schedule. The QRA will assess risk exposure at the Forecast i.e.
post mitigation level.

Both cost and schedule QRA will be undertaken on a project basis to support investment
decisions, project change and options appraisals where risk may be a factor and to understand
changes in risk exposure during the project lifecycle.

As part of the procurement process, cost and schedule QRA should also be conducted on
significant contracts prior to contract award in order to ensure that risk transfer through
contracts is well understood and cost effective.

For more details refer to Quantitative Risk Assessment Procedure Ref 2.

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Programme-wide elements QRA

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Project QRAs

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Crossrail Risk Model (CRM)

– Sum of programme-wide, sub-programme
elements and project QRAs

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10 Risk Appetite and Escalation

10.1 Risk Appetite

In its capacity as programme manager, systems integrator and delivery agent (for the Central
Core Area) Crossrail bears the majority of risk associated with delivery of Crossrail with limited
opportunity to transfer risk to third parties. Crossrail has no right of relief offered by the Project
Development Agreement.

Defining a risk appetite determines the way that the organisation chooses to prioritise risks. The
figure below shows the risk assessment criteria that are used at Strategic and Programme level
within Crossrail.

Each Severity Status carries a Risk Appetite Statement which gives guidance as to the level of
response that is required.

Probability Impact Diagram

Severity
Status

Risk Appetite Statement

High

This level of risk is generally unacceptable and priority should be given
to develop action plans to reduce risk to a lower level wherever possible
and practicable. Risks at this level can only be tolerated where all
reasonable measures have been taken to mitigate the risk.

Medium This level of risk is undesirable and action plans should be developed to
reduce risk to a lower level wherever prudent.

Low

As a general principle, risks should be mitigated to as low a level as
possible (towards the bottom left of the map) – but only as far as the
benefits gained from risk reduction outweigh the costs of mitigating the
risk.

Risk Appetite Table

10.2 Risk Escalation

Risks should be managed by the party best placed to manage the risk and at the most
appropriate level in the organisation. Risks may need to be escalated up the management chain
– either within or between the levels of hierarchy (i.e. Strategic, Programme, Project or
Contractor).

Accountable Managers, with the assistance of Risk Managers, should identify any risks which
are to be considered for escalation in their regular reporting cycle. These will then be reviewed
with line management at risk review meetings, as specified within the Programme Controls

Impact

1 3 20 100 1000 Threats
Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Severe

16
Very High 16 48 320 1600 16000

12
High 12 36 240 1200 12000

8
Medium 8 24 160 800 8000

4
Low 4 12 80 400 4000 Pr

ob
ab

ili
ty

2
Very Low 2 6 40 200 2000

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Governance structure, in order to review and approve the escalation of the risk. This cycle of
review is repeated up the organisation structure.

When selecting risks to escalate, these factors should be considered:

 Is any single risk so significant that it should be escalated to the next level?

 Are there any common causes of risk that should be escalated?

 Do any of the identified risks have consequential effects to the wider programme which
are significant enough for that risk to be escalated to the next level?

 Do any risks require responses which can only be implemented by the next level of
management?

Note that escalating risk does not transfer the ownership of risk, but allows the Accountable
Manager at the higher level to understand the risks within their responsibility.

11 Risk Reporting

Reporting on key risks and risk management performance should be a standard part of
performance reporting.

A standard format for risk reporting within the Crossrail organisation is shown below.

The Accountable Manager has discretion to select Top 5. Their selection should not be limited
to the most severe risks and should consider:

 Severity;

 Proximity; and

 Decision Required.

Schematic of Risk Reporting

Information on key Risks and Risk Management performance should be included in Area Directors
Report, Programme Directors Report, Board Report and Sponsors Dashboard.

Significant Risks

What are the significant risks?

Selected by:

– Severity
– Proximity
– Decision Required
–

Risk Profile

How risky is this project?

Progress with Actions

Are Risk Management actions
completed and effective?

Performance

Is the risk exposure reducing?

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11.1 QRA Report

The purpose of the programme-wide QRA report is to summarise the latest programme wide
cost and schedule risk assessment. The report includes a description of the inputs and results
and identifies the key drivers to change in risk exposure. The report is submitted to Risk Sub
Committee on a six monthly basis in line with the Semi Annual Construction Report.

12 Awareness and Training

Risk Management has been recognised as a key component of Crossrail’s culture. The
intention is that the pro-active management of risk is accepted and adopted as a behaviour
across the programme to support the Vision and Values. To this end, risk management is one of
five key skill areas identified by the Organisational Development Plan.

The key elements of the Organisational Development Plan which relate to risk management
are:

1. Developing Crossrail culture:

 Develop a coordinated plan to communicate the benefits of risk management and clear
accountability for managing risk;

 Engaging Industry and Delivery partners in developing risk management approach;

2. Developing organisational capability:

 Develop a competence framework for risk management and provide training to support
this;

 Risk Management included job descriptions where appropriate;

 Establish an appropriate risk management organisation;

3. Establish performance indicators for risk management.

13 Risk Management Systems

Crossrail will use the Active Risk Manager software (ARM) to record and update all risk
information within Crossrail. Access to ARM will be given to all Crossrail Staff who require and
will have write access to individual registers within the database as agreed by the Accountable
Manager responsible for that register.

Contractor’s staff will be expected to input the high-level risks into ARM for their contract in
accordance with the Works Information.

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14 Reference Documents

Ref: Document Title Document Number:

1. Crossrail’s Management Plan Volume 1 CR-XRL-O4-GPG-CR001-00001

2. Quantitative Risk Assessment Procedure CR-XRL-Z9-GPD-CR001-50004

15 Standard Forms / Templates

Ref: Document Title Document Number:

A. None

B.

1

Learning legacy
Lessons learned from the London
2012 Games construction project

Lessons learned from the
London 2012 Olympic
and Paralympic Games
construction programme

Abstract
This research project has sought
to identify the key factors which
have underpinned the success of
the London 2012 construction
programme. The research has focused
on the approach taken to the overall
management of the programme and
the way this shaped the approaches
taken to managing individual projects.

It was found that favourable
programme outcomes were directly
attributable to three ‘headline drivers’:
– the rigorous use of five key project

and programme management
processes;

– the explicit specification of a series
of targets and principles around
other key programme objectives
(such as health and safety); and

– a pervasive, high-level
management philosophy adopted
across the entire programme.

These headline drivers were
effective because of three critical
‘enabling factors’:
– the use of a well-resourced

Delivery Partner (DP);
– supportive contractual

arrangements; and
– a supportive programme-wide

culture.

Finally, the research identified six
‘supporting factors’ which, in turn,

underpinned and facilitated these
enabling factors:
– the so-called ‘Olympics effect’;
– the ‘health and safety’ effect;
– the strong emphasis placed on

personal and organisational
development;

– the practice of allowing contractors
to work with familiar partners;

– full funding; and
– the market downturn of 2008–09.

While some of these factors were
clearly circumstantial, many reflected
conscious senior management
decisions to put in place rigorous,
professional, yet flexible, programme
and project management.

While each component of the
management approach may appear
unsurprising, the combination – and
the level of execution – proved to
be immensely powerful. In addition,
it appears that the programme has
had a significant impact in raising
standards of practice across the UK
construction industry.

We found evidence of learning
carried forward at the level of
individual managers and, at the level
of entire construction firms through
the adoption of new, firm-wide
policies. This aspect of legacy is
immensely valuable and should
not be underestimated.

Authors
Ian Mackenzie
Senior Research Fellow, Innovation
and Entrepreneurship Group,
Imperial College Business School

Andrew Davies
Reader in Innovation Management,
Innovation and Entrepreneurship
Group, Imperial College Business
School

2

Research objectives, methodology
and scope
With less than one year to go to the
Games, the construction programme,
which will not only provide most of
the venues for London 2012 but
transform a huge swathe of east
London, has been successful. The £7.2
billion programme is on track to be
completed under the detailed budget
set in the 2010 spending review a.
The safety record is outstanding
and other targets (for example,
sustainability) have been met. Most
important of all, it is being completed
on (and in several cases before) time.

This picture is in sharp contrast
to the experience of many other
‘mega-projects’ (for example,
Denver international airport,
Wembley Stadium and the Athens
2004 Games) which have been
characterised by cost and time
over-runs 3. Whereas many of these
other projects have been mired in
confrontation between client and
contractor, the London 2012
programme has been a testament
to collaboration with a remarkably
low level of disputes.

Our research aimed to identify
what aspects of the programme
and project management approach
underpinned this success to yield
useful lessons for future mega-
projects. We conducted 30 in-depth
interviews – each typically an hour in
length b. The research was undertaken
in phases to address the two levels of
organisation created to manage such
a complex project c:
– Programme level: In a first phase

we focused on the management
of the overall programme with
interviews conducted within the
ODA which acted as ‘the client’
for the programme and the ODA’s
Delivery Partner (DP), CLM – the
joint venture between CH2MHILL,
Laing O’Rourke and Mace – which
was formed specifically to act as
the ODA’s DP. The interviews
focused on how the ODA and DP
formed an umbrella organisation

and created a consistent process
to coordinate and integrate each
project within the overall
programme.

– Project level: In a second phase
our focus shifted to specific
projects, including the Olympic
Stadium, the Velodrome, the
temporary structures, the
International Broadcast Centre
(IBC)/Media Press Centre (MPC),
the Aquatics Centre and the
Athletes’ Village. Here, interviews
with the ODA project sponsor and
the DP Project Manager were
complemented with interviews with
the relevant Tier One contractor
(project director). The interviews
addressed the ways in which each
individual project fitted within the
overall programme, whilst being
tailored to meet specific
circumstances.

While our main focus was on
understanding what led to success,
we had a particular interest in the
use of innovative approaches to
programme and project management
– as exemplified by the use of a DP
Although the output from each
mega-project is clearly unique, prior
research has suggested that there is a
growing stock of knowledge around
how best to manage such complex
programmes which is generally
applicable 1,4.

This stock of knowledge grows
through the use of innovative
programme or project management
practices which are either developed
‘in programme’ or imported from
prior, similar projects or from other
industries 2. Also of interest is how
learning within a programme is
captured for future use – the key
objective of the ODA’s learning
legacy programme. The section on
innovation and learning explores the
source of the various management
practices used on the London 2012
construction programme and looks at
how this is carried forward, while the
section on overall lessons provides a
summary of key lessons.

a The original Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) budget, set in 2007, was £8.1bn.
This included considerable contingency elements.

b A list of interviews is provided in Appendix 1.
c The Games project is an example of the most complex ‘system of systems’ project,

comprised of a variety of systems which must be integrated to achieve an overall goal.
These projects are often called ‘programmes’ and structured under a formal ‘umbrella
organisation’ (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007: 105).

This research aimed to
identify what aspects
of programme and
project management
underpinned the
success of the ODA’s
construction programme.

3

An overall framework
Detailed analysis of the interviews
helped us to develop a framework
which identified three ‘headline
drivers’ which we believe are directly
responsible for favourable programme
outcomes. These were the:
– rigorous use of five key project

and programme management
processes;

– explicit specification of a series
of targets and principles around
other key programme objectives;

– high-level management philosophy
adopted across the programme.

Next, we identified a series of
‘enabling factors’ which allowed
these headline drivers to function
effectively. These were:
– the use of a well-resourced DP;
– supportive contractual

arrangements;
– a supportive programme-wide

culture.

Finally, we identified a number of
‘supporting factors’ which, while less
critical to the primary drivers,

Figure 1: Overall ‘drivers of success’ framework

nevertheless, have made a valuable
contribution to outcomes. These were:
– the so-called ‘Olympics effect’;
– the ‘health and safety’ effect;
– the emphasis placed on personal

and organisational development;
– working with familiar partners;
– full funding;
– the market downturn.

Figure 1 illustrates this framework
in diagrammatic form.

Headline drivers of success
Rigorous management processes
The Games construction programme
posed three main challenges. The
first was the crucial importance of
completing construction in a tight,
well-defined timescale. The second
was the scale of the construction
programme, which encompassed
over 70 separate projects with very
significant interdependencies
(common services, site logistics, etc).
The third was the wide range of
stakeholders that had legitimate
influence over parts of the
programme.

On time On budget Exemplary
safety

Other targets met
(eg: Sustainability)

Use of well-resourced
DP

Five key management
processes

Supportive contractual
arrangements

Explicit objectives and
principles

Supportive culture

Programme management
philosophy

Olympics effect Health and
safety effect

Personal and
organisational
development

Working with
familiar partners Full funding Market

turndown

Supporting factors

Enabling factors

Headline drivers of success

Programme outcomes

¦

¦

¦

4

Against this backdrop, the familiar
‘large construction programme’
challenges – maximising the
efficiency of construction while
minimising inevitable problems
caused by:
– designers or contractors failing to

do what they say they would do;
– misalignment between client/

stakeholders and design, between
design and construction and
between the different pieces of
the construction jigsaw; and

– changes caused by inevitable
revisions to requirements,
construction problems and external
factors – took on even greater
significance.

It was, thus, essential that there was:
– a high level of detailed planning

(both to optimise at the project
and programme level and to
reduce likelihood of problems);

– a high level of visibility of
performance throughout
construction (to expose problems
and issues at the earliest point);

– a high level of inter-dependency
management d (to minimise
misalignments); and

– a robust way of identifying and
dealing with problems and
changes across the entire
programme.

Five key management processes
Our first headline driver is, thus,
the series of five key management
processes that the ODA and DP e set
up and operated. These were:
– Up-front planning process:

A comprehensive ‘baseline’
was developed in 2007 which
defined scope, specifications and
initial budgets across the entire
programme. The resulting ‘yellow
book’ provided a valuable tool
for tracking progress and changes
and was updated (‘the blue book’)
in 2009.

– Project and programme
monitoring process: Each
project was required to provide
very detailed information on
progress, budget position, future
programme, etc. on a monthly

basis. This formed the basis for the
DP to review the project (through
their ‘assurance’ function) and
for the DP to roll up projects to
provide an overall programme
view f . Monthly trend reviews
(involving the ODA and the DP)
allowed senior managers to
spot trends which might not
be so apparent at lower levels.
Contractors and the DP were also
subject to a very rigorous audit
regime. The DP had their own
audit function (which would even
be auditing the DP Project
Management team). The ODA
operated an audit, backed up
by Ernst and Young. Finally there
were periodic government level
audits. As one DP Project
Manager put it ‘It was like
working in a fish bowl’.

– Problem resolution process:
The above monitoring process
highlighted problems and
kickstarted the associated
process of seeking solutions –
where typically, the DP would
seek to work with the relevant Tier
One contractor. Whether at the
planning stage – or as a result
of an unforeseen problem – time
was taken to identify, explore and
evaluate options so as to work
towards a ‘best solution’. An
example of this ‘optioneering’
would be the change to the
Velodrome roof structure.

– Change management process:
This involved identifying any
proposed changes at an early
stage, a rigorous change
approval process (with escalation
depending on size of change)
and fully documenting changes,
together with their impact and
their supporting rationale. Any
significant change had to be
reviewed by a ‘change board’
chaired by the ODA. This process
was instrumental in resolving
contentious issues before they
got to a point where things
became confrontational. Also,
the tight documentation meant
that ex-post payment disputes
were all but eradicated.

d We also use the words ‘integration management’ or ‘interface management’
interchangeably.

e At this point we simply acknowledge that CLM was the ODA’s DP. We discuss the use
of a DP, and the use of the DP in enabling factors section.

f A reporting matrix called ‘the wall’ was used with one axis corresponding to projects
and the other functions. This enabled senior DP managers to identify ‘problem bricks’.

A high level of detailed
planning, visibility
of performance,
inter-dependency
management, and robust
problem resolution and
change control processes
were essential.

5

– Integration management process:
This sought to identify how
slippages or changes in one
project impacted on others.
Integration committees were
operated in both design and
construction phases. Integration
between each project interface
and the overall London 2012
Olympic Park infrastructure (which
was split into two major areas)
was particularly important.
Indeed, integration of the various
elements of the infrastructure (such
as utilities) which represented
successive overlays required
careful integration.

Taken individually, these approaches
were not particularly innovative.
What was striking, however, was the
level of effort and rigour with which
they were pursued and executed.

This was unusual for an industry
that is not renowned for embracing
formal management processes.
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that
these processes were instrumental
in keeping individual projects –
and the overall programme – firmly
on the rails.

These processes were not without their
critics. Several Tier One contractors
voiced frustration with what were
perceived as being overly bureaucratic
procedures which ‘took resource away
from project management’. For
example, the need to recast the
forward programme each month was
criticised in more than one interview.
Nevertheless, there was a broad
recognition that detailed information
was needed to facilitate sound
programme management, especially
in the context of a highly visible,
public-sector-funded programme.

Figure 2: Details of the London 2012 policy values and priority themes

Objectives

Venues

Site platform

Village vertical build

Transport

Operations

Stratford projects

Other projects

H
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lth
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af
et

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an

d
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cu
rit

y

Su
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in
ab

ili
ty

Eq
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lit
y

an
d

in
cl

us
io

n

Em
pl

oy
m

en
t a

nd
s

ki
lls

Le
ga

cy

D
es

ig
n

an
d

ac
ce

ss
ib

ili
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Priority themes

Mission
To deliver venues, facilities, infrastructure and transport on time for the
London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games that are fit-for-purpose

and in a way that maximises the delivery of a sustainable legacy
within the available budget.

Overarching themes

Time, cost and fit for purpose

Taken individually, these
approaches were not
particularly innovative.
What was striking,
however, was the level
of effort and rigour
applied.

Whilst the priority theme
targets were non-
negotiable, it was up
to each contractor to
implement them in their
own way.

6

Objectives and principles relating
to other aspects of performance
While ‘cost, time and quality of
construction’ were clearly its prime
objectives, the ODA had a number
of additional objectives that had to
be met to achieve broader social
and economic impact. Accordingly,
at an early stage, the ODA identified
six ‘priority themes’ as follows:
– Health, Safety and Security
– Design and Accessibility
– Equality and Inclusion
– Legacy
– Employment and Skills
– Sustainability

The ODA published a ‘strategy’ for
each of these themes and detailed
specific objectives and principles
which the ODA was committed to
achieve in the course of delivering
its programme of construction. These
objectives were cascaded down
through the DP to Tier One
contractors and beyond. While the
targets and principles were non-
negotiable, it was up to each
contractor to implement them in
their own way.

What was crucial was that ODA
senior management made it clear that
these additional targets were not just
window dressing. They were deemed
just as important as the traditional
construction targets. As a result, they
were taken seriously – and achieved
– right across the programme.

Particular mention should be made
of the Health and Safety theme
which was championed right from
the top of the ODA. A ‘Park health’
facility was set up whereby everyone
on the Park could get health care
‘on-site’. Major emphasis was put
on safety through the setting up of
‘safety and leadership’ committees.
As a result, the safety record on the
Games site has been exemplary, with
no fatalities or major injuries to date.

Broad programme management
philosophy
The ODA (and by extension the DP)
exercised the thoughtful use of
‘loose-tight’ management, where
some aspects were tightly controlled
so as to achieve a highly consistent
approach across the programme,
whereas other aspects were loosely
managed – which provided for

flexibility. Tightly controlled aspects
included the five key management
processes (discussed previously), the
principles and targets relating to
health and safety and the other
priority themes (discussed previously)
and the kind of behaviours required
to underpin the programme culture
(in the next section).

This ‘tightness’ made sense partly
because of the need for programme-
wide consistency (for example, if
individual project reporting was to
be rolled up to the programme level)
and partly so as to reinforce the
importance of process, principle
or target.

Loosely controlled aspects included
how contractors would implement the
principles (for example, health and
safety) or achieve the targets (priority
themes) and the procurement and
contract approach to be used for
each project. The rationale for the
former was that each contractor
already had their own way of doing
things. Attempting to impose uniform
safety routines would probably be
counterproductive. Better to provide
an objective and challenge the
contractor to find their own route
to achieving it. Providing flexibility
around procurement and contract
approaches also made sense, given
that projects within the overall
programme differed greatly.

While a recognised Tier One
contractor under design and build
NEC3 C (target price with pain/gain)
was probably appropriate for
the Olympic Stadium, design-led
procurement seemed appropriate
for the Velodrome (give the
aspiration for a signature building)
while the ‘managed package
strategy’ was appropriate for the
temporary venues given that their
somewhat unusual requirements
were less attractive to conventional
Tier One contractors.

The ODA also exhibited appropriate
flexibility when project circumstances
changed. The most striking example
was where the economic downturn
in late 2008 meant that the Athletes’
Village needed to revert to public
funding. The ODA renegotiated the
contract with Bovis Lend Lease to
‘development management’.

Major emphasis was put
on safety through the
setting up of ‘safety and
leadership’ committees.
As a result, the safety
record on the Games site
has been exemplary.

7

Enabling factors
There is no guarantee that specifying rigorous processes, setting overall
targets and principles and adopting what appears to be a well thought
out overall management philosophy will achieve the programme’s goals.
Certain ‘enablers’ are needed to ensure that desired outcomes are
delivered through proper execution and appropriate behaviour. Our
analysis suggests that there were three key enablers:
– a well-resourced DP
– supportive contractual arrangements
– a supportive programme-wide culture

In addition, the procurement
approach was changed from
‘all construction management’ to
a hybrid approach where over half
of the building was procured with
a Tier One contractor under a lump
sum, Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT)
design and build contract. A further
example of ODA flexibility was
when ISG, the Tier One contractor
on the Velodrome, challenged the
incumbent steel roof design in favour
of tensioned cable.

The ODA provided time for a
proper evaluation and ultimately
accepted the switch even though
it exacerbated short-term time
pressures. Also on the Velodrome,
ISG’s contract was changed from
target price with pain/gain to fixed
price as part of a restructuring where
the budget was creating a major
problem and the ODA took on
the risks associated with resilience
and security.

A well-resourced DP
– The DP concept
Given that the ODA was a transitory
organisation and that the lead time
for getting ‘up and running’ was
short, it was always clear that they
needed to appoint an organisation to
act as overall programme manager.
The initial thinking was to contract
with a conventional programme
manager. However, the ODA’s Chief
Executive, David Higgins, felt that
the role should be broader and set
out to appoint a DP.

Interviewees often found it difficult
to draw a clear distinction between
‘programme manager’ and ‘DP’ but
most would agree that the latter implies
a more dynamic, more pro-active
leadership of the overall programme.

The DP evolved over time (see
discussion below) but ended up
undertaking seven key roles:
1. developing/specifying detailed

project and programme
management processes;

2. administering the contracts with
Tier One contractors or equivalent
(for example, involving sign-off
and payment authorisation);

3. providing project assurance,
for example, checking that things
are done – and done properly –
on each project; challenging the
future programme;

4. providing optioneering and
problem solving expertise at the
project level;

5. managing the ‘change’ process;
6. providing visibility of project

performance to the programme
level and collating performance
programme-wide;

7. managing the interfaces between
the various projects, such as
integration management.

Of these seven roles, items
1, 6 and 7 related primarily to
programme management, whereas
items 2 to 5 related primarily to
individual projects. There was,
therefore, tight linkage between the
project and programme levels.

In addition, the DP provided specific
capability when needed. The DP
was asked to undertake certain
programme-wide functions such as
site-wide logistics. At the project
level, the DP was able to step in
to provide a form of construction
management for the temporary
structures when it became clear
that the conventional Tier One
procurement route was not working.

Broadly speaking, the
DP faced ‘downwards’
to the various individual
projects while the ODA
faced ‘upwards’ to the
plethora of stakeholders.

8

Broadly speaking, the DP faced
‘downwards’ to the various individual
projects while the ODA faced
‘upwards’ to the plethora of
stakeholders g. This division of roles
was generally felt to have been
very valuable. Together, the ODA
and DP played a vital role in
brokering between stakeholders and
the contractors when it came to
changes in requirements or changes
necessitated by a project’s situation.
Despite this role separation, it is clear
that the ODA and DP worked very
closely together (as discussed further
below). Overall, the ODA and DP
represented a ‘very intelligent client’.

– The choice of the DP
The choice of the DP appears to
have worked out very well despite
the need to weld together staff from
three distinct organisations. Initially, it
seemed that Bechtel was the heir
apparent to the role. However, the
joint venture emerged to offer a novel
breadth of programme management,
project management and direct
construction expertise. The ODA ran
a selection process which
emphasised (amongst other things)
‘compatibility of working style’ and
‘capability to deal with problems’ and
as a result, the DP was appointed.

The DP clearly provided access to
a wide range of skills. Less obvious
was the notion that the use of a new,
purpose-built joint venture created a
‘clean sheet of paper’. This probably
fostered a fresher and more objective
approach to going about things,
whereas a single firm appointment
could have imposed an established
set of beliefs about how things
should best be done.

The appointment of a DP would not
have paid off without the funding to
fully resource the task. At its peak, DP
staffing reached around 600. If the
200 or so staff from the ODA are
included, the overall ‘programme
management’ cost will come out
around 10 per cent of the overall
programme spend h. If we assume that
the minimum level of programme
management would be five per cent,
then the issue is whether the extra five

per cent is worth it. Across the
programme, the clear consensus is
that the extra five per cent has indeed
been worth it given the favourable
outturn performance.

Supportive contractual arrangements
The ODA had a clear preference for
NEC contracts between themselves
and Tier One contractors. NEC3 C
was ‘target price plus pain/gain’
while NEC3 A was ‘fixed price’.
The most important aspect of these
contracts was the requirement to
provide transparency of progress,
to bring problems or issues to light
as soon as possible and to work in
collaboration with DP and others
to find solutions to problems.
While an ‘open and collaborative’
approach can be affected under
a JCT contract, there is little doubt
that working under a contract that
enshrines these behaviours makes
life easier.

The contract between the ODA
and DP was carefully structured
in two regards: Firstly, the DP bid on
periodic ‘work packages’ i. The ODA
would specify the overall, ‘top-down’
requirements for the period leaving
the DP to work through the detail
and come back with a ‘bottom-up’
proposal which was then subject
to examination and negotiation.
This approach ensured that the DP
had high ownership of the resulting
work packages which reflected
bottom-up knowledge.

Secondly, the contract also involved
important incentives. The DP opted to
put 90 per cent of its margin ‘at risk’,
linked to meeting multiple key
performance indicators (KPIs). This
provided the DP with a huge incentive
to meet various milestones and targets
and served to align objectives
between the DP and the ODA. The
KPI approach also provided flexibility
so that incentives could be aligned
between the DP and Tier One
contractors. An example of this was
on the Athletes’ Village where
relationships between the DP and
Lend lease improved once it was clear
that success would benefit both.

g Stakeholders span from LOCOG through to various sports associations through to many
statutory bodies to Local and central Government.

h Source: ODA Annual Financial Reports.
i These work packages were typically let for a 12–18 month period.

Overall, the ODA and
DP represented a ‘very
intelligent client’.

10%
Percentage of the overall programme
spend on programme management.

90%
Percentage of DP’s margin ‘at risk’,
linked to meeting multiple KPIs.

9

A supportive organisational culture
It is well known that formal
organisational arrangements
(processes, resources, objectives,
etc.) can only go so far in driving
outcomes. The informal aspect of an
organisation, notably a supportive
culture, is crucial for driving the ‘open
and collaborative’ behaviours that
underpin success. The organisational
culture that we observed across the
programme was indeed supportive
in three important aspects j:
– a fundamental belief that

‘failure was not an option’ and
that everything must be done to
make the programme a success;

– a commitment to bringing
problems to light at an early
stage and striving collaboratively
to find solutions;

– a particularly strong discipline
around health and safety aspects.

Organisational culture cannot simply
be imposed by managements – they
develop in response to a number of
factors. Importantly, organisational
culture is greatly influenced by the
pronouncements and actions of
senior managers. This culture on the
London 2012 construction programme
can be traced back to the leadership
of the ODA – and other senior
managers at the DP or at Tier One

level who, mainly through past
experience, held these aspects to
be important. Several important
influences on the development of
this culture are highlighted in the
following section.

Supporting factors
We now describe a series of
factors which helped to underpin
the enabling factors and thereby,
the headline drivers of success k.

The Olympics effect
The fact that the programme was
for ‘the London Olympics’ – a very
prestigious and high profile event –
underpinned a widespread attitude
that ‘this programme has to be a
success’ and ‘we’ll do what it takes to
get it done’. This undoubtedly helped
to foster a culture of collaboration
across the programme and indeed, is
attributed by many for inspiring high
on-site productivity. As one executive
put it: ‘People were working at least
10 per cent harder than they would
normally work’. Some contractors
explicitly sought to produce ‘superior
performance’, a good illustration
being Carillion’s ‘going for gold’
campaign on the IBC-MPC where
their supply chain were challenged
to‘do the best they could every day’.

The IBC-MPC contractor sought to produce ‘superior performance’ through their
‘Going for Gold’ campaign, challenging the supply chain to ‘do the best they could
every day’

j Appendix 2 provides further detail on the culture observed across the London 2012
construction programme.

k The role of technology, though important, is not viewed by the authors as distinctive
as these other aspects. A brief summary of the technology deployed is contained in
Appendix 3.

The culture on the
programme can be
traced back to the
leadership of the ODA
and other senior
managers at the DP
or Tier One level.

10

The Olympic effect also undoubtedly
enabled highly experienced
managers to be recruited or
seconded into the ODA and
DP and encouraged contractors
to field their ‘A’ teams. The impact
of having experienced construction
professionals working on the
programme – many of whom had
prior experience of working together
– cannot be overstated.

The health and safety effect
Many interviewees cited that the
great emphasis put on health and
safety by the ODA did more than
just achieve a highly successful health
and safety record. It made individual
workers on site feel that management
did, in fact, care about them. This
generated commitment which, in
turn, inspired greater effort and
productivity. If this effect can be
substantiated, it has important
consequences for future construction
management practice.

The emphasis on human resource
management and organisational
development
A striking feature of the London 2012
construction programme was the
extent of attention and resourcing
devoted to providing what might be
described as a modern human
resource management and
organisational development
capability. These efforts contributed
greatly to the effective working of the
ODA and DP – and probably also
between the DP and Tier One
contractors. It is striking because the
UK construction industry is not
renowned for being a major advocate
of devoting resource to these areas.

This emphasis does, of course,
make sense given that the ODA
was a new organisation and the DP
was assembled at speed by its three
parent companies. It is not surprising
that there were significant problems in
the early days, particularly as the DP
sought to define its role, establish a
modus operandi and build personal
relationships. Several organisational
development activities appear to
have been particularly valuable in
overcoming these problems:

– the co-location of the ODA and
the DP over the planning phases
of the programme. This was then
translated into co-location of the
ODA and the DP with the relevant
Tier One contractor in integrated
project teams during construction
phases;

– the pairing of an ODA executive
(project sponsor) and DP executive
(project manager) across the
major projects (and many smaller
projects). Again, this was extended
to include pairing of the DP Project
Manager with the Tier One Project
Director in the construction phase;

– the proactive management of skills
requirements. This involved
determining what skills were
required, identifying skills gaps
and finding ways to bridge the
gaps. It included the running of
training workshops, including
team building exercises and
rigorous performance appraisal;

– the provision of coaches for
senior executives and specialist
facilitators for workshops;

– a strong emphasis on internal
communication to aid awareness
of how the programme was going,
to reinforce key messages and to
foster pride l.

Two further aspects are worthy
of special note:
– If it became clear that an individual

was not well suited to a particular
role – perhaps simply because
of personal style issues – then
changes would be made.
Proactively getting ‘the right person
in the right position’ was cited
on many occasions as critical
to fostering the right working
relationships and embedding the
open, collaborative culture. A
specific example of this principle
was the appointment of a Chief
Executive for the DP who was not
from any of the three parent
companies. This, in retrospect, was
a very helpful move as inevitably
there were tensions within the DP,
where parent company practices or
cultures clashed. The appointment
of someone who was seen as more
independent and ‘above the fray’
helped to defuse these tensions and
set common directions.

l Much effort was also put into external communications with stakeholders and the
general public.

A striking feature of the
construction programme
was the emphasis placed
on human resource
management and
organisational
development capability.

11

– The running of workshops to
discuss how the organisations
and the culture were developing
and to seek consensus around
issues and solutions. Many
interviewees credit these for
achieving and maintaining a close
alignment of the ODA and DP over
time. Informal weekly ODA-DP
management meetings were set up
to foster openness and
collaboration. As a result, trust
and confidence built up between
key individuals from each
organisation. In the early days,
each organisation would have its
own formal monthly management
review meetings. However, over
time, representatives from the other
organisation were invited along
so that the level of openness
(and hence, collaboration)
increased still further.

This emphasis on proactive
human resource management and
organisational development would
not have succeeded without the
support of top ODA and DP
management. This support was
made explicit through the
endorsement of a ‘People Strategy’
in 2007 which was prepared (and
implemented) by the ODA and DP
human resources teams.

Working with familiar partners
Several of the Tier One contractors
interviewed stressed the role that
‘working with familiar (supply chain)
partners’ had had in achieving good
project outcomes, the rationale being
that the value of established personal
relationships in resolving problems
and issues outweighed any loss of
competitiveness in bidding. In some
sense this is controversial in that EU
procurement regulations require open
bidding. However, it is clear that
the ODA and DP were sympathetic
to the ‘relationship’ argument and
generally tried to support the
preferences of the Tier One
contractors.

Full funding
Although it is difficult to come to a
truly objective view, the consensus
from our interviews suggests that

the London 2012 construction
programme was indeed funded to a
‘good level’. This is not to say that
there was money for whatever the
stadia designers came up with. There
were, in fact, clear limits on the
funding available for the stadia,
which in some cases led to serious
redesign to meet the available
budget. The important point, in our
view, is that there was sufficient
funding to allow for the:
– deployment of a well-resourced DP

(as discussed already);
– rigorous implementation of the

range of ‘best practice’ programme
and project management processes
and tools as described already;

– adoption of a proactive approach
to human resource management
and organisational development
(for the ODA and DP).

The full funding may also have
assisted the recruitment of top calibre
construction executives though, as
mentioned, working on the London
2012 construction programme was a
great attraction in itself.

The market downturn
Any discussion of ‘key success
factors’ would be incomplete without
acknowledging that the market
downturn from the second half
of 2008, induced by the global
financial crisis, helped financial
performance because contractor
and raw material prices declined.
This was in sharp contrast to the
‘heated’ construction industry that
was prevalent in the early years of
the programme.

Of course, the downturn created
problems in terms of the loss of
private funding for the Athletes’
Village and the IBC-MPC. However,
in both these cases, the switch to
public funding triggered a
reappraisal of design which, in turn,
led to reduced cost schemes. A
specific example of the impact of the
market downturn comes from the
IBC-MPC where ‘the overall cost of
the scheme was reduced from
£350m to £300m on account of
procurement savings’.

12

Figure 3: Learning and transferring knowledge

‘Learning from outside’
events and experiences
(such as other projects,

consultants and industries)

‘Learning within’
experiences and innovation

generated within a
mega-project

‘Capturing and transferring
learning’

learning, capturing and
transferring knowledge gained
to subsequent mega-projects

Innovation and learning on the
London 2012 construction
programme
Our research employed a simple
model (see Figure 3) which
recognises that learning and
transferring knowledge has three
components:
– the introduction (to a mega-

project) of novel approaches
from outside the project, whether
from previous mega-projects or
from other industrial sources;

– learning and innovation that
takes place within a particular
mega-project;

– activities aimed at capturing
the learning from a mega-project
so that the innovations can be
reused on future projects.

Examples of ‘learning from outside’
Throughout our interviews, we came
across examples where the use of a
particular management approach or
the advocacy of a desired aspect of
the culture was attributed to a key
individual. These individuals brought
into the programme both their past
experience of ‘what drives success
in major projects’ and an ability to
assess what was needed or was
appropriate in the particular
circumstances of the Park
programme. Examples would
include:
– Culture of collaboration from

David Higgins
– Proactive ‘optioneering’ from Mark

Reynolds (MACE)
– MIS dashboard from Ian Galloway

(Bechtel, CTRL experience)
– High health and safety standards

from Ian Galloway (Bechtel/oil
and gas experience)

– Rigorous programme assurance
processes from Richard Rook (LOR)

Previous UK mega-projects such
as Heathrow Terminal 5 and the
Channel Tunnel Rail Link were
repeatedly mentioned as important
sources for the learning brought in
by these individuals. In parallel, the
Director of Construction proactively
sought to engage advisors with
hands on experience of preparing
for previous Games to ensure that the
pitfalls were avoided and that the
ODA and DP could take on board
previous experience.

Examples of ‘learning from within’
While the programme and project
management processes described
earlier in this research paper were
not new per se, there was no doubt
considerable learning and refinement
that took place as they were
developed and operated. There
were many examples of process
learning, such as moving from a 40
strong/four hour ODA-DP monthly
review meeting to an eight person,
1.5 hour meeting as familiarity and
trust developed.

The value of using a DP drawn from
multiple companies produced
considerable within-programme
learning including:
– the value of having a broad range

of skills and capabilities available
(to provide flexibility in role); and

– the need to provide time for the
new organisation to ‘shake down’
for ‘the right people’ (those
who could operate in an open,
collaborative culture) to be
identified.

13

Finally, some of the Tier One
contractors gained their first exposure
to NEC3 contracts – with their
requirements for open, collaborative
behaviour – and had to learn to
work under what was an unfamiliar
regime. These contractors no doubt
gained a variety of knowledge and
experience from their participation
and resolution of challenges
encountered in the different projects.

Examples of ‘capturing and
transferring learning’
– ODA’s Learning Legacy Initiative

The ODA has clearly made a major
effort to codify learning, at various
levels, and make the knowledge
available for subsequent mega-
projects:
– Lessons learned: Lessons captured

at 70 per cent and 90 per cent
completion as part of the normal
project process. Some already
documented.

– Micro-reports: One to two page
reports documenting innovations
completed by contractors,
designers, engineers, DP, the
ODA.

– Case studies: 3,000-word studies
on various learning topics.
Completed by industry, for
example, the Institute for
Sustainability doing something on
waste, or produced internally and
peer reviewed by industry experts.

– Champion products: Templates,
tools and documents that could
usefully be applied to other
projects.

– Research projects: More detailed
studies by external parties. This
paper is a summary of a research
paper and fits within this category.

It is also worth mentioning that the
programme and project management
processes and procedures developed
specifically for the Games have been
comprehensively captured in the
Project Document Management
System (PDMS).

– Individual and corporate carry
forward

This kind of ‘codification’ approach
can make a significant contribution.
However, at the end of the day,
the most powerful mechanism for
carrying forward learning is almost
certainly when it is carried in the
heads of key individuals – or where
it becomes part of the DNA of an
organisation, such as the efforts
by senior managers involved in
the Olympic Stadium project to
encourage McAlpine to adopt
health and safety processes on
all the firm’s future projects.

Overall lessons
In seeking to identify the most important overall lessons from the London
2012 construction programme, we must recognise that no two mega-
projects are the same and that programme-specific characteristics will
inevitably shape the appropriate organisational structure and
management style. For example, the London 2012 construction
programme contained a wide variety of individual projects (requiring a
flexible approach to project procurement and contracting), whereas
Heathrow Terminal 5 represented a much more integrated and
standardised set of processes. Nevertheless, we believe four key lessons
can be identified:
1. invest in comprehensive project and programme management

processes;
2. find a way to create an intelligent and broad-capability client. In

the case of Heathrow Terminal 5, BAA were already strong – and
seconded in certain staff to boost their capability. Here the appointment
of a DP with multiple capabilities appears inspired;

3. secure ‘full funding’ (having a realistic programme to work from helps
to create the right culture from the off);

4. invest in human resources and organisational development – to build
skills, relationships and a supportive culture.

The learning legacy aims
to make the knowledge
available for subsequent
mega-projects.

14

References
1 Davies, A., Gann, D., & Douglas, T. (2009). Innovation in megaprojects:

systems integration at Heathrow Terminal 5. California Management
Review, 51(2): 101–125.

2 Dvir, D., & Shenhar, A.J. (2011). What great projects have in common.
MIT Sloan Management Review, 52/3: 19–21.

3 Flyvbjerg, B., Bruzelius, N., & Rothengatter, W. (2003). Megaprojects and
risk: an anatomy of ambition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

4 Shenhar, A.J., & Dvir, D. (2007). Reinventing project management:
the diamond approach to successful growth and innovation. Boston,
Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press.

List of interviews
– Carline Blackman, Head of Organisational Development, CLM

(17 November 2010)
– Louise Hardy, Infrastructure Director, CLM (17 November 2010)
– Ken Owen, Commercial Director, CLM (24 November 2010)
– Mark Reynolds, Deputy Programme Director, CLM (25 November 2010)
– Ian Galloway, Programme Director, CLM (1 December 2010)
– Simon Wright, Director of Utilities, ODA (1 December 2010)
– Ken Durbin, Technical Services Director, CLM (8 December 2010)
– Alison Nimmo, Director of Design and Regeneration, ODA

(8 December 2010)
– Richard Rook, Director of Construction Integration, CLM

(15 December 2010)
– Hugh Sumner, Director of Transport, ODA (15 December 2010)
– Michele Owens, HR Manager, ODA (1 December 2010)
– Howard Shiplee, Director of Construction, ODA (15 December 2010)
– Jason Millet, Venues Director, CLM (2 February 2011)
– John Armitt, Chairman, ODA (9 February 2011)
– Alice Coates, Marketing Strategy, ODA (9 February 2011)
– Tony Aikenhead & Chris Hall, Stadium – Project Director, McAlpine

(17 March 2011)
– Richard Rook, Stadium – Project Manager, CLM (17 March 2011)
– Simon Birchall, Athletes’ Village – Project Manager, CLM (28 March 2011)
– Mark Dickenson, Athletes’ Village – Project Director, Lend Lease

(28 March 2011)
– Alan Bates, Athletes’ Village – Project Sponsor, ODA (28 March 2011)
– Dean Goodliffe, Velodrome – Project Director, ISG (31 March 2011)
– Davendra Dabasia, Velodrome – Project Manager, CLM (31 March 2011)
– Colin Naish, IBC/MPC – Project Sponsor, ODA (6 April 2011)
– Tony Coyle, IBC/MPC – Project Sponsor, T1 (6 April 2011)
– Danny Richards, Basketball – Project Manager, CLM (10 May 2011)
– Dave Coulson, Basketball – Project Director, T1 (10 May 2011)
– Richard Arnold, Basketball – Project Sponsor, ODA (10 May 2011)
– Michael Lytrides, IBC/MPC – Project Manager, CLM (22 July 2011)
– Ian Crockford, Aquatics – Project Sponsor, ODA (4 August 2011)
– Stuart Fraser, Aquatics – Project Director, Balfour Beatty

(5 September 2011)

15

Appendices Appendix 1: Organisational culture
Culture encompasses widely held assumptions which drive people’s
behaviours – which can be norms (accepted ways of behaving), values (what
is deemed to be important) or beliefs (what people believe about how things
work). The table below shows some of the main aspects of the culture on the
London 2012 construction programme that we discerned from our interviews:

Beliefs – Failure is not an option
– We can/will solve problems

Values – Making a success of the programme is very important
– All the major objectives (cost, time, quality plus the priority

themes) are important

Norms – Bringing problems or issues to light is normal/good
– Collaboration is normal/good
– Working non-hierarchically (such as horizontally) where

appropriate

Perhaps the main feature to highlight is the highly collaborative culture which
extended across the entire programme. Within this culture, the cardinal sin
was not running into difficulties but not disclosing that the difficulties were
there and not working to find a solution.

Appendix 2: The role of technology
The key management processes were facilitated through a series of ICT
systems, for example:
– Prima Vera contract management system
– GIS (single model system)
– PDMS (processes, policies) system

The use of these systems was generally viewed as being necessary but quite
commonplace. None were viewed as being particularly innovative. Overall,
technology was viewed as an enabler but not a key reason for success.

© 2011 Olympic Delivery Authority. The official Emblems of the London 2012 Games are © London Organising Committee of the Olympic
Games and Paralympic Games Limited (LOCOG) 2007. All rights reserved.

The construction of the venues and infrastructure of the London 2012 Games is funded by the National Lottery through the Olympic Lottery
Distributor, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, the Mayor of London and the London Development Agency.

For more information visit: london2012.com/learninglegacy

Produced in association with:

Published October 2011
ODA 2011/269

Managing Programmes and
Portfolios (MPP) M32494

Case Study: Crossrail

Contents

• Background
• Route Map
• Funding and Construction Cost
• Programme Management
• Programme Governance
• The Business Case and Benefits
• Crossrail Learning Legacy Framework
• References

Background

• Crossrail project was the largest infrastructure project in Europe and the
largest project in the UK for a generation.

• An east-west link across central London was first proposed in 1845 (Gannon,
2008)

• In recent times long history of development for Crossrail dating back to 1974.

• Private Bill deposited in 1991 to obtain powers to build the scheme despite
multiple Government led cost-effectiveness reviews bill rejected early May
1994 and scheme safeguarded (Gannon, 2008)

• Hybrid Bill submitted in House of Commons February 2005 and received
Royal Assent (permission to build the railway) on 22 July 2008 (Gannon,
2008)

• Constructing a 118km railway from Reading and Heathrow through London
(Paddington, Bond St, Tottenham Court Rd, Liverpool St) and out to Shenfield
in Essex and Abbey Wood in Greenwich (Tucker, 2017).

Route Map

The Appraisal and Business Case for Crossrail (2019)

Funding and Construction Cost

• Original construction cost estimate £14.8
billion (2004).

• Public and Private Sector
– Public Sector: Central and Local

Government, Tax Payer
– Private Sector: Heathrow Airport and

Developers

• 5 October 2007 £15.9 billion funding
package announced by the Prime minister
Gordon Brown (Buck, p8, 2017).

• Most recent construction cost now
estimated £19 billion with an opening in
2022 -mid way through year (Building
News, 2020).

• 28% increase in construction costs!

Civil Engineering

5

Crossrail project: finance, funding and value
capture for London’s new Elizabeth line
Buck

9.1 Learning point
In both of the above cases the risk to both the project and

the developers was significant. The! developer was investing
substantial sums of money and e”ort into constructing a railway
station that was not going be operational for several years, while
failure by the developer to meet deadlines set by the project
could result in delays to the critical tunnelling and railway works.
Deals of this complexity could not have been done at every
station: reaching agreement on acceptable terms required both
developer and project to deploy very sophisticated engineering
and commercial skills, and each location should be considered on
a case by case basis.

More generally, Crossrail was expected to generate development
across London. Traditionally, developers seeking planning
permission for significant commercial developments would enter
into a section 106 agreement with the local authority, serving as

(Figure!4), both of which would experience substantial uplift in the
development potential as a result of the railway.

The Canary Wharf Group were early movers lobbying strongly
for Crossrail to be built and agreeing first to build the proposed
station at Canary Wharf, and also to make a contribution of
£150!million towards the cost. In!return, government granted rights
for Canary Wharf Group to develop retail and leisure above the
station (Figure!5).

Siting a station at Woolwich had originally been rejected on
the grounds of cost, inability to provide for freight trains to use
the tunnel under the Thames to North Woolwich, and its potential
to cannibalise the tra#c generated by the recently completed
extension of the Docklands Light Railway to Woolwich.

When the House of Commons hybrid Bill select committee
instructed the promoter to provide a station at Woolwich, the
Berkeley Group – in the partially developed estate where a
station would be sited – and the London Borough of Greenwich
collaborated with CLRL to make a proposal to government to
construct the station. Initially, the agreement provided for the
construction of a station box which would support a residential
development above. A!subsequent agreement provided for the cost
of fitting out the station to be met between the developer and the
sponsors.

Figure 3. Business rate supplement prospectus

Local government
Transport for London

direct funding £1.9 billion

Central government
Department for Transport
direct funding £4.8 billion

Overall funding envelope

£14·8 billion

Business rate supplement, borrowing
and direct contributions £4.1 billion

Community infrastructure levy
£300 million

Sale of surplus land and property
£500 million

Developer contribution £300 million

Fundraising for which
Transport for London

is responsible £5.25 billion

City of London committed funding
£250 million

Heathrow Airport Limited £70 million

Voluntary funding from London
businesses £100 million

Fundraising for which
Department for Transport
is responsible £480 million

Network Rail financing for work
on the existing network £2·3 billion

Figure 4. Final sources of funding

Figure 5. Aerial view of Woolwich Station with Berkeley Homes
oversite developments

Figure 1: Final Source of Funding (Buck, 2017)

Programme Management Construction

Civil Engineering
Volume 170 Issue CE5

Crossrail project: the execution strategy for
delivering London’s Elizabeth line
Tucker

6

Crossrail secured the services of a programme partner to
provide the client team with a professional programme, project and
engineering management services and to support the oversight and
management of the project at the programme level. This contract
was awarded in 2009 to Transcend, a joint venture of CH2M Hill,
Aecom and the Nichols Group.

Crossrail secured the services of a project delivery partner to
take on the day-to-day responsibility for delivery of the central
section and its constituent contracts to time, to the desired quality
and within the forecast outturn cost, while fulfilling its obligations
under the enabling legislation. This contract was awarded, also in
2009, to Bechtel Ltd and its nominated sub-suppliers Halcrow and
Systra. The project delivery organisation is shown in Figure 6.

Agreements were put in place with industry partners for the on-
network works (Network Rail) and upgrades to the existing London
Underground assets (London Underground), Canary Wharf station
(Canary Wharf Group) and Woolwich station (Berkeley Homes).
Agreements were also put in place with the statutory utilities
(Thames Water, British Telecommunications, National Grid, British
Gas, etc.) to administer all asset protection and modification works
required for existing infrastructure to make way for the new railway.

Crossrail also recognised the need to be able to begin advanced
or ‘enabling’ works before the start of the major central section
construction.!In 2008, an enabling works management agent contract
was awarded to manage the design and implementation for all enabling
works, including utility diversions, tra”c management, surveys and
other protection works. These works were concluded in 2011.

The architecture of this delivery model has remained intact since
2009 and, while the specific organisational delivery structure for
the central section has evolved over time during di#erent phases of
the project, the basic tenets of Crossrail’s vision have stood the test

The programme for design, procurement, construction and
commissioning of the various stages was set in 2009.! As of
the date of this paper, progress has passed 75% complete with
a high confidence of maintaining and achieving the staged-
opening milestones. Figure!4 provides an overview of the project
programme.

5. Overall project management structure

Crossrail’s execution strategy was outlined in the internal
document Crossrail Project Delivery Strategy in 2009 and was
based on a model in which the overall programme of work would
be engineered, procured, constructed and commissioned in a
series of projects by Crossrail and its industry partners, third party
stakeholders and the supply chain. This was to be accomplished by
an integrated delivery team in which Crossrail

! remained responsible for delivery and assurance of the
sponsor’s requirements

! entered into agreements with Network Rail, London
Underground and other third parties as necessary to deliver the
programme

! defined the health and safety, environmental and quality regime
under which the programme would be delivered

! managed finance and funding
! defined and implemented the strategies for procurement

of design, construction and other services to deliver the
programme

! integrated the overall programme
! established and managed programme-wide public relations
! coordinated optimal insurance for the programme.

Figure!5 shows the programme management structure.
A programme director was appointed by Crossrail to lead an

integrated delivery team made up of Crossrail, programme and
project sta# and supply chain partners for design, construction and
implementation.

2009
Design

Tunnelling

Railway systems

Rolling stock and
depot

Civil engineering and station construction

Public space and oversite development around stations

Network rail works

Phased
introduction
of services

Surveys and enabling
works

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Figure 4.!The project’s construction programme extends over
10!years – from work starting in May 2009 to full service operation in
December 2019

London
Underground

Design
consultants

Project
partners

Crossrail

Transport
for London

Department
for Transport

Operator
Rail for London
(Elizabeth line)

Executive
team

Framework
contracts

Delivery
contracts

Operating
contracts

Contractors
Train

operating
concession

Docklands
Light Railway

Canary Wharf
Group

Berkeley
Homes

Network Rail
(on-network works)

In
d
u
st

ry
p

ar
tn

er
a

g
re

em
en

ts

Integrated
team

Sponsor’s agreement

Shareholder
agreement

Project development
agreement

‘Crossrail project’

Project
representative

Joint sponsor
team

Rolling
stock/depot

Figure 5. Programme management structure

The Crossrail programme is structured to
deliver a series of opening stages as follows
(Tucker, 2017):

■ Stage 1: progressive introduction of new
class 345 rolling stock on existing suburban
services between Liverpool Street and
Shenfield (May 2017).

■ Stage 2: on-network works between
Heathrow and Westbourne Park, including
services running at a frequency of four trains
per hour from Paddington station to Heathrow
(May 2018).

■ Stage 3: Elizabeth line services running
between Paddington low-level and Abbey
Wood stations (December 2018).

■ Stage 4: through-running of Elizabeth line
services between Paddington low-level and
both Shenfield and Abbey Wood (May 2019).

■ Stage 5: full Elizabeth line service from
Reading and Heathrow through the central
operating section to Shenfield and Abbey
Wood (December 2019).

Figure 2: Provides an overview of the project programme ( Tucker, 2017)

Programme Management

Civil Engineering
Volume 170 Issue CE5

Crossrail project: the execution strategy for
delivering London’s Elizabeth line
Tucker

6

Crossrail secured the services of a programme partner to
provide the client team with a professional programme, project and
engineering management services and to support the oversight and
management of the project at the programme level. This contract
was awarded in 2009 to Transcend, a joint venture of CH2M Hill,
Aecom and the Nichols Group.

Crossrail secured the services of a project delivery partner to
take on the day-to-day responsibility for delivery of the central
section and its constituent contracts to time, to the desired quality
and within the forecast outturn cost, while fulfilling its obligations
under the enabling legislation. This contract was awarded, also in
2009, to Bechtel Ltd and its nominated sub-suppliers Halcrow and
Systra. The project delivery organisation is shown in Figure 6.

Agreements were put in place with industry partners for the on-
network works (Network Rail) and upgrades to the existing London
Underground assets (London Underground), Canary Wharf station
(Canary Wharf Group) and Woolwich station (Berkeley Homes).
Agreements were also put in place with the statutory utilities
(Thames Water, British Telecommunications, National Grid, British
Gas, etc.) to administer all asset protection and modification works
required for existing infrastructure to make way for the new railway.

Crossrail also recognised the need to be able to begin advanced
or ‘enabling’ works before the start of the major central section
construction.!In 2008, an enabling works management agent contract
was awarded to manage the design and implementation for all enabling
works, including utility diversions, tra”c management, surveys and
other protection works. These works were concluded in 2011.

The architecture of this delivery model has remained intact since
2009 and, while the specific organisational delivery structure for
the central section has evolved over time during di#erent phases of
the project, the basic tenets of Crossrail’s vision have stood the test

The programme for design, procurement, construction and
commissioning of the various stages was set in 2009.! As of
the date of this paper, progress has passed 75% complete with
a high confidence of maintaining and achieving the staged-
opening milestones. Figure!4 provides an overview of the project
programme.

5. Overall project management structure

Crossrail’s execution strategy was outlined in the internal
document Crossrail Project Delivery Strategy in 2009 and was
based on a model in which the overall programme of work would
be engineered, procured, constructed and commissioned in a
series of projects by Crossrail and its industry partners, third party
stakeholders and the supply chain. This was to be accomplished by
an integrated delivery team in which Crossrail

! remained responsible for delivery and assurance of the
sponsor’s requirements

! entered into agreements with Network Rail, London
Underground and other third parties as necessary to deliver the
programme

! defined the health and safety, environmental and quality regime
under which the programme would be delivered

! managed finance and funding
! defined and implemented the strategies for procurement

of design, construction and other services to deliver the
programme

! integrated the overall programme
! established and managed programme-wide public relations
! coordinated optimal insurance for the programme.

Figure!5 shows the programme management structure.
A programme director was appointed by Crossrail to lead an

integrated delivery team made up of Crossrail, programme and
project sta# and supply chain partners for design, construction and
implementation.

2009
Design

Tunnelling

Railway systems

Rolling stock and
depot

Civil engineering and station construction

Public space and oversite development around stations

Network rail works

Phased
introduction
of services

Surveys and enabling
works

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Figure 4.!The project’s construction programme extends over
10!years – from work starting in May 2009 to full service operation in
December 2019

London
Underground

Design
consultants

Project
partners

Crossrail

Transport
for London

Department
for Transport

Operator
Rail for London
(Elizabeth line)

Executive
team

Framework
contracts

Delivery
contracts

Operating
contracts

Contractors
Train

operating
concession

Docklands
Light Railway

Canary Wharf
Group

Berkeley
Homes

Network Rail
(on-network works)

Ind
us

try
p

ar
tn

er
ag

re
em

en
ts

Integrated
team

Sponsor’s agreement

Shareholder
agreement

Project development
agreement

‘Crossrail project’

Project
representative

Joint sponsor
team

Rolling
stock/depot

Figure 5. Programme management structure

• Crossrail’s vision from the outset was to safely
build a world class railway for London

• Programme director was appointed by
Crossrail to lead an integrated delivery team
made up of Crossrail, programme and project
staff and supply chain partners for design,
construction and implementation.

• Key to managing a programme of this scale
and complexity is the programme controls
process.

• Crossrail sought a collaborative relationship
with its principal contractors and the extended
supply chain

Figure 3: Programme Management Structure (Tucker, 2017)

Programme Governance

• Governance at 2 levels (Morris, 2017):
– Corporate Governance – established by Crossrail board establishes delegated

levels of authority for executive directors
– Programme Governance – sits below Corporate Governance and control the

Crosrail Project in accordance with the Delivery Strategy

• Programme Director responsible for maintaining programme governance and
ensuring successful delivery of new capabilities through projects (Morris, 2017)

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Jonathan Morris MEng – Crossrail Ltd

Jonathan Morris is the Programme Integration Manager at
Crossrail. He is responsible for ensuring the integration of the
end-to-end railway operates within a clear programme
governance structure, and assuring that critical integration
issues that support testing and commissioning and handover are
identified and resolved in a consistent strategy across the
Crossrail organisation. Jonathan started his career in project
management in airports and subsequently moved into
programme advisory. He now specialises in programme
governance, strategic planning, and performance management
on major complex programmes where he brings over 13 years
experience to bear. He has been with Crossrail since February
2014.

ABSTRACT

The Crossrail Project is a very large and complex programme with tight timescales. This
document provides an overview of the programme governance framework used at Crossrail to
control the leadership, decision-making, reporting and management of the Crossrail Project to
achieve its objective to deliver a world-class integrated end-to-end railway, and some of the
lessons learned.

READ THE FULL DOCUMENT

Introduction
Programme management is the coordinated implementation of a set of related projects and
transformation activities in order to achieve an outcome that realises its intended benefits.

During the lifecycle of a programme a series of projects will be initiated, delivered and closed.
Programme management complements project management by providing an umbrella under
which projects can be coordinated, and their outputs and capability transitioned into operations,
whilst maintaining the performance and effectiveness of delivery. It integrates and reconciles
multiple interdependencies to manage competing demands by the projects through providing a
context and control framework for the overall programme.

Programme governance is about controlling the work: the control framework of individuals,
authorities and forums through which a programme can deliver its objectives whilst remaining
within corporate visibility and control.

Any programme needs clear and transparent governance if it is to be successful.

Programme Governance Approach
Crossrail is a very large and complex programme that must deliver a safe operable integrated
end-to-end railway, on time and on budget, to the requirements set by the Sponsors. CRL
(Crossrail Limited) is the nominated undertaker appointed and funded by the Sponsors to
manage and implement the Crossrail Project as defined in the Project Development Agreement
(PDA) in accordance with an agreed Delivery Strategy. Its governance must be clear where
responsibility and accountability rests, and how decisions are made in a controlled way. Crossrail
has defined its governance at two levels:

Corporate Governance – established by the Crossrail Board which sets out delegated
authority levels for the Board, its committees and subcommittees as well as the scheme of
delegated authorities for the executive directors of CRL.

Programme governance – which sits beneath this and constitutes all the forums which, in
aggregate, control the Crossrail Project in accordance with the Delivery Strategy.

The diagram below illustrates the CRL Programme Management Framework, and the relationship
between the CRL Delivery Strategy and its Stage Delivery programme and opening baselines:

Figure 1 – CRL Programme Management Framework

The Programme Director is responsible for both establishing and maintaining programme
governance, and ensuring successful delivery of the new capabilities through the projects in
accordance with the CRL Delivery Strategy. He is supported in discharging his responsibilities
through support offered by both the Programme Controls and Integration teams to assure that:

1. Overall integrity and coherence of the programme is maintained

2. Strategic drivers are extended into the governance of projects

3. Projects are not detached or misaligned from the CRL Delivery Strategy

4. Risk profiles and thresholds for both the programme and projects are acceptable

5. Decision making on resolving directional issues between interdependent projects is informed
by both the latest intelligence, and the CRL Delivery Strategy

6. Focus is maintained on the achievement of the ultimate programme mission

Both the Programme Controls and Integration teams provide programme intelligence at the
Programme Leadership level, including the highlighting and drawing together of common themes
from across the CRL Project, and proactively making suggestions for improvements in the timely
direction of the delivery of the new capabilities required, in accordance with the CRL Delivery
Strategy. The principal place this is done is the Programme Delivery Board (PDB).

The diagram below illustrates Crossrail’s Programme Governance Map, showing relationships
between its key directorates, programme controls team, executive directors and the
Infrastructure Managers.

Figure 2 – Crossrail Governance Map

Programme governance is discharged through forums comprised of the individuals who have the
expertise and delegated authority to facilitate the delivery of CRL’s obligations. Ultimately delivery
is by CRL’s Industry Partners, and its supply chain, so effective governance must extend to
management of those in a manner, and to an extent, appropriate to each relationship. This is
consistent with the needs of a programme of the scale and complexity of Crossrail. The diagram
below illustrates the key forums that are delivered by each directorate across Crossrail:

Figure 3 – Crossrail Programme – Meetings Map

Lessons Learned
Crossrail has always had comprehensive programme governance in place since CRL was set-up.
The principal lesson that has been learned is the benefit of maintaining a clear overarching
programme governance structure, articulated in a single document that is regularly reviewed by
the programme leadership team. Further:

Decisions must be informed by the right breadth of scope at the right subsidiary level

Decisions can only be made by individuals with the appropriate delegated authority

Forums must form a clear and simple hierarchy:
Each must have a clear purpose and objectives

Membership will be established against these – it should be clear to all why they are there

Escalations of issues for decisions, where necessary, must be through a clearly defined
route

Gaps or overlaps of scope must be avoided

Business must be structured, efficient, recordable and traceable

Reporting must be simple, accurate and timely (even with complex inputs from many
sources)

Terms of reference must be clear, concise, transparent, in a standard Crossrail format, and
widely accessible, as well as approved by the more senior forum

Any changes to the programme governance structure, including the establishment or disbanding
of forums, must be notified to the Programme Director, and the whole governance structure
should be reviewed for efficiency and fitness-for-purpose whenever there is an impending step-
change in the programme lifecycle, or otherwise at a minimum of every 6 months.

Recommendations for Future Projects
CRL would recommend that future major projects:

Produce and maintain an overarching programme governance framework throughout the
lifecycle of the programme

Standardise and formalise governance in a single document

Ensure consistency of Terms of References in a standard format for all meetings and forums
throughout the organisation, and maintain all of these in a central repository

Ensure that the principal Programme Delivery Board (PDB) is focussed on reviewing progress
towards achieving a successful transition of the programme into operations (in CRL’s case,
staged opening) and not just reviewing the delivery progress of the whole portfolio of projects

Review the whole governance structure for efficiency and fitness-for-purpose whenever there
is an impending step-change in the programme lifecycle, or otherwise at a minimum of every
6 months

Ensure Technical Authority is coordinated across all works, including railway systems, rolling
stock and depots, in a single forum that assures the integration against the programme
requirements.

Regularly assure all of the most complex interfaces at a programme level, using a risk based
approach, and reviews its Delivery Strategy annually

Take a “Programme Intelligence” view to programme governance and assurance – this
consists both of delivery intelligence (provided by the PMO on cost/risk/schedule) and
technical intelligence (collective performance of the railway in assuring that all functional and
physical interfaces are on course to perform as the Requirements) at opening.

Remember that programme management is most effective when issues are debated freely
and risks evaluated openly.

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Author: Jonathan Morris MEng
Publication Date: 02/08/2018

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Figure 4: Programme Management Framework and Relationship between Delivery Strategy and Its Stage Delivery (Morris, 2017)

The Business Case and Benefits

• Benefits included within the Business Case included (Bennett, 2017):
– time savings, international connections, regeneration, social exclusion, town centre

regeneration, regional access, strategic interchange, capacity, congestion relief

• The first version for which costs were identified was that in the London Rail Study of
1974 with a predicted cost of £300m. The Central London Rail Study (CLRS) of 1989 put
Crossrail at the top of its “To Do” list of 3 schemes with costs of £1.4bn and a Benefit-
Cost Ratio (BCR) of 1.6:1

• The Business Case presented in July 2003 had a BCR of 1.99:1 for the 2003 ‘Preferred
Route’.

• The scheme, as revised following the Montague Review in 2004 and submitted in the
Crossrail Bill, had a slightly lower BCR of 1.8:1 largely due to the decision to terminate
the south eastern route at Abbey Wood, rather than Ebbsfleet.

• In 2004, The Crossrail business case considered the wider Economic Benefits that
increased the BCR 2.60:1 include within the business case were derived from improved
employment benefits and productivity improvements (Gannon, 2008).

– For instance estimates in the central area are for 5,000-13,000 2006 rising to 23,000-40,000 jobs by 2026.

• According to Buck(2017) the case was made on:
– Mayor’s analysis of London’s developed that predicted high growth
– High potential to develop London’s service sector

Crossrail Learning Legacy Framework

• Project and Programme Management (PPM) learning legacy seeks to share
the policies, processes and procedures used successfully on the Programme
for possible use or modification by future projects and programmes.

• For more information on Crossrail and its Learning Legacy documents click on
the link below

https://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/about-learning-legacy/learning-
legacy-framework/

References

• Bennett S (2017) Crossrail project to deliver London’s Elizabeth line: from options to
parliamentary bill. https://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/documents/crossrail-project-
deliver-londons-elizabeth-line-options-parliamentary-bill/ Date accessed 10 January
2022.

• Buck M (2017) Crossrail Project: Finance, Funding and Value Capture for London’s
Elizabeth Line. https://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/1C-
002-Finance-Funding-and-Value-Capture.pdf Date accessed 10 January 2022.

• Building News (2020) Crossrail cost to top £19bn as bosses confirm 2022 opening.
https://www.building.co.uk/news/crossrail-costs-to-top-19bn-as-bosses-confirm-2022-
opening/5107598.article. Date accessed 10 January 2022.

• Crossrail Learning Legacy Programme (2019)
https://www.crossrail.co.uk/benefits/crossrail-learning-legacy/. Date accessed 10 January
2022

• Crossrail Learning Legacy (2019), https://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk. Date accessed
10 January 2022

• Gannon M.J. (2008). Crossrail. Focus. The Journal of the Chartered Institute of Logistics
and Transport, Transport Planning and Policy Special Supplement, Volume 10, Number
11, pp. XVII-XX11 November 2008. ISSN 1466-836X.

References

• The Appraisal and Business Case for Crossrail (2019).
https://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/documents/appraisal-business-case-crossrail/.
Date accessed 10 January 2022.

• Morris J (2018) Crossrail Programme Governance.
https://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/documents/crossrail-programme-governance/ .
Date accessed 10 January 2022.

• Project and Programme Management (2019).
https://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/learning-legacy-themes/project-and-programme-
management/. Date accessed 10 January 2022

• Tucker W (2017) Crossrail project: the execution strategy for delivering London’s
Elizabeth line. https://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/documents/execution-strategy-
delivering-londons-elizabeth-line/. Date accessed 10 January 2022.

• Wright S and Palczynski R (2017). Crossrail programme organization and management
for delivering London’s Elizabeth line. https://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/1R-001-Programme-organisation-and-management.pdf. Date
accessed 10 January 2022.

1

in the early 1990s – a 22% fall. The  population then recovered
rapidly through the following decade, subsequently surpassing the
previous high, reaching 8·7 million in 2015. The combined effect
of the growing population and strong economic performance of
the professional and financial services industries elevated Crossrail
from a long-standing aspiration to a necessity.

Following a failed attempt to promote Crossrail in the 1990s, Cross
London Rail Links Ltd (CLRL) was formed in 2002 to develop new
proposals (Figure 1). CLRL was a legally separate vehicle initially
owned on a 50:50 basis by the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA)
(succeeded by DfT directly) and TfL. While CLRL’s main function at
that point was to support the preparation of the parliamentary hybrid
bill to provide the powers for the project, CLRL was also tasked with
developing options for delivery of the project.

CLRL engaged financial adviser Bank of America and legal
adviser Ashurst and undertook a wide-ranging review of the
funding and finance options and delivery models available.
The  resulting Crossrail Business Case (Cross London Rail Links
Limited, 2003) was presented to the then Secretary of State for
Transport, Alistair Darling, in July 2003.

He announced that the government supported the principle
of a new east–west Crossrail link, but wanted to be assured that
CLRL’s proposal was deliverable and financeable. He appointed a
review team, led by Adrian Montague (formerly deputy chairman

1. Introduction

At the outset of the establishment of the Crossrail project to
deliver the new Elizabeth line east–west railway across London,
the UK government’s preferred delivery model was a privately
financed concession. When this proved to be unachievable the
Treasury capped the contribution from the central exchequer at
around a third of the overall cost, requiring the remaining funding
to be generated from the ‘beneficiaries’ of the project.

The Department for Transport (DfT) and Transport for London
(TfL) – together the ‘sponsors’ – collaborated with the business and
property development communities in London to assemble a finance
and funding package. The quality of the cost estimate together with
the confidence generated by the risk analysis enabled the sponsors
to make the political and financial commitments necessary.

In turn, the certainty of funding provided the project company
with a high level of financial stability and covenant to proceed and
sustain the project.

2. Background

Following the Second World War, London’s population shrank
from a peak of around 8·6  million to a low point of 6·7  million

Crossrail project: finance, funding and
value capture for London’s Elizabeth line
Martin Buck FICE FRICS
Director, Crossrail Limited (2003–2016), London, UK

The £14·8 billion Crossrail project to deliver the new Elizabeth line east–west railway across London is the UK’s largest
transport project. Getting it into reality was only possible through an innovative programme of finance, funding and
value capture, which saw London business and future passenger revenues contribute approximately two thirds of
the cost. This paper sets out the experience and lessons learned from the funding structure established to enable the
Crossrail project to proceed.

Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers
http://dx.doi.org/10.1680/jcien.17.00005
Paper 1700005
Received 06/02/2017 Accepted 19/06/2017
Keywords: government/local government/public policy

Civil Engineering

Crossrail project: finance, funding and value
capture for London’s new Elizabeth line
Buck

ICE Publishing: All rights reserved

Figure 1. 2003 Preferred route

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project was the then mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, with the
senior management team at TfL.

The office of Mayor of London was created with the GLA in
2000. Following the abolition of the Greater London Council in
1986 London had been administered by a range of joint boards
and other government agencies, and it is arguable that without the
single point focus provided by the office of mayor the arrangements
put in place to enable the Crossrail project would not have been
possible.

The mayor’s office together with TfL coordinated the case for
the Crossrail project. While the project had a positive 2:1 ratio on
the public sector’s traditional cost–benefit analysis calculation, the
mayor’s chief economic adviser Bridget Rosewell was instrumental
in developing that case into a commercial vision for business in
London. That in turn, coupled with the close involvement of
London First, an influential business-based lobby group, resulted in
an unprecedented level of involvement of the business community
in the promotion of the project.

According to Rosewell (personal communication), ‘The case
for Crossrail had to be made by a wide variety of stakeholders,
from business interests to local communities. It  also needed to
be accepted by the Treasury and the DfT, and the acceptance
of non-transport benefits to the London economy was crucial.
The  realisation that Crossrail created real additional outputs –
“agglomeration benefits” – and that gridlock on the system would
happen without it was central to this’.

While the DfT was an interested party through its agency the
SRA, which co-owned the project company CLRL with TfL,
Crossrail lacked a clear champion at central government level until
Darling moved from the Treasury to the DfT. In his previous role
he was reported to have been firmly against the project on cost
grounds but then seemingly warmed to the proposal when the
potential for alternative funding became apparent.

Also key to moving the project forward in the early years was
London First. At  that time London was already enjoying the
benefit of several years of growth on the back of financial and
commercial services. The chronic under-investment in the London
Underground rail network was being addressed through a public–
private partnership (PPP) programme but London First was a very
active and vocal voice in advocating that continued growth would
only be sustained with a major step change investment along the
lines of Crossrail. Crucially, London First also formed a very
influential voice back into the business community by making the
case that business would need to step up and make a contribution if
the project were to go ahead.

‘The effort made to engage with stakeholders before 2007
was very important. The alliance of a Labour mayor and London
business community proposing a supplement to the existing
business rate, effectively a hypothecated tax, was compelling’, said
Julian Ware, senior principal of commercial finance, TfL.

4. Business case and investment model

Making the case for Crossrail progressed on two fronts:
GLA/TfL’s analysis of London’s development, which projected
significant growth in both population and jobs, and the high
potential to develop London’s service sector – already the most
productive in the UK. GLA/TfL argued that London was more

of Network Rail and chief executive of the Treasury Taskforce), to
assess this.

The Crossrail Review published in July 2004 (Montague, 2004)
set out a number of findings, noting that the scheme was expected
to cost in the region of £10 billion at the first quarter of 2003 prices
– approximately £17 billion nominal outturn – which it considered
to be ‘acceptable value for money’. Significantly on funding, the
report also noted ‘doubt as to the available market capacity in the
construction and financial sectors to support a project of this size’
(Montague, 2004: p. 2).

The report though went on to note, ‘London business interests
appear ready to contribute significant amounts, in the range
of £2,000  million to perhaps £3,000  million NPV [net present
value], to the project by way of Alternative Funding Mechanisms’
(Montague, 2004: p. 2). This indication of substantial contribution
from business sources proved to be a pivotal moment in the funding
case for Crossrail. It had crossed the threshold from why should the
project be undertaken to how and when.

The significant question of how such a contribution could be
realised and whether it would be sufficient to bridge the substantial
funding gap still remained, with Darling noting in his written
statement to parliament that, ‘a major funding challenge remains’
(Hansard, 2004: col. 23WS) and that, ‘those who benefit from
Crossrail should contribute substantially to its delivery’ (Hansard,
2004: col. 24WS).

It was clear from the Crossrail Business Case and the Crossrail
Review that the scale of the project was too great (and potentially
too complex) for a conventional privately financed solution. CLRL
therefore commissioned a second report, this time from legal advisors
Ashurst, Royal Bank of Scotland, and insurance brokers and risk
assessors Marsh, to establish a more detailed business model through
which CLRL (as delivery vehicle on behalf of DfT and TfL) would
propose to act as the delivery vehicle for the project on a principally
public procured (as opposed to private-finance initiative) solution.

The business model published in 2004 effectively established
the blueprint for an empowered, publicly owned quasi-independent
delivery vehicle for the project. This was a relatively novel approach
at the time. In due course, CLRL became the nominated undertaker
vested with the statutory powers to undertake the scheme, and with
the transfer of 100% ownership to TfL in December 2008, a formal
governance structure and legal arrangements for a successor
company, Crossrail Ltd (CRL), were put in place reinforcing its
powers and quasi-independent status as a subsidiary of TfL.

It remained for the sponsors to crystallise the case for such a
large investment, and in July 2006 the Greater London Authority
(GLA) and TfL set out the case for investment based on growth,
productivity gains assessed around the context of the agglomeration
effects of additional transport provision.

CRL and the sponsors worked with the government and respective
stakeholders to reduce the cost of the project by around £2 billion
and assemble a funding structure endorsed in the government’s
comprehensive spending review of 2007. Further background is
available on the Crossrail Learning Legacy website (Crossrail, 2017).

3. Political and stakeholder support

As with any public investment of such a large-scale, political
support was imperative. The  main political champion for the

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5. Cost estimate and risk analysis

As with any project, the cost estimate for Crossrail evolved with
the development of the scheme. A significant challenge for CLRL
was to maintain alignment between the engineering development
and the cost estimate as aspects of the project progressed at
different rates. The  approach to estimation of costs also had to
evolve over time, with global and elemental provisions being
developed into more refined estimates as the design developed into
more measureable detail.

However, it is important to note that at an early stage, any cost
estimate can only be an approximation based on the information
that is known at the time. Given the complexity of Crossrail
there were aspects in which the areas of uncertainty exceeded the
elements that could be determined and measured. The  areas of
uncertainty were evaluated in a risk model to produce a probability
based forecast of overall cost.

5.1 Learning point
An approach which worked well at this stage was to avoid

too much complexity too soon. Suggestions to adopt tools from
elsewhere were resisted in favour of simple models tailored to
address only the specific issues needed at that time. So, for example,
the investment model comprised simple Excel spreadsheets while
the risk model worked on approximately 200 items. Accordingly,
the results produced by the respective models could be easily
validated and errors recognised and corrected.

6. Funding and finance mechanisms

To distinguish between the terms ‘funding’ and ‘finance’,
‘funding’ is used in the sense of money that is available to use at
the time of the expenditure, that is during the course of the project
– typically this is a government grant that does not have to be paid
back or serviced thereafter. ‘Finance’ is used when money has to be
raised or borrowed and ultimately paid back through some form of
debt mechanism.

productive for a variety of reasons. Distinctive, high value
industries enable London’s employers to attract people with high
levels of skills and education, but other factors were important in
making London successful.

For example, the services industries in London were productive
due to close clustering, access to wide labour markets was an
important determinant to employers’ willingness to locate in
central London, and access to housing was essential to widen and
deepen labour markets. GLA/TfL’s case demonstrated the ability
and fit of Crossrail both to serve that growth and relieve other
bottlenecks.

Although by 2003 a ‘benchmark scheme’ had established the
basis of the east–west railway under the centre of London, the scale
and extent of Crossrail to the east and west of the central area was
the subject of intense debate. Concerns over affordability and the
demand of funds over time meant that all opportunities to reduce
the cost and improve the value for money had to be explored.

The review of options was informed by the development of an
investment model constructed to illustrate the effect of phasing or
staging respective parts of the project relative to one another and
over time. While the model was high level and based only on the
relatively early stage cost data available at the time, the resultant
scenario testing enabled the scale and pace of the project to be
judged against a range of affordability profiles.

As a result of the options appraisal, the Crossrail scheme
took on a very different shape, with the south-west branch being
abandoned and the south-east branch ending at Abbey Wood
to reduce costs while the western branch was extended to serve
Maidenhead, providing significant additional benefits at relatively
low cost (Figure  2). Options to phase or stage the separate
elements of the project did not prove of value and were not
adopted. More detail on the appraisal process and results can be
found in a separate paper (Bennett, 2017).

4.1 Learning point
Understanding and modelling the impact of different options on

cost and the timing of funding enabled CLRL to test the ‘benchmark
scheme’ and inform the selection of a more affordable solution.

Figure 2. Bill route

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transformative value of Crossrail to the business community
through both improved access for existing staff and access to an
additional 1·5 million people brought within a 45 minute commute
of central London.

Improved access was expected to produce a step-change through
the clustering agglomeration effects, now recognised as key drivers
in productivity and development, by driving traffic towards cluster
sites. For  retail businesses, there would be the added value of
improved access for customers travelling into central London and
the West End.

Early estimates indicated that the potential for business
contributions could be £2–3 billion but collecting sums of that scale
would not be achieved through voluntary contributions. To engage
the business community GLA and TfL worked with London First
to host a series of meetings and workshops to test sentiment and
rally support. Key at that stage was the strong government message
that, without a significant contribution from London business, the
project would not happen. Early dialogue established the need for
contributions to be equitable and fair.

The GLA’s preferred mechanism was to levy an incremental
supplement through the national non-domestic rate (i.e. business
rates) – to be known as business rate supplement (BRS). A number
of hurdles were overcome, the levy needed primary legislation,
the Treasury had to agree to its hypothecation for the Crossrail
project, and BRS itself would be levied by the mayor and the
GLA. Following the legislation being passed and a consultation
process in the latter part of 2009, the GLA published the proposed
arrangements in a final prospectus issued in January 2010 (GLA,
2010) (Figure 3).

In April 2010, the mayor of London levied a £0·02 supplement
on business rates for properties of a rateable value over £55 000
per annum, with this threshold ensuring that smaller premises
were exempt and the burden would fall on the larger businesses
which were more able to absorb the cost, and most of which were
along the line of the proposed route in any case. The BRS generates
around £225 million per annum, which for the GLA could support
borrowing of around £3·5 billion. The levy is expected to fall away
once the bonds are fully repaid, which is forecast to be in the 2030s.

8.1 Learning point
The mayor’s adoption of BRS was not an insubstantial risk.

Besides the attendant political risk of imposing a levy across the
city region, the mayor had to determine the rate to be applied,
ensure the collection and underwrite the subsequent bond letting
process to meet the funding commitments to the project.

The attractiveness of the BRS was that, as a supplement to an
existing taxation base, it was easily levied and collected, and the
proceeds were very predictable – the income realised has slightly
exceeded TfL’s forecasts. This predictability also made it relatively
easy to raise capital to be repaid through its proceeds.

9. Beneficiaries: property developers

Property developers, both existing and prospective, stood to gain
substantially from the proximity of their land and buildings to the
new railway. Particular among these were Canary Wharf Group,
the owners of the Canary Wharf estate in Docklands, and Berkeley
Group, owners of the Woolwich Arsenal estate in Woolwich

The Crossrail Review had expressed doubt that a privately
financed proposition could be supported in the market but pointed
to business interests being ready to contribute through ‘alternative
funding mechanisms’.

DfT had identified grant funds of approximately £5  billion
for Crossrail, and GLA and TfL had identified approximately
£2 billion that could be made available through borrowing against
future revenue income (that is fares) and by reprioritising other
aspects of its capital investment programme – this left a very
substantial funding gap. The government had said that the scheme
would only proceed with a substantial contribution from those who
would benefit most from it.

How and in what form would that contribution be secured and
made available to the project? While funding infrastructure through
a combination of costs on direct users (i.e. fares) and through
general taxation (i.e. grants) was common place, tapping the
indirect beneficiaries on anything like the scale proposed had not
been done before.

7. Managing cost

In 2004 the gap between the cost of the project – around
£17 billion – and the funds available from the sponsors was between
£8 billion and £10 billion. The first target for CLRL was to seek to
reduce that gap through cost savings or value engineering and to
assure all stakeholders that the cost estimates were confident and
robust. Through a critical review of the operational requirements
and further development of the design, savings of £2 billion in cost
and risk reductions were identified.

7.1 Learning points
At this early stage, the involvement of operationally experienced

staff enabled aspects of the engineering to be challenged and in
some cases eliminated. For example, the base scheme incorporated
two crossovers in each direction within the underground tunnelled
section of the railway. Crossovers enable trains to move from one
track to the opposite track but these are hugely complex structures to
construct, with significant risk in engineering, cost and time terms.

The operating team determined that, in practice, there were few
if any scenarios in which the train service would be re-routed by
means of the opposite track and the number of crossovers was
reduced to one in each direction. Similarly, the operator challenged
the complexity of the tunnel ventilation system and led the process
to secure agreement of the respective authorities to a reduced
number of shafts along the tunnelled route.

Also, it should be expected that the cost estimate will start high
when budgetary and provisional estimates reflect the immature level
of knowledge of both the work required and the risk associated. Over
time the costs – along with uncertainty – should reduce as the early
estimates are replaced by more empirical ‘bottom up’ cost estimates
with improved judgement around the probability and impact of risk.
If early contingency provisions are not rigorous, costs may rise.

8. Beneficiaries: business community

Identifying the beneficiaries was informed by the work previously
discussed in Section 6. The  business case analysis illustrated the

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9.1 Learning point
In both of the above cases the risk to both the project and

the developers was significant. The  developer was investing
substantial sums of money and effort into constructing a railway
station that was not going be operational for several years, while
failure by the developer to meet deadlines set by the project
could result in delays to the critical tunnelling and railway works.
Deals of this complexity could not have been done at every
station: reaching agreement on acceptable terms required both
developer and project to deploy very sophisticated engineering
and commercial skills, and each location should be considered on
a case by case basis.

More generally, Crossrail was expected to generate development
across London. Traditionally, developers seeking planning
permission for significant commercial developments would enter
into a section 106 agreement with the local authority, serving as

(Figure 4), both of which would experience substantial uplift in the
development potential as a result of the railway.

The Canary Wharf Group were early movers lobbying strongly
for Crossrail to be built and agreeing first to build the proposed
station at Canary Wharf, and also to make a contribution of
£150 million towards the cost. In return, government granted rights
for Canary Wharf Group to develop retail and leisure above the
station (Figure 5).

Siting a station at Woolwich had originally been rejected on
the grounds of cost, inability to provide for freight trains to use
the tunnel under the Thames to North Woolwich, and its potential
to cannibalise the traffic generated by the recently completed
extension of the Docklands Light Railway to Woolwich.

When the House of Commons hybrid Bill select committee
instructed the promoter to provide a station at Woolwich, the
Berkeley Group – in the partially developed estate where a
station would be sited – and the London Borough of Greenwich
collaborated with CLRL to make a proposal to government to
construct the station. Initially, the agreement provided for the
construction of a station box which would support a residential
development above. A subsequent agreement provided for the cost
of fitting out the station to be met between the developer and the
sponsors.

Figure 3. Business rate supplement prospectus

Local government
Transport for London

direct funding £1.9 billion

Central government
Department for Transport
direct funding £4.8 billion

Overall funding envelope

£14·8 billion

Business rate supplement, borrowing
and direct contributions £4.1 billion

Community infrastructure levy
£300 million

Sale of surplus land and property
£500 million

Developer contribution £300 million

Fundraising for which
Transport for London

is responsible £5.25 billion

City of London committed funding
£250 million

Heathrow Airport Limited £70 million

Voluntary funding from London
businesses £100 million

Fundraising for which
Department for Transport
is responsible £480 million

Network Rail financing for work
on the existing network £2·3 billion

Figure 4. Final sources of funding

Figure 5. Aerial view of Woolwich Station with Berkeley Homes
oversite developments

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to Crossrail. GLA  raised funding against the projected income
generated through the BRS and the CIL. The GLA and TfL credit
rating of AA+ enabled funds to be secured at very attractive rates
of interest compared to TIF or other project finance instruments
because the income was much more secure.

Irrespective of the Crossrail programme, TfL had itself been
granted wider powers to raise debt independently of the central
exchequer and an AA+ credit rating gave it access to very attractive
funding (TfL had already established lines of bond credit with the
European Investment Bank). TfL evaluated the options and rejected
the TIF option electing itself to absorb the risk of the BRS receipts
and retain the margin over the cheaper bond finance. Through a
series of bond issues TfL has raised £3·5 billion of debt with an
initial tenure of 15 years repayment.

Bringing all of the different sources together illustrates
that London, in the form of business and property receipts, is
contributing approximately a third of the cost of the project.

12.1 Learning point
While the different methods of value capture have produced a

large contribution to the cost of the project, the requirement to
turn future receipts into usable funds for the project required TfL’s
substantial corporate standing to underwrite the income and secure
the debt on acceptable terms.

13. Other funding: redevelopment over stations

The railway incorporates the construction of nine new stations,
a number of which required the acquisition of substantial property
to enable the construction works to take place. The parliamentary
powers for Crossrail had to incorporate provisions for compulsory
purchase of the required property so that they could be demolished
for the construction of the stations and respective entrance
facilities.

CLRL worked with the respective stakeholders to ameliorate
some of the concern around the compulsory purchase arrangements
through offering to collaborate over the subsequent redevelopment
of the sites (Figure 6).

13.1 Learning point
By adopting a collaborative approach with the existing property

owners CLRL removed much of the potential resistance to the
compulsory purchase process and gained the benefit of the
specialist redevelopment skills of the existing owners. A separate
paper in Crossrail Learning Legacy will describe the collaborative
arrangement Crossrail put in place with the developers.

The redevelopment value was estimated at £550 million, which
the mayor underwrote as part of TfL’s contribution to Crossrail’s
funding package. A  study commissioned by delivery company
Crossrail Limited (CRL) – which replaced CLRL in 2007 –
estimated the uplift in land values within 1 km of Crossrail
stations between 2010 and 2020 (the railway opens in 2018) to
be £5·5  billion (Crossrail, 2012). While this is a very positive
reinforcement of the case for constructing Crossrail, the estimate
illustrates the very low level of value captured (approximately
10% in this case) by the public sector – the remaining 90%
accruing as windfall gains to the owners of the properties
impacted.

a voluntary contribution to related social infrastructure. These
are private agreements made between local authorities and
developers, attached to planning permissions, that make acceptable
developments that would otherwise be unacceptable in planning
terms, based on that section of the Town and Country Planning Act
1990. For Crossrail, the government extended those powers in the
form of a community infrastructure levy (CIL), which is a lump
sum on each completed development.

The CIL provided for the mayor of London to impose an
additional levy on both commercial and private residential
development, which as with the BRS would be hypothecated to
Crossrail. The rate applied is between £20/m2 and £50/m2 dependent
on the area of the city, and is set at the mayor’s discretion. The levy
for each location is set at the time of planning consent but is only
payable on completion of the development. After a slow start, the
CIL was generating £100 million a year by 2015–2016.

10. Beneficiaries: Heathrow Airport

Public transport access is a significant factor in the continuing
growth of Heathrow Airport (owned and operated by Heathrow
Airport Holdings Limited (HAHL), formerly British Airports
Authority (BAA)). Routing a branch from the western leg of the
railway into Heathrow Airport central terminals increased the
efficient use of the tunnel infrastructure constructed a decade
previously by BAA and substantially improved the capacity
provided by the existing Heathrow Express service.

Discussions with the Civil Aviation Authority established that
a contribution by HAHL on account of the improved surface
access would be admissible for inclusion in the regulated asset
base (RAB). This would then enable HAHL to recover the cost
through the airport landing charge. As a result, HAHL pledged a
contribution of £70 million to the project.

11. Beneficiaries: Corporation of London

The Corporation of London pledged to contribute £250 million
from organisations within the City of London.

12. Converting benefits to cash

An immediate problem in securing funds from beneficiaries is
that the money to invest in constructing the railway is required
before (in the case of Crossrail several years before) the benefits
begin to be realised – and even then, perhaps only with the
exception of a property disposal, the benefit is accrued over a long
period of time.

Not only would appropriate ways of collecting funds be needed
but a method would need to be found to convert the likely long-
term revenue stream into usable project funding. TfL analysis drew
on international experience of raising debt for public infrastructure,
with a US-style tax incremental financing (TIF), typically bonds
which carry the risk of actual incremental tax receipts, emerging as
a strong option.

The GLA’s and TfL’s balance sheet capacity and relatively low
level of borrowing enabled the mayor to provide substantial support

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15. Other funding: rolling stock and
maintenance depot

There was a well established market in the UK for train
manufacturers and other finance organisations to provide trains
and maintenance facilities on a service basis. While Crossrail
had a number of unique characteristics on account of the tunnel
alignments and length and capacity of trains, market consultation
suggested that there would be a good appetite for a private finance
initiative or PPP procurement.

As above, the £1·5 billion capital cost would be defrayed with
the cost of the train fleet and its upkeep in service remunerated
through availability payments by the operator after the start of the
service (Figure 7).

16. Passenger fares: operating surplus

As discussed, the ability of capital elements of the cost to be met
by the operator is dependent on the commercial performance of
the railway after the start of services. Crossrail’s funding case was
assisted by the high level of expected usage and revenue.

Based on forecasts at the time, Crossrail’s operating revenue
would cover the cost of operating the service, the track access
charges to Network Rail including repayment of the £2·3  billion
capital cost, repaying the £1·3  billion cost of the train fleet and
associated maintenance and providing a further surplus in the order
of £1·9 billion being applied to pay down TfL’s debt. Taking this
into account, it can be argued that Crossrail’s future passengers will
pay approximately a third of the cost of the project.

17. Formalising funding commitments

The various strands of the funding structure were developed in
principle over the course of 2005–2006 and subsequently developed
into a proposal submitted to government as part of the Treasury’s

14. Other funding: Network Rail

When the Elizabeth line is fully operational in 2019, nearly
100 km of the total 118 km route length will run over tracks on the
existing national railway, controlled by Network Rail. In the early
2000s Network Rail was rebuilding itself after the failure of its
predecessor Railtrack, and its stated priorities were elsewhere in
completing the West Coast main line upgrade and Thameslink – a
similar railway to Crossrail but substantially upgrading an existing
route running north–south across London. In  view of its other
strategic priorities, Network Rail declined to take a lead role in
the project but committed to collaborate with CRL to ensure the
necessary measures were put in place.

As part of the arrangements for constructing the railway the
sponsors applied for a track access option, a process under the
national railway regulatory process providing for Network Rail to
put in place the necessary infrastructure to support a future service
– this was an essential requirement to secure the commitment to
the investment in the central section.

The other limb of the arrangement with Network Rail was a
regulatory protocol approved by the Office of Rail Regulation in
November 2009. The protocol provided for the £2·3 billion cost of
the works to be financed by Network Rail for later incorporation
into the Network Rail RAB – in effect meaning that Crossrail would
not have to finance or fund the works but Network Rail would be
remunerated through a track access charge paid by the operator.

14.1 Learning point
The RAB-funded option was an effective way of defraying the

capital cost of the required works. The operating revenues of the
resultant service are forecast to be sufficient to cover the subsequent
access charges, which also accrue a return for Network Rail at the
regulatory rate.

Network Rail is also entitled to charge the ‘carry cost’ or interest
on the debt arising during the construction period and before access
charges start to flow – in Crossrail’s case the carry cost could not be
included in the amount financed by Network Rail and the interest
costs fell to the project.

Figure 6. Canary Wharf Station oversite development by Canary
Wharf Group

Figure 7. Tottenham Court Road Station eastern ticket hall –
theatre oversite development

Civil Engineering

8

Crossrail project: finance, funding and value
capture for London’s new Elizabeth line
Buck

Property development above and around station sites contributed
both directly to the cost of the project and indirectly through a
special ring-fenced levy applied across the city.

The forecast passenger numbers together with London’s
relatively high fare structure means that the future revenue income
will pay for operating the railway and allow certain capital costs
to be defrayed into the operating phase of the railway’s life cycle.
Future passenger revenues will meet the cost of upgrading the
existing national rail lines, meet the cost of the new trains and
the associated maintenance and provide a further surplus to repay
TfL’s debt.

In 2003, with access to central taxpayer funding closed off, the
funding gap looked daunting – tapping indirect beneficiaries on
such a scale had never been attempted before. Through a series of
separate but coherent measures, London was able to engage and
persuade the business community of both the necessity and the
value of the investment in the transport infrastructure.

The project proceeded and London will soon start to reap its
return on investment.

Acknowledgements

The author is very grateful for the assistance of Mark Fell,
legal director and company secretary, and Simon Adams, head of
commercial, Crossrail Limited; Shashi Verma, CIO and director
of customer experience, and Julian Ware, senior principal of
commercial finance, Transport for London; Bridget Rosewell of
Volterra Partners; and Mark Elsey of Ashurst.

comprehensive spending review 2007 process. During the review,
CLRL’s cost and risk analyses were subjected to rigorous review
by both the Treasury and external consultants and were found to
be robust.

On 5 October 2007 Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced a
£15·9 billion package and the signing of heads of terms detailing
the arrangements and sources of funding and providing for the
formation of CRL as the delivery vehicle for the project. The heads
of terms were developed into a suite of agreements between
the sponsors, CRL and respective stakeholders. The  funding
arrangements between the sponsors and CRL were embedded
within a project development agreement.

18. National Audit Office review

In January 2014 the National Audit Office published its report
(NAO, 2014) on Crossrail, noting that the project had been
established with an appropriate level of funding based on robust
estimates, and provided certainty of funding (Figure 8).

19. Conclusion

At time of writing, the Elizabeth line is forecast to open on time
and within its funding envelope, and London will soon start to
enjoy the full benefit of a huge investment.

This success has only been possible through an innovative
approach to funding, finance and value capture.

In 2003 the Crossrail Review endorsed the cost estimates, which
it considered to be value for money, but expressed ‘doubts about the
available market capacity in the construction and finance sectors to
support a project of this size’ (Montague, 2004: p. 2). In its response,
the government in turn expressed support for the project but noted
the funding challenge saying that ‘those who benefit … should
contribute substantially to its delivery’ (Hansard, 2004: col. 24WS).

London’s municipal and transport authorities, bolstered by the
creation of the GLA and the new mayor, developed a persuasive
and commercial case for investment by the business community in
the transport infrastructure in the city. Working with London First,
the mayor introduced a supplementary business rate with proceeds
ring-fenced to fund Crossrail.

References

Bennett S (2017) Crossrail project to deliver London’s Elizabeth line: from
options to parliamentary bill. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil
Engineers – Civil Engineering, http://dx.doi.org/10.1680/jcien.17.00006.

Cross London Rail Links Limited (2003) Crossrail Business Case. Crossrail Ltd,
London, UK.

Crossrail (2012) Property Impact Links. Crossrail Learning Legacy, London,
UK. See http://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/documents/property-impact-
study/ (accessed 06/02/2017).

Crossrail (2017) Project Initiation and Development. Crossrail Learning
Legacy, London, UK. See http://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/learning-
legacy-themes/project-and-programme-management/business-case/
(accessed 06/02/2017).

GLA (Greater London Authority) (2010) Paying for Crossrail: Business Rate
Supplement. GLA, London, UK. See https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-
do/business-and-economy/promoting-london/paying-crossrail-business-
rate-supplement (accessed 06/02/2017).

Hansard (2004) HC (series 6) vol. 424, part no. 23, cols 24WS–26WS (20 Jul.).

Montague A (2004) Crossrail Review. TSO, London, UK.

NAO (National Audit Office) (2014) https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2014/01/Crossrail-summary..pdf (accessed 06/02/17).

Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Chapter 8. Her Majesty’s Stationery
Office, London, UK.

How can you contribute?
If you would like to comment on this paper, please email up to 200 words
to the editor at [email protected].

If you would like to write a paper of 2000 to 3500 words about your own
experience in this or any related area of civil engineering, the editor will be
happy to provide any help or advice you need.Figure 8. Class 345 train at Bombardier factory

1

<TPa]X]V�[TVPRh
Lessons learned from the London
2012 Games construction project

Programme
Management

Abstract
London’s successful bid for the 2012
Olympic and Paralympic Games
created the need for a major
regeneration and construction
programme to provide the venues
and infrastructure needed to stage
the Games.

The programme of construction was
extensive, technically and politically
challenging. It was also up against
a!fixed deadline of the Opening
Ceremony of the Games in July 2012.
Turning the vision of the Olympic Bid
into the reality of roads, bridges and
stadia was the job of the Olympic
Delivery Authority (ODA), a!new
publicly funded body established by
an Act of Parliament in April 2006.

From its creation until the planned
completion of the majority of the
capital works a year ahead of the
Games, the ODA had just over five
years to staff up, procure and deliver
around £6 billion of major
construction works. The majority of
the construction works were to be
built on a largely derelict and
polluted site in Stratford, east London.
At the same time the ODA needed to
satisfy government, the media, local
residents and the public at large that
it was:
– providing value for money; and
– on track to provide both the

infrastructure required to stage the
Games, and a lasting legacy for a
relatively deprived part of London.

Authors
Kenna Kintrea
Head of Venues and Infrastructure
Programme, ODA

Association for Project Management
(APM)
Peer reviewer

Olympic Park looking south through the parklands

2

The ODA had five years
to staff up, procure and
deliver £6 billion of
major construction works.

Introduction
London’s successful bid for the 2012
Olympic and Paralympic Games
created the need for a major
regeneration and construction
programme to provide the venues
and infrastructure needed to stage
the Games.

The programme of construction was
extensive, technically and politically
challenging and up against a fixed
deadline of the Opening Ceremony
of the Games in July 2012. Turning
the vision of the Olympic Bid into the
reality of roads, bridges and stadia
was the job of the ODA.

From its creation until the planned
completion of the majority of the
capital works a year ahead of the
Games, the ODA had just over five
years to staff up, procure and deliver
around £6 billion (bn) of major
construction works. The majority of
the construction works were to be
built on a largely derelict and
polluted site in Stratford, east London.

At the same time the ODA needed to
satisfy government, the media, local
residents and the public at large that
it was:
– providing value for money; and
– on track to provide both the

infrastructure required to stage the
Games, and a lasting legacy for a
relatively deprived part of London.

Organisation Period Activity

London Development Agency a
(LDA)/ODA

Year 1 (2006–2007) Planning and land assembly

Olympic Delivery Authority Year 2 (to Beijing 2008) Demolish, dig, design

Year 3 (to 27 July 2009) ‘The big build’ (foundations)

Year 4 (to 27 July 2010) ‘The big build’ (structures)

Year 5 (to 27 July 2011) ‘The big build’ (completion)

London Organising Committee of the
Olympic and Paralympic Games

Year 6 (to 2012) Testing and commissioning, the
Olympic and Paralympic Games

Olympic Park Legacy Company 2012 onwards Conversion of the Olympic Park
and!venues to permanent legacy
configuration, re-opening the Park
to!the public

ODA scope and programme
The ODA’s programme of works
included:
– the deconstruction and land

remediation of approximately
a!400 hectare (ha) site;

– the master planning and
submission of approximately 950
individual planning applications;

– the construction of infrastructure –
around 20 kilometre (km) roads,
13km tunnels, 26 bridges, new
utilities infrastructure (water, gas,
electricity and telecommunications);

– the construction of 14 permanent
and temporary sporting venues
and a 12,000 square metre (m2)
broadcast centre and 29,000m2
media centres (for commercial use
after the Games);

– construction of the Athletes’ Village
(to be converted to 2,800 homes
for sale after the Games);

– the creation of approximately
100ha of parklands, gardens and
public open space; and

– transport improvements, including
station and infrastructure works.

The ODA budget (part of the overall
public sector funding package
agreed for the Games in March
2007) was set at £8bn, including
approximately £2bn of contingency.

Table 1: London 2012 construction and infrastructure: project phases (milestones published annually)

a The London Development Agency. Responsibility for the legacy development of the
Olympic Park was transferred to the Olympic Park Legacy Company in 2010.

3

The ODA Mission: to
deliver venues, facilities,
infrastructure and
transport for the London
2012 Olympic and
Paralympic Games on
time, to budget and to
leave a lasting legacy.

Strategic framework
With extensive public funding being
injected into the ODA it was to be
expected that its objectives would
go!beyond simply delivering a
programme of construction projects.
In particular, the UK government had
committed that the Games would
leave a lasting legacy for London
and the UK. The ODA translated
this!into the following Mission and
Objectives, agreed with members
of!the Olympic Board:

ODA Mission
‘To deliver venues, facilities,
infrastructure and transport for the
London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic
Games on time, to budget and to
leave a lasting legacy’.

ODA Objectives
– To create infrastructure and

facilities associated with Games’
venues to time and agreed budget
in accordance with the principles
of sustainable development.

– To deliver Olympic and Paralympic
venues to time, to design and
building specification, and to
agreed budget, providing for
agreed legacy use.

– To deliver the necessary transport
infrastructure for the Games, and
devise and implement effective
transport plans which provide for
legacy use.

– To assist the LDA in the finalisation
of sustainable legacy plans for the
Park and all venues.

ODA priority themes
In the execution of its objectives, the
ODA also committed to contribute to
the overall London 2012 vision of a
broad legacy of economic, social
and environmental benefits for
London and the UK. To realise this,
the ODA defined six ’priority themes’
to underpin its activity as set out
below.

Published policy documents and
strategies b, outlined strategic benefits
as well as specific objectives.

Priority themes were embedded as
a!fundamental part of the overall
programme governance.

Figure 1: ODA Strategic Framework

b The ODA’s priority theme strategies. Available from: www.london2012.com/about-us/
publications (accessed 10 February 2012).

4

The ODA delivery
strategy was based on
a smaller number of
important tenets.

Delivery strategy
The overarching strategy
The ODA delivery strategy was
based on a smaller number of
important tenets:
– Getting the right people with

delivery capability on board –
fast.

– Setting a realistic budget.
– Nailing down the scope,

programme, budget and funding
early and sticking to it.

– Early and prompt decision making
– saving time will save money.

– Strong programme management.
– Allowing industry partners to

deliver.
– Active risk management from start

to finish.
– Transparency and proactivity

in!internal and external
communications.

– Maintaining a collaborative
approach with government and
industry partners.

People and delivery capability
The ODA needed to move rapidly
through the planning phase to all-out
delivery. After initial staffing of ODA
key positions, it was decided to
employ a Delivery Partner (DP) with
experience of large-scale construction
projects and proven delivery
capability. The DP selected was a
private sector consortium, CLM,
comprising a partnership from the
three parent companies of CH2M
Hill, Laing O’Rourke and Mace.

The DP was appointed both as
the!ODA’s overall programme
management partner, but also having
responsibility as Project Manager for
the major construction projects. This
was preferred over the alternative
approach of separating project and
programme management as it was
judged that there were clear
synergistic benefits of a common
programme and project manager,
and that the potential for conflicts of
interest could be managed by virtue
of having the ODA in an overall
assurance role.

Figure 2: Delivery strategy

Sub-
programme
project
delivery

CLM

Supply chain

DP project
manager

Project
delivery team

DP project
manager

Project
delivery team

DP project
manager

Project
delivery team

DP project
manager

Project
delivery team

Programme
sponsorship

Programme
delivery

ODA

CLM

Priority theme
heads

Programme
assurance

heads
Commercial

director
DP sub-

programme
managers

DP
programme

director

DP
programme

controls

Project
sponsors

ODA
accountable

directors
LDA

ODA
programme
assurance

office

Executive
management

board

Senior
responsible

owner
(ODA CEO)

5

The Programme Baseline
Report was crucial in
bottoming out areas of
scope uncertainty at an
early stage.

The rapidly changing nature of the
programme, together with the DP
concept required a dynamic approach
to organisational design and resource
management. Joint reviews (ODA
and CLM) of organisational design
took place during the programme
life!with the objective of ensuring
constant alignment of client and DP
organisational models, skills and
resources.

Despite the finite lifecycle of the
ODA!the organisation recognised the
importance of investing in people to
build leadership capability, embed
team working and resilience, and
retain and motivate staff. A tailored
learning and development
programme was deployed that
included team building (especially
between the ODA and CLM), focused
skills development, mentoring and
health and wellbeing activities.

This programme was one of the
bedrocks of the ODA’s People
Strategy and positively impacted
retention, motivation and capability.

Nailing down scope, programme,
budget and funding
The ODA documented the
programme scope and submitted
it!with detailed budget assessments
to the Ministerial Funders Group
(Funders) and the Olympic Board for
approval. The resulting Programme
Baseline Report (PBR) (a detailed
500 page description of aligned
scope, programme, budget and risk)
was published in November 2007.

It identified the items that the ODA
planned to deliver, the allocation of
risk between the ODA and Funders
(to govern any subsequent
contingency allocations) and
importantly, those items which were
out of its scope. The development
of!this document was crucial in
bottoming out areas of scope
uncertainty at an early stage in the
programme and gave the ODA a
firm footing for delivery of the
programme.

Communications and stakeholder
engagement supporting delivery
The ODA understood at the outset
that there would be huge levels of
public interest in London 2012. It
also!recognised that the project could
only be delivered in partnership and
with the support of a large coalition
of organisations, many of whom had
differing interests. As a result, the
ODA adopted a highly proactive
and!systematic communications and
stakeholder management approach
from community and political
engagement, through to daily public
site visits and media opportunities.

The strategy was to:
– embrace transparency and ensure

complete alignment between
internal and external objectives;

– maintain a drumbeat of progress
with intense focus at big moments;
and

– recognise that ’seeing is believing’,
let success speak for itself and
allow as many people as possible
to see the Park for themselves.

Programme management
Work Breakdown Structure
A Work Breakdown Structure (WBS)
was defined to organise the scope
of!work and manage delivery and
monitoring of the programme, with
individual ’projects’ defined, typically
corresponding to a single venue (for
example, the Olympic Stadium) or
element of infrastructure (for
example, Utilities). Some ’projects’
such as Logistics and Security
provided programme-wide services
as this was determined to be the
most efficient delivery and
procurement model.

Planning and approvals
Objectives for the programme as a
whole were approved by government
via the PBR described earlier. This
also outlined the definition of
individual projects, which together
made up the totality of the ODA’s
scope. Following approval of the
PBR, individual project business cases
were developed and approved by
government. These established the
project objectives, overall design
parameters (including for legacy)
and cost targets.

6

Approval of the business case
initiated the release of individual
project budgets to the ODA.
Thereafter, a rigorous change control
process maintained the critical
relationship between scope, schedule
and budget and sought to manage
any emerging ’requirements creep’.

Programme control
Although delivery responsibility was
cascaded down to project level, all
key policies and processes were
determined and implemented at a
programme level. Thus, for example,
all projects followed a standard
approach for risk management, cost
and progress reporting and change
control.

Standardising project control and
reporting was of fundamental
importance in preserving control
of!the overall cost and schedule. It
provided a consistent approach to
project management and allowed
project level data to be easily rolled
up to programme level for overall
review of performance and likely
outcomes. This in turn gave
management key data to enable
tradeoffs of resources or targets to
be!made, to achieve programme
level objectives.

Monthly ’Implementation Reviews’
with senior management reviewed
the progress of every individual
project, and allowed a programme-
wide view of risks, issues and
resources to be taken.

Figure 4: Programme breakdown

Village Transport
Venues and park
infrastructure

Developer

Stratford
projects

Village
vertical

build sub
programme

Operational
and support

projects
Other

projectsOperations
Site

platform
projects

Venues

Transport
sub

programme

Delivery
partner

Transport delivery partnersDevelopment
manager

SCDL CLM

On Park
venues

Off Park
venues

Eton
Dorney

ODA ODA
transport TTL

BAA

Network
Rail

Boroughs Highways
Agency

Lend
lease

Olympic Delivery Authority

ODA
property

Z2-7
infrastructure

Stratford
property

Stratford
infrastructure

Z1
infrastructure

Programme management *

Interface management

Project management

Client representative

* CLM is responsible for programme managing
all other areas of the programme

7

Across all aspects of
managing integration
there were two key
elements; issue
identification and
issue resolution.

Integrated planning
There were several aspects to
managing integration across the
programme. These included
dependency management (schedule
logic/construction sequencing),
design management (coherent and
compatible solutions), physical
integration (for example, two or
more!projects need to be in the same
geographical place at the same time)
and change management
(consequential impact of scope or
schedule changes particularly across
project/organisational boundaries).

Across all aspects of managing
integration there were two key
elements; issue identification and
issue resolution.

Where issues were identified and
resolved within a single project, this
was managed within the project’s
meeting and governance structures.
Generally this involved the Tier One
contractor managing the interfaces
between its Tier Two contracts.

At a programme level additional
processes were required to manage
the cross-project interfaces to ensure
that consequential impacts were
identified and programme priorities
applied in resolution.

Where escalation was required,
then!the criticality of an issue was
assessed in terms of overall
programme impact (both schedule
criticality to key delivery milestones
and managing any ’bow-wave’ effect
of delay). A key requirement for this
was the integrated programme
schedule.

Integration issues and the potential
solutions were ranked in order of
impact upon key milestones (for
example, Venue Beneficial Possession).
This ensured that decisions were
prioritised and options assessed in
the programme (as opposed to an
individual project) context.

Figure 4: Interface management

8

Transparency of the
ODA’s governance and
assurance processes
helped provide
government with
confidence that the ODA
was delivering to plan.

Programme governance
and!assurance
From the outset the ODA instituted
processes and systems, meeting
structures and delegations to ensure
strategic direction, performance
management and value for money.

The DP was fully integrated into
all!aspects of governance, from
the!Executive Management Board
downwards, and was responsible
for!leading programme and project
delivery review meetings, with
participation from the ODA.

Stakeholder meetings were also
held!on every project and for each
priority theme to ensure that key
stakeholders were kept engaged
as!projects developed.

Successful delivery of the priority
theme targets was monitored monthly
by project as part of the overall
project progress review. Dedicated
Boards for each priority theme (with
ODA Board-level participation)
assured that at a programme level
the priority themes were achieving
the!targets, and where shortfalls
were forecast, helped deploy targets
or!resources to enable delivery.

Transparency of the ODA’s
governance and assurance processes
helped provide government and
other agencies with confidence that
the ODA was delivering to plan and
helped reduce outside intervention
into the ODA’s day-to-day work.

Benefits management
and the Learning Legacy
The majority of benefits generated
by!the ODA Programme delivering
venues and infrastructure will be
realised after the transformation from
Games format to legacy, through
future sporting and regeneration
uses. The management of the direct
benefits obtained from hosting the
London 2012 Games will lie with the
London Organising Committee of the
Olympic Games and Paralympic
Games (LOCOG) and HM
Government (Department for
Culture,!Media and Sport (DCMS)-
Government Olympic Executive
(GOE)). The legacy benefits will be
delivered by other agencies, such
as!the Lea Valley Regional Park
Authority (LVRPA) and the Olympic
Park Legacy Company (OPLC).

Figure 5: Programme governance and assurance

ODA board

Executive management
board

Change board Operations board

Procurement board Commercial board Project boards and
implementation reviews

Priority theme boards

Strategy
and policy
approvals

Issues resolution

9

By setting and achieving
ambitious targets for a
range of measures
across the themes, the
ODA believes it has
made a significant
impact.

The ODA’s design philosophy was to
’design for legacy and adapt for the
Games’ and thus the long-term usage
of the buildings and infrastructure
was the primary focus of design
and!construction, with legacy targets
being included in business cases and
design briefs. The ODA has worked
closely with the OPLC to ensure that
the platform left by the ODA is
aligned with OPLC’s legacy
aspirations for the Park.

Despite not being directly responsible
for delivery of the majority of benefits,
the individual project business cases
included anticipated benefits that
were agreed with government or the
responsible agency. As the projects
were completed, and the business
cases were formally closed out,
a benefits handover plan was
created per project to ensure that
responsibility for delivery of the
benefits was passed to the
responsible agency.

An area where the ODA clearly
aimed to provide lasting benefits was
through the delivery of its priority
theme objectives. In these areas the
ODA publicly declared an aspiration
to raise the bar in the UK construction
industry in areas such as Health and
Safety, Sustainability, Equality and
Diversity, and Employment and Skills.
By setting and achieving ambitious
targets for a range of measures
across the themes, the ODA believes
it has made a significant impact.

In order that the lessons learned,
innovation and best practice from
the!ODA’s experience is captured,
disseminated and used in future
projects the ODA has established a
’Learning Legacy’ project, working
with industry and academic partners.
This will be published through a
learning legacy website.

Conclusion
The ODA’s approach to programme management and organisation
did!not contain any one magic ingredient; rather it concentrated on the
establishment of a clear delivery strategy, maintaining a high level of
transparency to all stakeholders, clear definition of scope and focused
delivery.

The appointment of a DP allowed the!ODA flexibility and agility in
responding to the differing skills required at different stages of the
programme, and the effective partnership between the ODA and the DP
underpinned the success achieved in delivery of the objectives. A clear
separation of roles between the ODA and the DP gave the DP the
freedom to execute the programme, while retaining adequate oversight
and assurance from the ODA to satisfy stakeholders that the objectives
would be achieved.

Fully integrated programme management was crucial to ensure that the
complex programme of work delivered the programme-wide benefits the
ODA had committed to, and met the cost and delivery targets agreed
with government.